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Ruminations on Terrorism &
Anti-Terrorism Law & Literature
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY*
They never forgot
That even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course
Anyhow in a corner, some untidy spot
Where the dogs go on with their doggy life and the torturer's horse
Scratches its innocent behind on a tree.
Only God can tell the saintly from the suburban,
Counterfeit values always resemble the true;
Neither in Life nor Art is honesty bohemian,
The free behave much as the respectable do.'
* Christopher L. Blakesley is Professor of Law at the Boyd School of Law at the University
of Nevada at Las Vegas. He previously held the J.Y. Sanders Chair and was Professor of Law at
the Louisiana State University Law Center. He received a Doctorate (J.S.D.) and an LL.M. from
Columbia University; a J.D. from the University of Utah; an M.A. at the Fletcher School of
International Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; and a B.A. from the University of Utah. He
teaches International Law, Comparative Law, Comparative Criminal Law, Family Law, and
Terrorism. Prior practice was in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State
on matters of international criminal law, including terrorism, extradition, and mutual assistance in
criminal matters. Professor Blakesley has published several books, over twenty chapters in books,
and more than sixty major scholarly articles in American and foreign journals. He has been
elected to the American Law Institute. His works include: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CASES & MATERIALS; THE INDIVIDUAL FACING TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS; COMPARATIVE LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW; Women or Rights: How Should Women's
Rights Be Conceived & Implemented, in 2 WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; The
Impact of a Mixed Jurisdiction in Legal Education, in LOUISIANA: A MICROCOSM OF A MIXED
JURISDICTION: EXPLORING THE NATURE OF THE LOUISIANA LEGAL SYSTEM; Jurisdiction over
Extraterritorial Crime, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. Portions of this article are adapted
and updated from parts of chapters one and four of his book TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY.
1. W.H. Auden, NEW YEAR LETTER (1941).
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Violence shall synchronize your movements like a tune,
And Terror like a frost shall halt the flood of thinking.
Barrack and bivouac shall be your friendly refuge,
And racial pride shall tower like a public column
And confiscate for safety every private sorrow.2
INTRODUCTION
General. When an atrocity like that of September 11, 2001, occurs,
the rhetoric of those who conspired to cause it or who otherwise
prompted it is so venomous that it generates similar rhetoric and possi-
bly even similar conduct in reaction. Prior to September 11, we might
have refused to believe that human beings could actually commit such
acts upon others. How is it possible that leaders of nations or groups are
able to inflame hatred and fear in people to the point that some become
willing to destroy themselves along with those they see as infidels or
enemies? We cannot fathom what can cause individuals to fly planes
filled with innocent passengers as missiles into buildings also filled with
innocents. This article will attempt to fathom why.
I also address the dangers that face us because of our "war" on
terrorism. We must be vigilant against an event like September 11 ever
happening again, but it is just as important to be vigilant in ensuring that
we do not allow ourselves to overreact in a manner to commit terrorism
in order to fight terrorism. Finally, we must be vigilant to protect
against governmental overreaction on the home front that will erode our
constitutional liberty in the name of fighting terrorism or protecting "the
homeland." Is it possible that some of the dangers from anti-terrorism
measures are similar to the dangers of those who use "terrorism" to fight
their "just cause," such as their "war" to lift the yoke of oppression?
Thus, this article addresses the following questions, among others:
What is terrorism? How does terrorism compare to war crimes or
crimes against humanity? What is the proper response when terrorism
occurs; when one is attacked with ferocious and indiscriminate3 force
causing the slaughter of thousands? What is the proper response when
one is part of a group that has been oppressed for ages? Is terrorism a
matter of law? Sociology? Anthropology? Pathology? All of these and
more? In sum, this article presents my views on what terrorism is: its
nature, its character, its characteristics, and its causes. Most importantly
for this study, I will try to provide a workable legal definition of terror-
2. W.H. Auden, In Times of War, in W.H. AUDEN & CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD, JOURNEY TO
WAR (1939).
3. Perhaps it is more accurate to say "discriminate," in that innocent civilians were targeted
in the World Trade Center and in the airliners used as weapons.
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ism and elucidate its constituent elements. To clarify the analysis, I will
distinguish terror, war crimes, and crimes against humanity from
terrorism.
In discussing terrorism, this article also attempts to determine what
constitutes an improper (illegal) response to oppression and, similarly,
what is an illegal response to terroristic atrocity. What is the legal way
to rebel or break the yoke of oppression? What is the legal way to
defend oneself against an atrocity such as that committed on September
11, 2001? What is legal rebellion and what is legal self-defense in this
context? It must be possible to defend and protect the innocents of the
world without purposefully or indiscriminately destroying other
innocents.
Discussing terrorism in light of the September 11 atrocities is
daunting. It requires one to wonder how to maintain an equilibrium in
the face of a menace that wishes its own death as long as it flows from
the slaughter of "the enemy." How is it possible to combat this menace
without falling into a trap of hatred or blind fear that leads to the use of
terror to fight terrorism? The overarching issues relating to September
11, terrorism, and counter-terrorism include: whether oppression can
provide any justification for that atrocity; similarly, whether that attack
calls for or allows self-defense under international law, and, if so, what
constitutes a legal response in self-defense. I will elucidate and compare
the crimes of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the
parameters of self-defense.
It is important to define terrorism, a term that is overused today. It
is applied over-inclusively to contain almost all acts of violence commit-
ted for political purposes by clandestine groups. It is also often used
under-inclusively to exclude state terrorism.4 Some commentators see
terrorism as the lower end of the warfare spectrum, a form of low-inten-
sity, unconventional aggression.5 Walter Laquer defines terrorism as:
the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to
achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the
victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms
and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.6
4. But see CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY (1992) (2d ed. in process) [hereinafter BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM];
JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS (1989).
5. See, e.g., Scott S. Evans, The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism,
Judicial Review, and the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 21, 22-23
(1994).
6. Walter Laquer, Reflections on Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 88 (1986); see also
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES & MATERIALS
172 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES].
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This definition is deficient from a legal point of view. It is both overin-
clusive and underinclusive. Its descriptive accuracy is not apt, since we
now see terrorists whose purpose is to destroy and only to destroy. This
article will address these points.
U.S. Response: The War on Terrorism
With regard to the current "war" on terrorism, U.S. officials have
claimed that they are doing everything possible to avoid civilian casual-
ties, and evidence seems to suggest that this generally may be true.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon to hear individuals in the public, even
in the press, argue that since al Qaeda intended to slaughter innocents,
why shouldn't we? Indeed, it is easy to fall into this evil desire. In the
midst of our difficult times, we run a significant risk of participating in
or condoning violence that also could include mass slaughter of
innocents. Herman Melville, through Captain Ahab, brilliantly allows
us to address some of our own least appealing tendencies:
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of
things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes
the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil to
crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable
in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all
the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down;
and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's
shell upon it.7
Voltaire's "everyman" in Candide cynically assessed international
law and the laws of war as consisting of righteous brutality on a grand
scale and simple suffering on a human scale.8 Voltaire's assessment of
international law, terror, and our own tendency to become barbaric can
apply to our similar tendency to confuse justice with vengeance. 9
Exploitation of human weakness by the few with power may be the
actual culprit.' ° Primo Levi drove himself to despair (and suicide) over
the issue of why common, everyday, "civilized" people fall into a
miasma of evil."1 Sadly, many of us tend to distrust, denigrate, and dis-
7. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1851).
8. Louis Rend Beres, Straightening the "Timber": Toward a New Paradigm of International
Law, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 163 n.7 (1994).
9. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-3 1; Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the
Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 77 (1994);
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Modem Blood Feud: Thoughts on the Philosophy of Crimes
Against Humanity, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, AND
PROSPECTS (2002); P.D. JAMES, CERTAIN JUSTICE 7 (1997).
10. See BLAKESLEY TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-89.
11. See PRIMo LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1988); see
also BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-31; SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS
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criminate against those whom we perceive as being different. This ten-
dency is often manipulated by "leaders" for their own nefarious
purposes and by propagandists who proliferate the hatred, fear, and rage.
We are made to believe that those "who are different" are dangerous and
",evil." 12
Of course, evil does occur, and did occur on September 11, 2001.
It is pathetic, but probably true, that terrorism has become virtually
banal. 13 Certainly, one must defend one's self, family, and nation. On
the other hand, the oppressed rightly seek to escape their oppression.
How properly, legally, and morally to defend oneself or to escape
oppression is not so simple (or, at least not that easy). Lofty rhetoric,
religion or other philosophy, or principle are appropriated by those who
wish to pervert it for their own uses. A people's deep-seated fears and
hatreds are exploited often by those who retain a nefarious desire to
prompt the people to commit acts of atrocity in the name of the ideal,
but actually serve the prompters' purposes. A perversion of these same
values and fears are also used to oppress.
Furthermore, fear and hatred can also prompt us to take or allow
action that will cause the erosion of our civil liberties and human rights
as an expedient to fight terrorism. In the face of terrorist attack, espe-
DISCONTENTS (James Strachey, trans.) (1961). For an interesting fictional musing on the
subconscious, see IRVIN D. YALOM, WHEN NIETZSCHE WEPT: A STUDY OF OBSESSION (1992).
12. For example, in Rwanda, Georges Ruggiu, the infamous "Italian Hutu," who pleaded
guilty before the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in May 2002, of persecution and
incitement to genocide and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 53 (1999), available at
1999 WL 33268309 (noting that broadcast speeches, for example, "referred to the Tutsis and
Hutus from the opposition parties as collaborators of the RPF. These speeches encouraged the
militias to target Tutsis in their daily acts of vandalism"). Ruggiu, actually a Belgian national of
Italian origin, is a former journalist who worked for Radio Tildvision Des Mille Collines (RLTM).
Id. Donald McNeil wrote an article in March on Rwanda's most famous musician, Simon
Bikindi. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Killer Songs, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 17, 2002, at 58. His songs
were played on Radio des Milles Collines during the period of the genocide. The article quotes
Alison DesForges, the Human Rights Watch Rwanda specialist:
Alison DesForges, the lead Rwanda specialist for Human Rights Watch, says that
"Bikindi's songs are subtle, using poetic language and oblique references. There's a
Rwandan proverb," she says. "A message is given to many, but those who are
meant to understand, understand. There's always a subtext in Rwanda. You don't
have to resort to brutal language. People understand."
See also Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza is Boycotting His Trial at the ICTR: Lessons in
Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315 (2001); ALISON DES
FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 71 (1999); Christine L. Kellow
& H. Leslie Steeves, The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide, J. COMM., Summer 1998, at
107-116; Ameer F. Gopalani, The International Standard of Direct and Public Incitement to
Commit Genocide; An Obstacle to U.S. Ratification of the International Criminal Court Statute?,
32 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Bill Keller, The Monster in the Dock, N.Y. Times.corn Online News Report
(Feb. 9, 2002), available at http://dupagepeace.home.att.net/monster.html.
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cially one as senseless and atrocious as that of September 11, we are
tempted to promulgate rules for "protection" and "security" that ulti-
mately could erode protection, security, and the very values our troops
fight for by leading us to a society that conforms more to what the per-
petrators of terrorism may live under and would want us to suffer.' 4 We
must, therefore, be vigilant to ensure that we are not manipulated by the
terrorists or by our own overreactive leaders into taking action or acqui-
escing to action, terroristic in and of itself, that is destructive of our
liberty and other important values.
In addition to the moral traps and dangers facing us, we have to
address several very difficult legal, constitutional, and technical
problems. One problem, for example, is to determine whether flying
airliners into buildings constitutes an "armed attack" under domestic and
international law. This question is important because under current
international law, the nature of the legal response depends on it. Since
September 11, however, the traditionalist position has been ques-
tioned.' 5 If it was not an "armed attack" as traditionally contemplated,
did it constitute some other sort of attack that would allow violent action
to be taken in response? If so, what responses does international law
allow? Also, what protections does the law provide to those upon whom
the response impacts? When prosecuting alleged participants, what pro-
tections and rights obtain for those captured or arrested pursuant to the
response?' 6 These are very important and difficult questions that foster
vigorous disagreement. "
When an "armed attack" is committed against a person or group, it
may require, and both domestic and international law may permit, a
reaction in self-defense. 8 The September 11 attacks on the World
14. See, e.g., The USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter
USA Patriot Act]. The so-called "Patriot Act" makes terrorism a predicate act for which a wiretap
under Title III can be authorized. Id. § 201. The USA Patriot Act also authorized law
enforcement to conduct wiretapping for crimes related to computer fraud and abuse. See id.
§ 202; see also Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for
Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1064-65 (2001).
15. I am questioning it here, of course. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-
Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L.
& Pun. POL'Y 539, 540 (2002); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 457 (2002); Cf George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the
Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002).
16. See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1-9 (2002).
17. Cf Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A18;
Harold Honjgu Koh, Editorial, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,186581,00.html; Akhil Reed Amar, Nation-War Powers: Is Bush Making History?, TIME,
Dec. 03, 2001, at 62. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 11-12 (1946).
18. Principles of necessity and proportionality, rather than issues of jurisdiction, may inform
considerations of self-defense based military responses to terrorism. See, e.g., Robert J. Beck &
1046 [Vol. 57:1041
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Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania airspace were acts
of terrorism and crimes against humanity. Armed attack under interna-
tional law is not required to be "military" in nature. 9
To participate in or plan atrocities like those of September 11 is
certainly criminal conduct. One response may be to attack the perpetra-
tors or those who are protecting them, but whether this is "legal" under
the circumstances and current international law is open to debate.2°
When the conduct that fits these crimes is prosecuted, is it correct to
suggest, as the Bush Administration does, that participants may have no
protection under international law, including the Geneva Conventions?
2
'
The conduct of the perpetrators constituted at least terrorism and
murder. It appears that the following elements of the crime occurred:
(1) over three thousand human beings were killed; (2) the conduct on
that day involved commission of multiple acts committed as part of a
wide or systematic attack upon innocent civilians (in the WTC and in the
airliners); and (3) at least some of the perpetrators (and their leaders) had
the necessary mens rea of intending or at least knowing that they were
part of a systematic attack on a civilian population. 2 The armed attack
does not have to be "military" in the traditional sense.23
ON DEFINING TERRORISM: CONSIDERING ITS CAUSES
I will define terrorism, for purposes of this article, to be the use of
violence against innocent individuals for the purpose of obtaining some
Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and Forcible State Responses to
Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994) (discussing the U.S. response to Iraqi government's
attempt to assassinate former President Bush); Alberto Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of
Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287 (1987) (discussing proposed
responses to increases in terrorism against Americans); William V. O'Brien, Reprisals,
Deterrence, and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 423 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Roy S. Lee, How the World Will Relate to the Court, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 756-57 (2002). In fact, the use of non-military common modes of
transportation and innocent civilians as weapons shows that, perhaps, the military/non-military
distinction no longer makes sense.
20. See Glennon, supra note 15, at 540; Feldman, supra note 15, at 457; Fletcher, supra note
15, at 635.
21. See Wedgwood, supra note 17; Koh, supra note 17; Amar, supra note 17, at 62; see also
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8, 11-12 (1946); Paust, supra note 16, at 1-9; Glennon, supra note 15, at
540; Feldman, supra note 15, at 451. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 635; Christopher Bryant &
Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 373, 375, 434-38 (2002).
22. These seem to be the constituent elements of the crime against humanity of murder under
customary international law which is reflected in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, in art. 7(l)(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/contents.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See Lee, supra note 19, at 755-57.
23. See Rome Statute supra note 22.
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military, political, or philosophical end from a third-party government or
group. The violence must be aimed at or must wantonly impact inno-
cent civilians. In this way, it obviates any application of self-defense
because, as we shall see below, innocents include non-combatants in war
and non-attackers in a non-war setting. As such, one has no right to
defend oneself against a person who is not threatening one's life or limb.
Terrorism is political or ideological violence without restraint of law or
morality. Terrorism may be fully domestic, but it is international terror-
ism only when the conduct transcends borders or is so massive or
includes a use of weapons of mass destruction that it poses a threat to
international peace and security. Later in this paper, I will provide a
more detailed definition of terrorism, determine its constituent elements,
and analyze them. We will consider whether a war crime or crime
against humanity is a functional equivalent of terrorism, but which
occurs during legally recognized or recognizable armed attack. It will
be necessary in this process to distinguish both domestic and interna-
tional self-defense and to distinguish the legal and illegal use of violence
in war. It may be that the offenses relevant to this paper (war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and terrorism) have equivalent elements and a
similar harmful impact, but they occur in different factual and legal cir-
cumstances. The differing circumstances are crucial to an understanding
of terrorism and to adopting any proper legal response to it.
On August 8, 1945, the London Charter declared certain conduct,
including specifically the slaughter of civilian populations, even when
committed during war, to be intolerable.24 The rule of interconnecting
irony, especially inherent in international law and reality, is emphasized
once again when one notes that on that very day the United States
dropped its second atomic bomb, this time on an "undefended town,"
Nagasaki, killing at least 70,000 of its mostly civilian population." The
juxtaposition of law, innocence, and military necessity could not have
been manifest more starkly. Is a similar irony at work today? We face
the unspeakable terrorism committed against innocent non-combatants
going about their daily business on airplanes, only to become part of the
weaponry that slaughtered thousands more innocents in the name of
religious necessity and to escape "oppression." Reaction to this terror-
24. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279, at art. 6(c); Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical
Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1, 4
(Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
25. The 70,000 souls were the least number of immediate deaths in Nagasaki. Within the
next five years, at least another 130,000 inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki died as a result of
the atomic bombings. Elliot L. Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND LAW 19, 32 (Arthur Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984).
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ism has been swift and violent, although it remains to be seen whether it
has been sure. How one defines terrorism is obviously important.
Harvard Professor of Government Michael Ignatieff recognizes and
accepts this irony. He writes in a New York Times Book Review
essay26 that: "Caleb Carr, a popular novelist and a military historian,
makes two arguments in 'The Lessons of Terror."' 27 The first is that
punitive warfare by states against civilians amounts to terrorism. 28 The
second is that terrorism never works. 29 Both of these arguments strike
me as wrong. Ignatieff argues that
war against civilians has been a feature of the Western military tradi-
tion since the Romans razed Carthage. Carr argues that indiscrimi-
nate war against the Carthaginians, and then against the barbarians,
helped bring about Rome's downfall. The slaughter of civilians,
which was supposed to terrify and subdue, only incited further rebel-
lion and, besides, taught the barbarians to be indiscriminate in
return.
30
First, both Carr and Ignatieff are not correct that "war against civilians"
has been a feature of "Western military tradition since [the razing of
Carthage by the Romans]. ' '3' First, even in the "West," that sort of bar-
barity was occurring long before Carthage. Furthermore, the "tradition"
was close to worldwide, not only "Western." Carr's point that the razing
of Carthage was "indiscriminate" is incorrect also, because it was dis-
criminate in that the civilian population was intentionally slaughtered.32
This slaughter of innocents did "work." Indeed, the result for the
Romans is ironically called the "Carthaginian Peace." Sadly, as Igna-
tieff correctly points out, it continues to work, at least in the short-term.
Ignatieff continues: "If Carr were saying only that warfare against
civilians has perverse consequences, he would be pointing out some-
thing worth remembering. If he were saying only that when empires
teach barbarians to be indiscriminate, they end up being victims of bar-
barism themselves, no one could object." But, the main weakness in
Carr's analysis, according to Ignatieff, is that, "Carr persists in equating
war against civilians with terrorism, and this leads to absurdity."33 Igna-
tieff attempts to refute Carr's position with the following examples of
historical depredation:
26. Michael Ignatieff, Barbarism at the Gates: Warfare Against Civilians, Caleb Carr
Argues, Should Always Be Viewed as Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2002, at 8.
27. See generally CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR (2002).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 8; CARR, supra note 27, at 85.
33. See Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8.
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Sherman's march through Georgia during the Civil War becomes ter-
rorism. So does Jimmy Doolittle's raid on Tokyo and Nixon and
Kissinger's bombing of Cambodia. The problem here is not to
absolve Sherman, Doolittle or Nixon of responsibility for wreaking
havoc on civilians [but that] it confuses everything to call them ter-
rorists. Carr makes no distinction between conventional, if barbaric,
acts of war committed by a state army under regular command, as
part of a formally declared campaign to defeat another state, and vio-
lence against civilians by nonstate actors with the aim not of military
victory but of causing panic or inflicting revenge.34
At this point, Ignatieff has made a few correct technical points, but his
implications are troublesome.
Ignatieff notes that:
[I]ntentions matter in judging consequences. Carr makes the valid
claim that good causes can be undermined by the use of barbarous
means. He then goes on to argue, mistakenly, that those who use
such means are terrorists. But this ignores intentions and contexts.
Sherman used barbarous means in the context of a just intention, to
bring the Civil War to a speedy conclusion. He was a serving officer
of the United States, not an irregular, like the abolitionist John
Brown, whose raids on slaveholders should properly be counted as
acts of terror .... 35
Ignatieff, therefore, is arguing that John Brown is a terrorist (for a good
cause) and Sherman is a "regular" general committing war crimes (for a
good cause).
The depredations committed by the likes of Sherman, Doolittle,
Truman, Nixon, and Kissinger may not have been terrorism, although
they were founded on the use of terror as a weapon. The conduct would
fit more likely into the category of a war crime or a crime against
humanity, depending on the circumstances. The key point is that the
essential or constituent elements of this conduct have nothing to do with
motive, purpose, or cause. Their legal essence or their gravamen is
pretty much the same, but they fall into different legal categories.
Ignatieff argues that the indicated conduct by Sherman, Doolittle,
Nixon, and Kissinger was extremely brutal war tactics, but not "ter-
ror."36 Here, Ignatieff confuses terror and terror tactics with terrorism.
He also suggests that this conduct may not have been criminal because
the perpetrators represented "legitimate" governments or armies and
committed the brutality for a just cause.
Ignatieff is correct to draw attention to distinctions between terror-
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
1050 [Vol. 57:1041
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ism and the other noted conduct. Those distinctions are legal niceties
that are very important, but not for the reasons suggested by Ignatieff.
They are important for jurisdictional, not moral, or even punishment,
purposes. If, in an international war (as with Hitler in World War II) or
in a civil war (as with Sherman in the United States, Ntkatimurana in
Rwanda, or the French and the National Liberation Front in Algeria), a
leader orders or a perpetrator intentionally or indiscriminately kills non-
combatants in order to gain territory, shorten, win, or otherwise gain an
advantage in a war by panicking a population or government, he com-
mits a war crime or crime against humanity depending on circumstance.
If a leader simply slaughters his own civilians during "peacetime"
because he wishes to avoid or deflect any potential insurrection, then it
is a crime against humanity once it reaches the level of threatening inter-
national peace or security. Otherwise, if it does not reach that level, then
it is arguably terrorism against that population or, perhaps, even geno-
cide. If a person or group flies an airliner into a building full of non-
combatants to kill them and to undermine a regime or to cause chaos,
then it is terrorism. Thus, the conclusion that Ignatieff draws is just as
wrong and as that of Carr, and probably more dangerous. Both Carr and
Ignatieff confuse or conflate jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Ignatieff continues with what he considers to be Carr's essential
mistake:
Carr has been misled, it seems to me, by what he calls "Vattel's law."
Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss pastor and jurist, published "The Law
of Nations" in 1758. In it, he made the claim that in determining
whether a war is just, it is as important to assess how combatants are
actually fighting as it is to assess what they are fighting for. Just
causes can be betrayed by unjust behavior on the battlefield, like kill-
ing civilians or prisoners, or employing disproportionate force to
attain an objective.37
Part of Ignatieff's error is that he reads international law (and
Emmerich de Vattel) as a political scientist and not as a lawyer, or at
least, so it seems. Vattel, however, is focusing on issues that implicate
the law. The context and point of the entire discussion is to determine
what legal consequences obtain after the commission of a war crime, a
crime against humanity, or terrorism. So, Ignatieff states, "[t]o use the
terms of art, Vattel was distinguishing between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. The former refers to the grounds that justify going to war, the
latter to the rules that define just conduct of hostilities."38 True. Igna-
tieff continues: "[b]ut the two, while distinct, need to be considered
37. Id.
38. Id.
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together."39 Of course they do, but this does not mean that they are the
same or that they implicate the same legal consequences. Ignatieff
pretends.
Ignatieff states that "[i]ntentions matter in judging conse-
quences. 4° Of course they do, but the issue is what is meant by inten-
tions. Ignatieff seems to think that intent equals motive. This is clearly
not the case if one's point is asking the question of whether the conduct
constituted the crime of terrorism. In criminal law (even international
criminal law), the intent that counts is the intent to kill or maim
innocents (non-combatants). Motive may include an "intent" to cause
panic. In a war, forces use terror to panic the enemy and to accelerate
the end of the war. Motive and intent may overlap, but they are distinct.
The distinction is important. Ignatieff seems not to understand this or
simply chooses to ignore it.
Ignatieff notes correctly that "[a]ll the people slaughtered by Sher-
man and by Brown are dead [not surprisingly], and aggrieved descend-
ants may not care whether they were killed by terrorists or armies
pursuing a just cause by unjust means. 41 Quite true. He continues:
"[t]here are those who equate the civilians killed by American bombing
in Afghanistan with the civilians killed in the World Trade Center. All
are dead, but death does not create any moral equivalency among
them."4 This is also quite true, as long as no evidence exists that inno-
cent civilians in Afghanistan were intentionally slaughtered. On the
other hand, an innocent Afghan, say a mother with her children, eating
dinner, is no less innocent than those killed in the WTC. If proof were
obtained that she were intentionally slaughtered by the United States or
any troops, this would establish a moral and legal equivalency. After
missing this obvious point, Ignatieff again falls into error. Ignatieff is
correct to say that the distinctions are intensely important, but they are
important legally because the elements that one must prove and the
jurisdiction under which one will prosecute are dependant on the distinc-
tions. This is only to say that one type of crime or one instance of a
crime is more serious or egregious than another. But both (or all) are
crimes, crimes of close to the highest magnitude.
Ignatieff continues:
In one case, civilians were massacred deliberately, and without warn-
ing, during a time of peace, by a nonuniformed group whose inten-
tion was to spread terror. In the other case, civilians were killed
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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during an exercise of legitimate self-defense by a state, in response to
an act of war, and were killed unintentionally despite good-faith
efforts, by targeteers and weaponeers, to avoid doing so.
If the actors and targeteers made legitimate and good faith efforts to
avoid civilian casualties in a war (in effect, they did not intentionally or
recklessly attack them), no crime was committed at all. No reasonable
person makes this association. Thus, it seems that Ignatieff is setting up
a "straw man." On the other hand, General Sherman, Doolittle, and Tru-
man (at least in Nagasaki) intentionally attacked innocent civilians so as
to cause panic and convince the opposition's military leaders to stop
fighting the war. This was not only terror (but not terrorism), but a war
crime. Thus, for Ignatieff to move from these examples to Afghanistan
seems disingenuous, unless he has evidence that innocents were pur-
posefully attacked in Afghanistan.
Another example that Ignatieff uses in an attempt to justify his
points is the experience of the French in Algeria.43 He states:
In their campaign to secure independence from France, the Algerian
National Liberation Front resorted to terror. The ensuing nightmare
is memorably captured in Gillo Pontecorvo's great film "The Battle
of Algiers." As cafes and bus stations were bombed in order to drive
the French out of Algeria, the French Army responded with raids,
blanket arrests, bombing and torture. In this infernal cycle, the
French disgraced themselves and finally lost even the will to disgrace
themselves further. The F.L.N., fighting for their land, eventually
triumphed. The message of Algeria hardly confirms that terror never
works. It supports the different point that indiscriminately brutal acts
of counterterror rarely succeed.4 4
Does it make sense to claim that a group fighting for independence
from colonialism commits terrorism, based solely on the fact that the
group is not the "recognized" government? If the Algerian War is con-
sidered to be a civil war or a war of national liberation that takes on
international aspects, then the laws of war obtain and the slaughter, tor-
ture, and other depravity that occurred on both sides constitute war
crimes or crimes against humanity.
Here again, Ignatieff makes the mistake of equating terror with ter-
rorism, but, I repeat, they are not the same. Ignatieff's confusion is
much worse than Carr's. In Algeria, a war of national liberation was
raging. It seems to me that it was an "internal" war with "international"
43. Id.
44. Id.
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implications. Today, after Protocols 145 and 11,46 additions to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, it would be clear that crimes against humanity
were committed by both sides. I would even argue that customary inter-
national law that had developed around the 1949 Geneva Conventions
also provided for criminal sanctions against acts performed by both
sides. But some of the "terror" was legal, though brutal. If this is Igna-
tieff's point, it is banal. Sadly, war is brutal, terror-bound and, of
course, sometimes successful. Occasionally, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or terrorism also help one to succeed in one's purpose for
committing them. This argument, that terrorism sometimes succeeds, is
Ignatieff's next exercise in banality. He states:
As for the futility of terrorism itself, who could say with confidence
that Jewish terrorism-the assassination of Lord Moyne and then of
Count Bernadotte, the bombing of the King David Hotel, followed by
selective massacres in a few Palestinian villages in order to secure the
flight of all Palestinians-did not succeed in dislodging the British
and consolidating Jewish control of the new state? Though terror
alone did not create the state of Israel-the moral legitimacy of the
claim of the Holocaust survivors counted even more-terror was
instrumental, and terror worked.47
Whether it worked or not, it still may or may not have been crimi-
nal, depending on whether the perpetrators committed the elements of
terrorism, a crime against humanity, or a war crime. Success does not
(or at least should not) have anything to do with the criminality of the
conduct. Many criminals "get away with it." So what? What they got
away with was still criminal.
Motive or the "justice" of the "cause" may have relevance to jus ad
bellum, but not to jus in bello. Ignatieff continues his attack:
Carr makes the valid claim that good causes can be undermined by
the use of barbarous means. He then goes on to argue, mistakenly,
that those who use such means are terrorists. But this ignores inten-
tions and contexts. Sherman used barbarous means in the context of
a just intention, to bring the Civil War to a speedy conclusion. He
was a serving officer of the United States, not an irregular, like the
abolitionist John Brown, whose raids on slaveholders should properly
be counted as acts of terror.48
45. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
46. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol If), Jan. 23, 1979, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol 1I].
47. Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8.
48. Id.
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Ignatieff's point here is correct insofar as it concerns the distinc-
tions among terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet,
all of these are crimes of similar gravity. Ignatieff, nevertheless, claims
that Carr equates barbarity with terror. Well, these do equate, but terror
may not be terrorism; Ignatieff conflates the two.
Ignatieff's error here is that he equates terror with terrorism. He
confuses terror and "terror tactics" with the crime of terrorism. Terror is
part of terrorism and it may be a tactic in war. But, depending on the
circumstances, terror or brutality may or may not constitute a war crime,
a crime against humanity, or terrorism. Some brutality or terror in war
is not a war crime or a crime against humanity. A fortiori, it is not
terrorism in that case. So, Ignatieff is correct to say that brutality is not
terrorism in some contexts,49 but he ignores a whole range of criminal
conduct where brutality against innocent civilians is terrorism or some
other equally egregious crime. As far as barbarity to the level of crimi-
nality is concerned, it may be a war crime, crime against humanity, or
terrorism. One's "cause" or motive is irrelevant, unless it somehow
rises to the level of an excuse or justification, such as self-defense.
Ignatieff seems to think that it is the essential element to distinguishing
terrorism and non-terrorism. 0 Ignatieff has confused all or most of the
legal elements of the problem of terrorism.
What, then, is terrorism? Ignatieff's confusion is based on a lack of
understanding that the crime of terrorism, like all crime, including
crimes against humanity and war crimes, must have express and prova-
ble constituent elements. Ignatieff seems to think that an attack to cause
panic "guarantee[s] terrorism."'" If so, virtually every act of war (every
attack on the enemy) is terrorism.5" Terror is an essential part of war.
Terrorism is a crime. Some terror tactics in war rise to the level of
crimes against humanity or war crimes. The same conduct committed
against innocent civilians in peacetime would be terrorism.
Scott Shuger of Slate magazine challenges Professor Ignatieff, but
Shuger, though much closer to a correct understanding, also misses the
point.53 Shuger notes how President Bush thinks it is obvious who is a
terrorist, that Michael Kinsley thinks it is inscrutable.54 Shuger consid-
49. This is a truism. It is like saying that non-terrorism is not terrorism.
50. See Ignatieff, supra note 26, at 8.
51. See Scott Shuger, Off on a Terror: How to be Intellectually Honest About Terrorism,
SLATE, Feb. 19, 2002, available at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2062267. Scott Shuger is a Slate
senior writer who spent five years in the U.S. Navy and served overseas as an intelligence officer.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
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ers it something easy to oversimplify, but scrutable, nonetheless. I agree
with Shuger on these points. Shuger argues:
Michael Ignatieff ... chastises Caleb Carr's book on terrorism for
"blurring of the distinction between terror and war against civilians."
By Ignatieff's lights, Carr's mistake is that he "makes no distinction
between conventional, if barbaric, acts of war committed by a state
army under regular command, as part of a formally declared cam-
paign to defeat another state, and violence against civilians by non-
state actors with the aim not of military victory but of causing panic
or inflicting revenge." Ignatieff says, for example, that Carr fails to
recognize that although Civil War Union General William Sherman
used "barbarous means" against civilians in his march through Geor-
gia, they were "in the context of a just intention," and he was "a
serving officer of the United States, not an irregular, like the aboli-
tionist John Brown, whose raids on slaveholders should properly be
counted as acts of terror."55
Shuger continues:
But (as Kinsley has observed) terrorism is inherently immoral,
because it justifies any awful means. So to say with Ignatieff that a
given act isn't terrorism because it has a just context is simply to
assert, rather than argue, that it is not terrorism, and paradoxically
also to accept the very paradigm of terrorism.5 6
Shuger is absolutely right that to claim that a "just cause" or "just
context" as the justifier is to accept the terrorist paradigm. Indeed, just
about every group that commits such atrocities has a "just cause" or
context upon which to claim justification. It is apparent (I believe that
he actually admits it) that Ignatieff simply likes some terrorists and dis-
likes others. He impliedly adopts the aphorism: "One person's terrorist
is another's freedom fighter." Of course, Ignatieff is correct that there
are levels of culpability, but that is to state a legal truism, even a
banality.
Shuger adds that "the idea that non-terrorism requires a formally
declared campaign [is equally incorrect]." 57 I would suggest that it is
equally silly in the current world because war has not been declared
since the Korean conflict. Indeed, the United States never formally
declared war on Afghanistan, and Shuger is correct that "there's less
than meets the eye in Ignatieff's serving officer/irregular. The Nazi
occupiers of France were serving officers and the French Resistance
members were irregulars."58 Indeed, some of our own Special Opera-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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tions forces use civilian garb, as do our CIA and other agents.
In sum, it seems that either due to lack of space in the New York
Times Review of Books or due to lack of understanding of the law of
war, the law of humanity, or terrorism, Ignatieff s essay makes a sham-
bles of proper understanding of terrorism or the law of war. Shuger
again points out quite correctly, that:
What Ignatieff misses is that terrorism isn't about irregular armies or
the absence of declarations or causing panic; it's about attacking the
other side's noncombatants utterly without concern for them or prov-
ocation from them. ("Noncombatants" marks a different class than
"civilians" because the former includes military members who've
surrendered or who have been incapacitated by prior attacks and
excludes civilian employees at military installations and war
plants.)59
Of course, the killing of "non-combatants" during a war would be a
war crime, as would the killing of civilians other than those participating
in the war effort at a war plant or a military installation (or it would be a
crime against humanity). Shuger also states, though, that:
If the killing of noncombatants is accompanied by some genuine con-
cern for the other side's noncombatant population-as there would
be if a civilian population was attacked in order to shorten the war to
save lives on both sides-and if the other side had attacked your non-
combatant population first, then what you have is the bloodiest possi-
ble variant of permissible war, but not terrorism.
60
It seems to me that this is mostly incorrect. Certainly, killing inno-
cent civilians while attacking military targets, if one does not intention-
ally or recklessly (with criminal negligence in the depraved heart sense)
try killing civilians, is neither terrorism, a crime against humanity, nor a
war crime. On the other hand, intentionally killing innocent civilians to
"shorten the war" or doing so in retaliation for an attack on one's own
civilian population is criminal. It is a war crime, crime against human-
ity, or terrorism, depending on the context described below.
Professor Michael Glennon illuminates and helps rectify one aspect
of the confusion represented in Ignatieff's piece. Glennon discusses the
unreality, illogic, and dysfunctional elements of traditional international
law (what he calls the de jure system) relating to armed conflict, particu-
larly relating to the law of self-defense. 61 He contrasts the incoherent de
jure system with the de facto system. 62 He suggests that the United
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. See Glennon, supra note 15, at 540.
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Nations' (U.N.) "Charter's use-of-force regime has all but collapsed. '6 3
Glennon argues that U.N. Charter article 51 and interpretive jurispru-
dence are incoherent, at least insofar as that article and jurisprudence
counsel that "any use of force against a safe-haven government is per se
disproportionate. 64 This counsel, says Glennon, "turns the principle of
proportionality inside out," and is based on a maladroit conflation of jus
ad bellum and jus in bello.65
Traditional international law on the law of war has been careful to
maintain "the complete disjunction of jus ad bellum from jus in bello,
i.e., upon keeping the rules concerning when force can be used com-
pletely separate from the rules concerning what force can be used."6 6
Glennon's point is that,
rules concerning how a war can be fought can, and must, be honored
even though the war is fought for illicit ends, and wars fought for
permissible ends still cannot be fought by illicit means. The plain
illogic of this second corollary derives from conflating the two, from
supposing that an impermissible object necessarily renders impermis-
sible any amount of force employed in its pursuit.67
This conclusion, notes Glennon, cannot follow or the principle of pro-
portionality would be rendered empty.68
Glennon's argument deflates Ignatieff's position, at least in the
obverse. Ignatieff conflates jus ad bellum and jus in bello in order to
claim that conduct by a legitimate regime or by insurgents with military
garb cannot be terrorism. The obverse point to Glennon's analysis is
that even when a nation acts in legitimate self-defense, it must conform
to the rules of jus in bello. Glennon's proposition that legitimate self-
defense allows or ought to allow an attack against a non-state-actor who
has committed or is about to commit terrorism, such as that committed
on September 11. This is obvious if one accepts the proposition that
terrorism is a crime because it violates the basic, primordial rule that one
cannot intentionally attack an innocent, no matter how lofty one consid-
ers his purpose to be. By the same token, counter-terrorism is criminal
when it targets civilians. I will elaborate on this point throughout this
article.
Al Qaeda, on September 11, 2001, targeted the civilian population
in the WTC and used innocent civilians as weapons in the airliners that
it "militarized" to do its nefarious work. Al Qaeda members clearly
63. Id.
64. Id. at 549-52.
65. Id. at 550-51.
66. Id. at 551.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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manifested the mens rea or intent required to commit terrorism, as they
not only demonstrated their utter disregard for the U.S. noncombatant
population, as Shuger noted, but they also used innocents as weapons
and actually targeted other innocents.6 9 Their commission of the actus
reus is just as self-evident, as they flew the planes into the towers.
Shuger continues, arguing that "since the 9/11 attacks were not a
response to a U.S. attack on any noncombatant population, those attacks
count as terrorism."7 Here, Shuger is incorrect. Having had one's
innocent civilians attacked cannot be a justification or an excuse for
attacking the innocent civilians related to the perpetrators. His position
on this point, though I doubt that he means for it to do so, would justify
or excuse al Qaeda's attack, if there had been evidence that the United
States had attacked innocent civilians. This cannot be and is not correct.
On the scope of the term terrorism, one must ask whether the Pen-
tagon was a legitimate military target. Shuger correctly notes that it
was. The attack was atrocious, but it was not terrorism because of or on
the basis of the nature of the Pentagon as a target. On the other hand, it
was the means of attacking the Pentagon that rendered it terrorism. 71
Flying an airliner into the Pentagon was a manifestly wanton and gratui-
tous attack on noncombatants.72 Perhaps the civilian employees of the
Pentagon were not "non-combatants"-they were engaged in keeping
our military effective and they were attacked at their posts, but the
clearly innocent passengers on the hijacked plane used in the attack cer-
tainly were non-combatants.73 If "al-Qaida had attacked the Pentagon
not with airliners full of innocents, but with a truck bomb driven by
suicidal jihadists, that would have been war, not terrorism. '"" The same
is true of the attacks on the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia in
1996, and on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. 75 These were attacks on
purely military targets without intentionally endangering civilians-
were horrible, but not terrorism. And yes, these attacks were sneaky,
but so what? War is not fencing, where the rules require the prior
issuance of an "En Garde!" If there were such a requirement, then for
instance the nighttime U.S. special ops raids last October on a
Taliban airbase and on a Mullah Omar compound were terrorism too,
since our troops attacked without warning.76
69. See Shuger, supra note 5 1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
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Ignatieff, on the other hand, seems to want to define terrorism in
the same way as every group that wants to commit it. I agree with
Shuger on his important point: "Let's face it: We cannot define terrorism
so that only the other side's military can be destroyed or so that only our
weapons can be used."77 Terrorism can be committed by a group,
nation, or government.
Professor Bassiouni has recently entered this fray.78 He has noted
what he considers to be the root causes and characteristics of terrorism,
and, thereby, provides or hints at his definition, though he avoids calling
what he provides a definition.79 Indeed, he states that "'[t]errorism' is a
value laden term. Consequently it means different things to different
people, a characteristic that perhaps is best expressed in the saying,
'[w]hat is terrorism to some is heroism to others,' and has never been
satisfactorily defined."8 Yet, Bassiouni calls for prosecution of terrorist
perpetrators. 81 Without a definition, this would be prosecuting one's
enemy's heroes, because they are one's enemy's heroes. On the other
hand, Bassiouni's statement of terrorism's characteristics comes close to
providing a definition.
Terrorism is a strategy of violence designed to instill terror in a seg-
ment of society in order to achieve a power-outcome, propagandize a
cause, or inflict harm for vengeful political purposes. That strategy is
resorted to by state actors either against their own population or
against the population of another country. It is also used by non-state
actors, such as insurgent or revolutionary groups acting within their
own country or in another country. Lastly, it is used by ideologically
motivated groups or individuals, acting either inside or outside their
country of nationality, whose methods may vary according to their
beliefs, goals, and means. 82
One of Bassiouni's main purposes in writing his recent thoughts on
terrorism seems to be to debunk the ideologically and statist approach
currently in vogue, which provides that only non-state-actors can com-
mit terrorism." He points out correctly that the common usage of the
term terrorism (which is state generated and state biased), excludes state
actors.84 This common usage allows that only "small, ideologically
77. Id.
78. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented
Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 84-85 (2002).
79. Id. at 101.
80. Id,
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id. at 101-03.
84. Id. at 86.
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motivated groups" can commit terrorism.85 Bassiouni is absolutely right
in attacking this pernicious, state biased approach. It should be self-
evident, as Bassiouni notes, that application of a double standard that
accommodates the same or similar terror-violence by state actors, yet
condemns it when committed by non-state actors, only leads to more of
the same conduct by both types in a horrible dialectic of terror.86 Yet,
Bassiouni's own analysis seems to be manipulable by those who would
oppose it. It is subject to being turned on its head by "statists" who wish
to commit terror-violence on their "enemy's heroes."87 It is absolutely
necessary to define terrorism and to provide specific constituent ele-
ments if one is going to have a legal principle upon which to prosecute
perpetrators or to attack perpetrators in self-defense.
Although Bassiouni's approach is appropriate for some purposes,
such as understanding some of the reasons why some terrorists commit
some types of terrorism, it leaves some important elements out if one is
going to prosecute those who commit terrorism or attack the perpetrators
in self-defense. My thoughts in this article are aimed at providing a
definition and approach that will not only allow for legal integrity in
prosecution or action in self-defense, but will reply both to Professors
Bassiouni and Ignatieff.88
Why is Terrorism Perpetrated?
Sometimes, the perpetrator of terror or terrorism is motivated by a
fundamentalist vision: having the truth and the concomitant obligation to
apply any means, including violence against innocents to enunciate,
establish, and maintain it. This is a zealot's vision of how to establish a
world of "good order." Terrorism is committed in a claimed attempt to
establish or maintain some favored political order, such as theocracy,
socialism, or democracy.89 Sometimes it is used by the group in power
simply to maintain power and wealth. 9° For example, the former South
African Government terrorized and oppressed its non-white population
to maintain its power and the wealth of the white minority. The Mou-
gabe Regime in Zimbabwe, 2001-2002, seemed to have run amuck to
85. Id.
86. See discussion infra notes 105-31.
87. For example, Professor Ignatieff's position is the classic statist position attacked by
Professor Bassiouni.
88. Compare Ignatieff, supra note 26, with Bassiouni, supra note 78.
89. See, e.g., the crimes committed by the Soviets or its allies incident to the so-called
"Brezhnev Doctrine," and those committed by the United States or its "allies" under the "Reagan
Doctrine." BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 1185-86.
90. For a wonderful novel on this and other pertinent points, see MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, LA
FIESTA DEL CHIVO [THE FEAST OF THE GOAT] (2000).
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maintain its power.9 Sadly, one could mention so many other tragic
examples and episodes. Sometimes terror is a tool that is used in an
attempt to win a war (to intimidate the enemy into capitulating).92
Arguably, the United States may have helped to precipitate the
Cambodian atrocities or, at least, set the stage for them, by insisting that
Prince Sihanouk not be neutral and by saturation bombing. Are these
examples of terror-tactics the same as terrorism? We will attempt to
distinguish between the terms "terrorism" and "terror. 93
WHY TERRORISM? VIEWS FROM HISTORY: PUNISHMENT,
POWER, WAR, AND EXPIATION
It may be helpful in our attempt to understand terrorism and some
of its causes to analyze briefly the history of the "laws of humanity."
We have seen the importance of and confusion over jus ad bellum and
jus in bello, to understanding terrorism and its placement in the jurispru-
dential construct. We will now consider the role that notions of expia-
tion and redemption have played in the law of justifying violence,
including war, punishment, and terrorism.
Palliating the depredations of war has been considered an important
aspect of warfare since at least the sixth century B.C.94 As early as the
sixth century B.C., the great Chinese General Sun Tzu wrote The Art of
War, which provided many humanitarian protections and limitations on
the conduct of his warriors during war.95 In fact, one might say that
since antiquity there have been war crimes and crimes against humanity
that were forbidden in law and conscience. For example, the Code of
Hammurabi (1728-1686 B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (2000 B.C.), and
the even earlier Code of Ur-Nammu (2100 B.C.).
In the very early "modem era," Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and
Emerich de Vattel all called for the rule that punishment was necessary
for those who commit serious offenses, in their requirement that there be
no sanctuary for the criminal. Each nation has an obligation to "prose-
91. CNN Online News Report, Fiery Face of Mugabe Shock Troops, Mar. 6, 2002, available
at http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar7a_2002.html.
92. For example, the carpet bombing of London, Dresden, and Tokyo, and the use of the
atomic bomb on Nagasaki, especially because it was an undefended city and, thus, not subject at
all to the claim that it was a military target. Hence, terror was the essential purpose of the
bombing.
93. For now, one might say that terror is used in all war and is part of warfare. It is also part
of terrorism, of course, but as terrorism it is its own genre.
94. See Timothy L.H. McCormack, From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The Evolution of
an International Criminal Law Regime, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 24, at 31, 32.
95. See generally SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (Samuel Griffith trans., 1963); SUN Tzu, THE
NEW TRANSLATION (J.H. Huang trans., 1993); Timothy L.H. McCormack, supra note 94, at 32-33.
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cute or extradite." The ascendancy of "positivism" in the nineteenth
century created the perception that international law was binding only on
states and could not impose obligations or impose punishment directly
on individuals; that was solely for states to do.
For centuries military commanders-from Henry V, under his
famous ordinances of war in 1419, [to the American military prose-
cutions of soldiers involved in] the My Lai Prosecutions... under the
U.S. Code of Military Justice-have enforced such laws against vio-
lators. In other cases, states have tried prisoners of war for offenses
committed against the customary laws of war. Thus, both the
accused's own state and the captor state (for POWs) have standing to
prosecute.
Neither of these systems, however, has functioned with any
degree of efficiency.96
Telford Taylor in his classic, Nuremberg and Vietnam,97 continued
the history, noting that the "laws of war" are of ancient origin, following
two main developmental streams.
The first flowed from medieval notions of knightly chivalry. Over
the course of the centuries the stream has thinned to a trickle; it had a
brief spurt during the days of single-handed aerial combat, and sur-
vives today in rules (often violated) prohibiting various deceptions
such as the use of the enemy's uniforms or battle insignia, or the
launching of a war without fair warning by formal declaration.98
Taylor further noted that,
the second and far more important concept is that the ravages of war
should be mitigated as far as possible by prohibiting needless cruel-
ties, and other acts that spread death and destruction and are not rea-
sonably related to the conduct of hostilities. The seeds of such a
principle must be nearly as old as human society, and ancient litera-
ture abounds with condemnation of pillage and massacre. In more
recent times, both religious humanitarianism and the opposition of
merchants to unnecessary disruptions of commerce have furnished
the motivation for restricting customs and understandings. In the
17th century these ideas began to find expression in learned writings,
especially those of the Dutch jurist-philosopher Hugo Grotius. 99
Professor Taylor continued the history as follows:
96. Jack Landman Goldsmith III, Rapporteur, Challenges to International Governance Theme
IV - The Internationalization of Domestic Law: The Shrinking Domaine Reserve, The Year of
International Law in Review, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 87 ASISPROC
575 (1993).
97. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG & VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 20 (1970)
[hereinafter TAYLOR, NUREMBERG].
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id.
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The formalization of military organization in the 18th-century
brought the establishment of military courts, empowered to try viola-
tions of the laws of war as well as other offenses by soldiers. During
the American Revolution, both Captain Nathan Hale and the British
Major John Andr6 were convicted as spies and ordered to be hanged,
the former by a British military court and the latter by a "Board of
General Officers" appointed by George Washington. During the
Mexican War, General Winfield Scott created "military commis-
sions," with jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war committed
either by American troops against Mexican civilians, or vice versa.
Up to that time the laws of war had remained largely a matter of
unwritten tradition, and it was the United States, during the Civil
War, that took the lead in reducing them to systematic, written form.
In 1863 President Lincoln approved the promulgation by the War
Department of "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field," prepared by Francis Lieber, a German
veteran of the Napoleonic wars, who emigrated to the United States
and became professor of law and political science at Columbia Uni-
versity. These comprised 159 articles, covering such subjects as
"military necessity,' ''punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of
hostile countries," "prisoners of war," and "spies." It was by a mili-
tary commission appointed in accordance with these instructions that
Mary Surratt and the others accused of conspiring to assassinate Lin-
coln were tried. l°°
Professor Taylor shows how the idea of war crimes and their pun-
ishment evolved after the Civil War, noting that the horrific violence of
the Crimean War, the Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870
prompted an increasing belief, in Europe and America, in the need for
codification of the laws of war and their embodiment in international
100. Id. at 21; see also generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); see also Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials
in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 123 (1993); Christopher L. Blakesley, Autumn of the
Patriarch: The Pinochet Extradition Debacle & Beyond-Human Rights Clauses Compared to
Traditional Derivative Protections such as Double Criminality, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1
(2000) [hereinafter Blakesley, Autumn of the Patriarch]; Christopher L. Blakesley, The Modem
Blood Feud: Ruminations on Political Violence, in 2 GLOBAL DIALOGUE 128 (2000) [hereinafter
Blakesley, The Modem Blood Feud]; Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a
Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 77 (1994) [hereinafter
Blakesley, Obstacles]; Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 10, 16 (Gerhard Mueller & Edward Wise eds., 1965); Hans
Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to
the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 553-56 (1943) (noting that international
law provides for some offenses as criminal, though enforcement is undertaken by domestic
courts); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of
International Criminal Law in the Process of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 193 (1982); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 365 (1953).
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agreements. That movement precipitated the series of treaties, the mod-
em foundation of the laws of war, known as the Hague and Geneva
Conventions. These include the extremely important Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907, and the Geneva Prisoner of War, Red Cross, and
Protection of Civilians Conventions of 1929 and 1949.
Taylor summarized some of the major points of these conventions.
"[T]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited."'"' Notably, the ensuing articles specify a number of limita-
tions to what is allowed in warfare and how the Geneva Conventions
expand these principles. This article discusses these rules in the sections
on war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Taylor makes the very important point that these conventions artic-
ulate laws of war as general principles of conduct; the conventions spec-
ify neither the means of enforcement nor the penalties for violations.10 2
Nevertheless, Taylor explains, the rules and principles have become
domestic law in most nations, as their essence has been adopted by the
military law of many countries. 0 3 One can find these in the general
orders, manuals of instruction, or other official documents. For exam-
ple, in the United States,
the Lieber rules of 1863 were replaced in 1914 by an army field man-
ual which, up-dated, is still in force under the title "The Law of Land
Warfare." It is set forth therein that the laws of war are part of the
law of the United States, and that they may be enforced against both
soldiers and civilians, including enemy personnel, by general courts-
martial, military commissions, or other military or international
tribunals. ' 0 4
These principles and rules have become jus cogens principles and
customary international law.
EXPIATORY VIOLENCE
Societies since antiquity have exhibited, for good or for ill, a deep
need for expiation and redemption when crime has been committed in
their midst or against them. This seems to have been true whether the
attack arose from within or without the group. When the crime was
committed by an external source, war usually was the expiatory means
101. See Taylor, Nuremberg, supra note 97, at 22. The Hague Convention IV, art. 22 (1907).
102. Taylor, Nuremberg, supra note 97, at 23.
103. Id.
104. See TAYLOR, NUREMBERG, supra note 97, at 20; Meron, supra note 100, at 123;
Blakesley, Autumn of the Patriarch, supra note 100, at 10-13; Blakesley, Modern Blood Feud,
supra note 100, at 45; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 100, at 77; see also Schwarzenberger,
supra note 100 at 10, 16; Kelsen, supra note 100, at 553-56 (noting that international law provides
for some offenses as criminal, though enforcement is to be undertaken by domestic courts).
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of choice.10 5 Punishment, of course, was the tool when the crime was
committed internally. Redemption is good. On the other hand, occa-
sionally groups have been prompted to take action for expiation that
seems in retrospect to be antagonistic to the actual well-being or healing
of the group.
Anciently, the social cell, tribe, or group would require vengeance
against those who were found to have committed a crime, caused certain
harm, or perceived harm against the social cell or its leader. When
crime occurred, society was required to purge itself of the taint, to avoid
the wrath of the god or gods. Some metaphysical dangers could only be
avoided through spilling the blood of the perpetrator or his proxy. When
a person who had committed an act that put the group at this sort of
metaphysical risk escaped, the group had to seek that person's return to
expiate itself. If the person's return was not possible, the group had to
purge the taint by proxy, often through the attack and wholesale slaugh-
ter of those who represented the fugitive.106 When Jericho fell to Israel,
the warriors utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and
woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the
sword. 107
There have been war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terror-
ism since antiquity.'0 8 The Lex Talionis, or law of exact retaliation, is
found in the Jewish Torah or biblical Pentateuch.'°9 Lex Talionis
105. See, e.g., Joshua 6:21; Judges chs. 19-21; 1 Kings 2:28-34.
106. See, e.g., 1 Kings 2:28-34.
107. Joshua 6:21.
108. Exodus 21:24; Yoram Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. I, 11 (1986). See CODE OF HAMMURABI (1728-1686 B.C.); LAWS OF
ESHNUNNA (2000 B.C.); CODE OF UR-NAMMU (2100 B.C.).
109. See Deuteronomy 19:21. "Do not look on such a man with pity. Life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, and foot for foot!" Leviticus 24:17-20; Exodus 22:20, 22:1, 22:6;
JOHN SMITH, ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW (1960). In addition, see GODFREY DRIVER &
JOHN MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS (1952), which applies both the lex talionis and
compensation. Rule 196, for example, decrees that "[i]f one destroys the eye of a free-born man,
his eye shall one destroy," but Rule 198 requires, "[i]f the eye of a nobleman he has destroyed or
the limb of a nobleman he has broken, one mine of silver he shall pay." Translation by L.W. King
can be found on the Internet in the Avalon Project of Yale University Law School, at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamcode.htm. Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF
VENICE act 1, sc. 3, lines 157-67 (Randal Martin ed., Theatre Books 2001) (1600). Note that the
exacting of a mutilating fine is contrary to Jewish law. Compare Rabbi Hertz's comment on the
lex talionis ("eye for eye"):
In the Torah .... this law of "measure for measure" is carried out literally only in
the case of murder .... [O]ther physical injuries which are not fatal are a matter of
monetary compensation for the injured party. Such monetary compensation,
however, had to be equitable, and as far as possible equivalent. This is the
significance of the legal technical terms, "life for life, eye for eye, and tooth for
tooth."
J.H. HERTZ, THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 309 (2d ed. 1960); see also Jules Gleicher, Three
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"requires" an eye for an eye" l0 to benefit the punished individual as
much as to protect the punishers. I"I  In virtually all ancient cultures,
metaphysics and law were merged; 12 the social cell felt obliged to
purge itself of the threat of destruction by the wrath of God or gods.
There was a sense that when the group was tainted by crime committed
by one of its own or by another against the group, the taint had to be
removed to make the group whole again. Punishment of the wrongdoer,
combined with religious ceremony, was the cleansing or expiating
mechanism. The Code of Manu 1 3 provided that rest and happiness for
the wrongdoer and society are obtained only by soul-purging punish-
ment of the perpetrator. "Blood atonement" was required by the Israe-
lites for heinous offenses." 4 The Cheyenne banished the one who
tainted the food or water supply and followed with the ritual of the
"breaking of the arrows," to cleanse the group. 1 5
In many societies, the cleansing qualities of fire made it a favored
method of capital punishment. Nero used burning at the stake to propi-
tiate Vulcan, the god of fire. 6 Punishment has been the mechanism to
rid the society of crime's destructive plague." 7 If the perpetrator
became a fugitive, it was necessary to obtain his person or a proxy to
purge the taint.II Although some of the forms of ancient punishment
are repugnant to us today, the mystical need to seek retribution, to make
Biblical Studies on Politics and Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 869, 890-99 (1998). Could it not
be said that Shylock's troubles begin with his deviation from Jewish law? Compare
SHAKESPEARE, supra, at act 1, sc. 3, lines 31-35, with id. at act 2, sc. 5, lines I 1-16; Dan Markel,
Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001).
110. Exodus 21:24; Dinstein, supra note 108, at 11.
S111. See, e.g., I Kings 2:28-34 (discussing blood atonement).
112. See BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-31, 171-288.
113. INDIAN HISTORY SOURCEBOOK: THE LAW OF MANU, Bk. VII, 18, 23-24; bk. VIII, 17 (G
Buhler trans., 2002), available at http://www.fordham.edu. The Code of Manu (or Manusmriti) is
an anonymous brahmanic collection of teachings or rules, which, united or compiled significantly
older principles and rules referencing the legendary law-giver Manu, "the wise one." The Code is
usually dated to have been written in the first centuries A.D. "The "Code of Manu" was translated
into English for the first time in 1794, THE LAWS OF MANU (George Buhler trans., 1886).
114. See I Kings 2:28-34.
115. See Robert A. Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation-State Status of American Indian
Tribes: A Case Study of the Cheyenne Nation, AM. IND. J., Oct. 1977, at 6 (vol. 3, no. 10); Robert
Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation State Status of American Indian Tribes: A Case Study of the
Cheyenne Nation 31 (1976) (LL.M Thesis, available in the Columbia University Law Library).
116. GRAEME NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE 43 (1985).
117. See, e.g., FOLKE STROM, ON THE SACRAL ORIGIN OF THE GERMANIC DEATH PENALTIES
14, 208 (Donald Burton trans., 1942) (Ph.D. thesis published in Stockholm); see also, HANS VON
HENTIG, PUNISHMENT, ITS ORIGIN, PURPOSES, AND PSYCHOLOGY 83, 84 (1973).
118. See, e.g., Judges 15, 19, & 20. When the perpetrator was not obtainable, sometimes the
village believed to be where the perpetrator was hiding or at least was from had to be utterly
destroyed. See id. This caused many blood feuds. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-31.
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society whole again after it has been tainted, continues. Dostoyefsky
made the point in Crime and Punishment."' We will also consider the
thoughts of a few other luminaries who address the conundrum.
Still today, oppression or perceived oppression by one group
against another is the impetus for retaliation by the oppressed against the
oppressors and then counter-retaliation by the original oppressors. Any
member of the opposing group (call it the family, clan, tribe, people,
nation-state) is fairly subject to retaliation. The retaliator is not viewed
by his or her own group as a criminal or a terrorist, because he or she is
an instrument of the group's need to avenge or expiate itself. Once this
occurs, the other group feels justified in a counter-reprisal and the ven-
detta rages. No doubt, violence is justified under certain circumstances,
but never when intentionally or recklessly applied to non-combatants or
innocent civilians.
This section will study some examples of attempts at expiation
through punishment of the "evil-doers." We will consider the relation-
ship between the authority to punish and sense of expiation. We will see
how this relationship was well understood and exploited by leaders, who
used the idea that the good of the group and the individual were pro-
moted by punishment of the wrongdoer. Both the wrongdoer and the
people needed the wrongdoer to be punished. 20 If the wrongdoer was a
foreigner and had taken refuge abroad, it was necessary to capture him
to accomplish this expiation; sometimes this required going to war.' 2'
Thus, a mystical relationship between punishment, or war, and
cleansing atonement applied (applies) in the domestic systems of pun-
ishment, and in warfare, to obtain retribution for wrongs. This idea has
proved useful to leaders who wanted either to establish or protect their
own sovereign power from trouble within or without the group. 122 I will
119. See generally FYODOR DOSTOYEFSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett trans.,
1947) (1866).
120. See BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 5-31, 171-288.
121. See, e.g., I Kings 2:28-34; Judges chs. 19-21 (especially 21:10-14).
122. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 1-69 (Vintage
Books ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975). Foucault and his authorities prompted the ideas
that follow on this issue; see also John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political, and Legal
Implications of American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1, 35-36
(2001) (discussing the recent work of the iconoclastic physical anthropologist Christy Turner,
noting that she dealt a shuddering broadside to the paradigm of an integrated, egalitarian harmony
among the prehistoric and contemporary Pueblo when she proposed, in part, that the external
facade of Pueblo pacifism and equanimity hides internal episodes of raw and loathsome
terrorism-including violence, mutilation, and cannibalism practiced within the group). Beyond
this, Ragsdale's work suggests that the apparent cooperation and common vision of the prehistoric
Chacoan nirvana was produced by force and fear, rather than the internalized precepts of balance
and harmony. See CHRISTY G. TURNER & JACQUELINE A. TURNER, MAN CORN: CANNIBALISM
AND VIOLENCE IN THE PREHISTORIC AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 459-84 (1999).
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attempt to establish that connection and show how terrorism and anti-
terrorism are often cut of the same cloth. Then, I will move from my
attempt to understand why we tend to take such action, applying the
principles discerned, resulting in a definition of terrorism. Although
redemption and cleansing of the soul are good things, the tendency of
group leaders to exploit this need or instinct is troublesome.
Medieval Abuse: Terror in the French Middle Ages, the Revolution,
and Destroying the Rule of Law
The theoreticians and technicians of punishment in the French Mid-
dle Ages used the symbol of the bourreau (the executioner) to represent
the king's power.123 Contemplate the playing card king. A person con-
demned to be "expiated" for attempted regicide was the bottom half: the
inverted figure of the king. This perfect opposite of the king simultane-
ously represented the powerlessness of the condemned and the people.
According to the history, the perpetrator represented the people. So the
king was omnipotent; the people had no power. Naturally, the omnipo-
tent king had control over the life and death of his subjects. Indeed, he
had power over their very souls. Terror and power interrelated in a very
significant and horrifically symbolic way.
One who would challenge that power, the traitor who attempted
regicide or even parricide, the analogue to regicide, must be shown to be
absolutely without power or hope. He must be symbolized to the people
in the most powerful way as the opposite of the sovereign. The sover-
eign must be seen as omnipotent; the rigicidaire utterly powerless.
Indeed, he must be shown not even to have the power to die. The king
had power over that person's very soul, over the very soul of the people.
In fact, the people's soul must be seen as being born of the punishment
available to them.
Thus, it followed that the traitor must die a thousand deaths. It
would not do simply to execute him. The executioner, therefore, was to
take that person up to the very edge of death by torture, but bring her
back again. Then, up to death and back again, up and back, up and back,
a thousand times. The bourreau was "the man of a thousand deaths." '124
Finally, the individual was "allowed" to die when it suited the king.
It seems natural and right that people should revolt against such
power, even if that power represented "law." Revolution eventually
123. See FOUCAULT, supra note 122, at 11-13, 28-30 (analyzing ERNST KANTOROWITZ, THE
KING'S Two BODIES (1959)).
124. 111 Pieces Originales et Procdures du Procs fait () Robert-Frangois Damiens, 372-374
(1757); ANONYMOUS, HANGING Is NOT PUNISHMENT ENOUGH (1701); Foucault, supra note 122, at
1, 12, 28-29.
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ensued. The French rivolutionaires applied tactics of terror learned
from their former masters in the Ancin Rigime. The people turned on
their former masters with a vengeance and the Reign of Terror followed.
Violence is certainly justified in some circumstances: in rebellion
and revolution to escape oppression. John Stuart Mill wrote: "Political
liberties or rights which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the
ruler to infringe, specified resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be
justifiable."1 25 So-called modern revolution and related violence may be
culminations of the Enlightenment philosophy and considered justified,
even noble. Violence and terror against innocents, though, are neither
noble nor justified. When revolution takes that turn, it descends to a
self-destructive reign of terror.
Murder was murder and terror was terror under the Ancin Rigime
and under the Reign of Terror, no matter how it was rhetorically glori-
fied at the time or afterward. In Charles Dickens's Tale of Two Cities,
Madame DeFarge is an interesting literary symbol of this truth. She
certainly had good reason to wish to avenge herself and the French peo-
ple. She knit, and registered, all who would be executed to avenge and
"free" her people. Once the wave of violence and concomitant power
takes hold, they consume her as she embodies them. Similarly, tvariste
Gamelin in Anatole France's Les Dieux Ont Soif portrays a sensitive
artist interested in rectifying injustice, who becomes a paranoid monster
as he is consumed with the need and desire to execute all who might
have been connected with the Ancin Rigime.
When violence explodes with its ferocious and relentless intensity
against those who "represent" or "symbolize" the enemy, it consumes
those who wield it as well. Righting wrongs in Madame DeFarge's and
Gamelin's cases destroyed not only the original oppressors (who
wielded violence first), but also those who used it second to avenge the
former evil. Thus, violence consumes the good that prompted it. It
always consumes even its own. Gamelin, who was finally decapitated
by his beloved Guillotine, makes the point:
Until recently it was necessary to seek out the guilty to try to uncover
them in their retreats and to wrench confessions from them. Today it
is no longer a hunt with packs of hounds, no longer the pursuit of a
timid prey. From all sides the victims surrender themselves. Nobles,
virgins, soldiers, prostitutes flock to the Tribunal to extract their
delayed condemnations from the judges, claiming death as a right,
which they are eager to savor. 126
Today we seem no different. Whenever violence moves from
125. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (1865).
126. ANATOLE FRANCE, Les Dieux Ont Soif [THE GODS ARE ATHIRST] 1987 (1978).
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being applied to combatants or their leaders to strike down innocents, it
is murder, even if rhetorically glorified. Violence against innocents for
whatever end, however glorified, is immoral and criminal. We saw the
oppression and terror of the Ancin Regime overcome by revolution and
evolve into the directorat, a regime that was worse than the one it
replaced.'27 A balance and relative end to the violence eventually devel-
oped as a result of the rule of law. Today, the rules of life are no differ-
ent. Violence is immoral and criminal when perpetrated against
innocents. The excuse given is meaningless.
The Very Early "Modern Era" and "Post-Modern" Reality
Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Emerich de Vattel all called for the
rule that punishment was necessary for those who commit serious
offenses, with no sanctuary for the criminal. 128 Each nation has an obli-
gation to "prosecute or extradite."' 129 The ascendancy of "positivism" in
the nineteenth century created the perception that international law was
binding only on states and could not impose obligations or punishment
directly on individuals.130
Our mal du sicle continues to accelerate in the new millennium.
Crimes against humanity form part of a nauseating modern equivalent of
the ancient blood feud. There are so many others; it is nearly impossible
to keep track, but now it has occurred on U.S. territory. The problem is
that we are facing a vicious threat to use terrorism against us by a group
that feels a moral-religious right to kill innocent people in order to
obtain vengeance, to throw off oppression, and, as they see it, to make
the world safe for their god.
Other times, it is simply the wronged person or group looking to
right wrongs or to obtain retribution. Sometimes, it is the nihilist simply
looking to destroy the status quo with terror. Even the nihilist seems to
have an almost metaphysical vision of the need to destroy. Perhaps
many of these are pretend nihilists, using crimes against humanity sim-
ply as his or her way of gaining power and becoming a statist function-
ary, using terror to maintain his or her power.
127. SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 746-819 (1989).
128. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs 526-29 (Francis Kelsey trans., 1925)
(1646); JEAN BODIN, THE Six BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALE 100-11 (Kenneth D. McRae ed.,
Harvard Political Classics 1962) (1576); EMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 311-13
(Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758).
129. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE chs. 18 (sec. 6), 21 (sec. 3), 25 (sec. 8)
(Francis Kelsey trans., 1925). BODIN, supra note 128, at VIII; DE VATTEL, supra note 128, at 289.
130. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS [hereinafter BLAKESLEY ET AL., INDIVIDUAL].
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On Opposing any Definition of Terrorism
Defining terrorism has almost been anathema. The U.N. General
Assembly attempted on several occasions to convene an international
conference to define terrorism and distinguish it from legitimate acts in
furtherance of struggles for national liberation, but such a conference
never occurred.' 3 ' The Cold War caused confusion in the realm of
defining terrorism and distinguishing it from wars of national liberation.
During the Cold War, many believed that defining terrorism would
cause more problems than it solved. Some wars of national liberation
utilized terrorism as their major tactic or strategy. Some argued, and
some continue to argue, that terrorism in this context was justifiable; it
was the only means that could provide an escape from colonial or post-
colonial domination. 132
Thus, many felt that providing an international definition lent dig-
nity to terrorists and placed their acts in the context of acceptable inter-
national behavior. The so-called "Reagan Doctrine" called for vigorous
intervention to promote and protect democracies. This doctrine went as
follows:
[A] particular socialist state, staying in a system of other states com-
posing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common
interests of that community. The sovereignty of each socialist coun-
try cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the
world revolutionary movement .... Discharging their inter-national-
ist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defend-
ing their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and other socialist states
had to act decisively . . . against the anti-socialist forces in
Czechoslovakia. 133
In 1985, President Reagan said: "Freedom movements arise and
131. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/46/654 (1991); Michael
P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too Much
Convergence Between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law?, 7 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 391 (2001).
132. See, e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 7-
31 (Constance Farrington trans., 1963) (1961).
133. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1170 (3d ed. 1999)
(citations omitted); T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 9-18 (2002) (discussing the debate
over humanitarian intervention); see also Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and
Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794 (1995); Michael Reisman, Coercion and
Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Oscar
Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 645 (1984); Malvina
Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy, 34 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 163 (1993); BLAKESLEY ET AL., INDIVIDUAL, supra note 130, at 1185-86 (discussing the
Reagan and the Brezhnev Doctrines); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right of Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Jean Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan
Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 19-20 (1991).
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assert themselves. They're doing so on almost every continent popu-
lated by man in the hills of Afghanistan, in Angola, in Kampuchea, now
Cambodia, in Central America .... They're our brothers, these freedom
fighters, and we owe them our help." 134 Others have noted that
[t]he Reagan Doctrine, as we understand it, is above all concerned
with the moral legitimacy of U.S. support-including military sup-
port-for insurgencies under certain circumstances: where there are
indigenous opponents to a government that is maintained by force,
rather than popular consent; where such a government depends on
arms supplied by the Soviet Union, the Soviet block, or other foreign
sources; and where the people are denied a choice regarding their
affiliations and future. 135
Refusal to Define & Propagandist Abuse of the Term "Terrorism"
We delude ourselves if we think that terrorism is committed only
by our "enemies." Our "enemies" think the same way. Thus, each of us
may commit the exact same acts, but consider them justified when we
do them, and terrorism when done to us. Terrorism must be defined in a
neutral manner and not by what conduct or ends the government or
group deems to be justified. We, the people on each side, must choose
whether we will support our own terrorism while condemning that of
our "enemies." If we do not differentiate, our anti-terrorism rhetoric and
action actually becomes pro-terrorism.
An objective, neutral definition of terrorism sinks in only with dif-
ficulty. Indeed, one has never really been accepted. The problem is that
denizens of nearly every nation or group are bombarded continually with
the propaganda that "terrorism" is committed only by loathsome ene-
mies. Moreover, people often are ideologically, perhaps naturally,
predisposed to dismiss any suggestion that terrorism is a phenomenon
that all parties to a conflict, including themselves, could commit.
The late Professor Richard Baxter articulated the commonly felt
sense of futility in trying to define terrorism: "We have cause to regret
that a legal concept of 'terrorism' was ever inflicted upon us. The term
is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal
purpose."' 3 6 With deference to the esteemed professor, some sort of
134. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World:
Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in RIGHT V. MIGHT supra note 133, at 24, 26 n.13.
135. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 133, at 20.
136. Richard Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380
(1974); JOHN MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICY INITIATIVES 3-5 (1985); Jordan Paust, A Definitional Focus, in TERRORISM:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 18 (Yonah Alexander & Seymour Finger eds., 1977); Goeff
Levitt, Is Terrorism Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 97 (1986).
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working definition is needed if we are going to be prosecuting people for
terrorism. No legal definition makes any sense except in terms of the
purpose for which it applies. If our purpose is preventing the violence
that most people fear and instinctively think of when they use the term
terrorism, we will have the working definition we need.
I will provide at least a limited definition of criminal terrorism,
which establishes the elements necessary to convict someone of the
crimes it comprises. We will consider whether a war crime covers the
same or similar conduct as terrorism; it is an international crime when a
state allows, or ignores, purposeful or criminally reckless killing of
innocents-those hors du combat;137 or of the peacetime equivalent of
those hors du combat. Crimes against humanity 138 such as genocide,139
torture, 14 0 or apartheid 4 ' are also conduct that could fit within the idea
or crime of terrorism. 142
137. For the definition of war crime, see Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: The
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 449, 455 (1989). For a discussion of the relation
between terrorism and war crimes, see infra notes 222-249, and United States v. Calley, 48
C.M.R. 19 (1973).
138. For the definition of crimes against humanity, see infra notes 249-271.
139. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
140. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M, 1027 (1984). Also note the 1993
Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, in which individuals and women's
groups of Bosnian Muslim and Croat survivors of Serbian sexual atrocities sought international
justice for genocide. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
141. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
Nov. 30, 1973, art. III, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50.
142. For example, it may be said that hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft are international
crimes. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
974 U.N.T.S. 177; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, I.C.A.O. Doc. 9518, 27 I.L.M. 627. See International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
See also International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, GA Res. 52/164,
U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 72d Mtg., (1997), 37 ILM 249 (1998) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings
Convention]; Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection as Protection Against
Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 895, 911-18 nn.47-77 (1987) [hereinafter Blakesley, Jurisdiction as
Protection] and accompanying text for more authority and extensive analysis; Robert Friedlander,
The Crime of Hijacking, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 455 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
This is true, although the world community has been strangely reluctant straightforwardly to
declare it such. Friedlander, supra, at 462. Nevertheless sabotaging an aircraft in flight, hijacking
a transnational commercial airliner, and attacking international airline terminals are all proscribed
acts made punishable by the domestic law of most nations. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46501 et seq.
1974; The Antihijacking Act of 1974 was enacted to fulfill the United States' responsibilities
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What we call this terror-violence is important for jurisdictional pur-
poses, but, no matter what category the conduct falls into, it is all illegal,
immoral, and criminal terror-violence. Its actus reus is the application
of violence against innocents. Its mens rea is the intent to harm
innocents, the knowledge that the conduct will harm innocents, or the
wanton disregard of that high degree of risk, all with the intent to intimi-
date or influence a third party group or government.
It may well be true, as some commentators suggest, that the most
efficient way to deal with terrorism is to prohibit specific conduct rather
than to have some generic, mega-crime called terrorism. The latter
would cover too wide a range of conduct. Nevertheless, for now we live
in a world where terrorism is a reality and where the term is utilized
indiscriminately to apply only to "enemy conduct." Thus, if we wish to
maintain any sort of intellectual, moral, or legal integrity, it is necessary
to wrestle with the term and its conceptualization, to come to grips with
what makes some conduct terrorism, for example, hijacking, hostage
taking, killing diplomats, bombing a civilian neighborhood, blowing-up
Pan Am 103, and attacking the World Trade Center with loaded
airliners.
To say that it is punishable because it is proscribed, and that it is
proscribed because states agreed that it is terrorism, obviously begs the
analytical question contemplated in this article. The problem with the
inductive approach by itself, without analysis, is that unless we distill
the essential principles of the conduct condemned by international (and
domestic?) law to see what makes an act terroristic, we have gained no
conceptual insight. Some may know it when they see it, but we have no
standards. In the arena of terrorism and the anarchy that abides in inter-
national criminal law, we are trying to function with a dialectical system
of principle and rule development like that which existed in the mists of
ancient England. In very early common law England, the dialectical
under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft which requires
signatory nations to extradite or punish hijackers 'present in' their territory. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 4, para. 2, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1643, 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 7192. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); The International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83-, 99 Stat. 219 (1985) (codified at 22
U.S.C. 2349aa-4 (Supp. 1987)); The Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, also called the Anti-Hijacking
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 49 (1974) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 1301; loi du 5 Juillet
1972, No. 72-623, 92 Gazette du Palais (L6g.) 360 (1972); Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Protection,
supra, at 918-19; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and
Multilateral Responses to Aircraft Hi-Jacking, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427, 450 (1987). Moreover,
the nation that obtains jurisdiction over the person of the alleged perpetrator has a duty under
international law to extradite or prosecute. Friedlander, supra, at 462; JOHN MURPHY, STATE
SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONs 3-5
(1990). The international crime status of the conduct and the obligation to prosecute or extradite
are established by international treaty and customary international law.
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process began with fixed rules and principles received by Romans after
Caesar's conquest. 143 These rules were fixed and, when applied rigidly,
became troublesome and unjust as new situations came before judges.
The next phase was for the rules to be expanded to apply to new situa-
tions, providing the judges more power. This, in turn, allowed corrup-
tion to be insinuated, so a new "Code" was promulgated to control the
discretion of the judges. In Rome, the dialectical development was the
same.
Thus, in the international criminal law arena, we begin by applying
a treaty, such as the Rome Statute or the Hague Convention IV (though
they have been applied quite rarely in the history of international law).
Judges would decide a case often pursuant to vague or undeveloped
principles or policy. Thus, coherency and conceptual integrity have
been hard to come by.
Analysts must discern principles, policy, coherency, or conceptual
integrity, including those behind legislation, treaties, or judicial deci-
sions. We must consult our underlying principles.' 44 Certainly, agree-
ments among nations condemning certain conduct are of some moment
of themselves, but they must be based on some essential principles;
these, we must scrutinize. Otherwise, we give in to the tendency so
evident in the so-called war against terrorism: Law degenerates into
nothing other than an epithet, a propagandistic exercise in or by which
143. What I mean by this is that when the common law courts began to decide cases, they
obviously had scant, vague precedent, if any. Thus, as they found cases that were similar to those
they decided previously they would expand the rule or principle to include the new instance in
question. Of course, England was an imperial province of the first order. At one time it had a
garrison of 30,000 Roman soldiers. Edward Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29
FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 455-56 (1961); CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR, Bks. I-IV
at Bk. IV (1870). See Christopher L. Blakesley et al., Family Autonomy, in CONTEMPORARY
FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 4-8 (1984); Peter Stein, Logic and Experience
in Roman and Common Law, 59 B.U. L. REV. 437, 437-41 (1970) (discussing that when Roman
and Anglo-American Common Law each were reaching maturity they adopted similar
mechanisms of development, each subject to a tension deriving from the contrasting forces of
logic and experience); Lawson, The Contribution of Roman Law to Western Civilization, 4 EUR.
STUDIES IN LAW: MANY LAWS 124, 125-36 (1977); see also, e.g., VACARIUS, A SUMMARY OF LAW
FOR POOR STUDENTS (F. de Zulueta ed., 1927) (circa 1149); Ambrosina, 2 IL GLOSSATORE
VACARIO POLEMISTA ANTIERETICALE (nota bibliografica), in RIVISTA ITALIANA PER LE SCIENZE
GIURIDICHE 415-20 (1950); Glanville, THE TREATISE ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS (1189) OF THE
RELAM OF ENGLAND; HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel C.
Throne trans., 1968) (1898); JOHN BURY, HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 142 (1923);
Hans WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 18 (1978); SIR HENRY MAIN,
ANCIENT LAW 140 (10th ed. 1884); Ernest Young, The Anglo-Saxon Family Law, in ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-SAXON LAW 151-52 (1905); Cyril ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF ROME FROM 753 B.C. TO 410
A.D., at 338 (2d ed. 1941); PERCY H. WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH HISTORY 55
(1925); CHARLES P. SHERMAN, The Romanization of English Law, 23 YALE L.J. 318 (1914).
144. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 109 (1990).
1076 [Vol. 57:1041
RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM
the one with the power almost always wins. Ultimately, terrorism is
fostered, not eliminated.
Some commentators' fixation on the difficulty of coming up with
"a generic definition" misses the point. 4 5 It is not as important to
develop a generic definition as it is to capture the essence of the social
evils and legal wrongs that terrorism represents. If we are going to sanc-
tion conduct, we must understand the nature of the social harm we are
sanctioning and why we are sanctioning it. Most commentary on the
international law of sanctions is deficient from a legal standpoint
because penalties are discussed as if they were mere politics. This loses
sight of the basic principle of penal jurisprudence: nulla poena sine lege
("no punishment without a law"). Imposing punishment or sanction
obviously is penal in nature, although many politicians claim otherwise.
For application of a legal penalty to be appropriate, proof of elements
constituting a prohibited social harm is required. The basis for sanction
must be principled and articulated. If the purpose is not legal, but politi-
cal-if law and sanctions are tools to be used against one's enemies to
manage them politically-we should recognize that and not implicate
"the rule of law."
To refer to political management of others as the rule of law is to
debase the latter. It is not surprising that this deficiency hampers many
writers' analyses, when we see that international criminal law is likewise
deficient. There are at least twenty-two categories of international
crimes, representing some 314 international instruments enacted since
1815, none of which has properly defined the offenses proscribed nor
provided the rudimentary elements of "guilt."'14 6 Of course, most of
these instruments have left definition to the process of domestic incorpo-
ration into national law, which is done by promulgating laws that pro-
scribe the relevant conduct. This, of course, will include explicit penal
elements to be proved. This process rectifies the deficiency domesti-
cally. But, it leaves international law insufficient, invigorating the claim
that international law is not law at all. It is also a problem when one
prosecutes individuals in international tribunals.
Yet, many internationalists are willing to accept this exercise in
vagary (and futility), or perhaps they just do not notice. Mere agreement
among nations to sanction some nebulous conduct is not sufficient. If
we accept it as law, then we admit that international law is a baser type.
Certainly, law has its promotional qualities, but it must have more. If
145. Levitt, supra note 136, at 97; MURPHY, supra note 142, at 3-26 (1990).
146. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Introduction to Draft Convention for an International
Criminal Tribunal (1990) (transcript on file with author); M. Cherif Bassouni, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1986).
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we are talking about a rule of law, it is not appropriate to punish an
individual, a group, or nation for vague, undefined conduct. We must
determine and promulgate beforehand the concrete actus reus, mens rea,
and proscribed social harm. Failure to address the essential and specific
evil of terrorism (in both a generic and a specific sense) prevents most
commentators from developing any original thesis that would help us
understand what it is about certain conduct that makes it not only terror-
istic, but punishable as a crime.
Although many traditional commentators believe that it is futile to
define terrorism generically, they also admit that it would be wise to
proscribe "major forms of terrorist acts currently neglected by interna-
tional treaty law . . ,"I" One wonders how this can be done without
coming to grips with what it is that makes such conduct terroristic and
what elements must be proved to penalize it. If theft of nuclear material,
for example, is terroristic activity, we must determine why and when
this is so. Would theft of nuclear material be criminal terrorism if done
during a war or to prevent an enemy from using it militarily? Some
suggest that
support for wars of national liberation and repressive responses by
target governments themselves raise profound issues of law and
morality-issues that deserve a great deal more analysis than they have
received to date. But [that] clear analysis of these issues is hindered
rather than helped by treating them as part of the problem of
terrorism. 48
Such a suggestion without analyzing why existing offenses ought to be
punished as terroristic offenses, other than just because nations have
agreed to do so, belies what is really a simple reiteration of a positivistic
and status quo policy orientation. For example, the common justifica-
tion for approving the United States' interception of the Egyptian air-
liner carrying the hijackers of the Achille Lauro and equivocation over
whether the bombing of Libya was legal indicate an assumption of a
particular political perspective or orientation. It belies any in-depth
analysis of these events' 49 and contradicts any attempt to provide a test
if illegality is based on the means rather than the goal of prohibited
conduct.
Nevertheless, the sense or essence of Baxter's statement of regret
and frustration as to a legal definition of terrorism seems correct and apt.
His statement seems to provide that it is bad to have a legal definition of
147. MURPHY, supra note 142, at 29.
148. Id. at 22.
149. Analysts must determine, for example, the facts and establish whether there was
intentional or reckless bombing of civilian targets.
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terrorism if its use is merely legalistic epithet or propaganda, quibbling
and obfuscation, or if it is used as a rhetorical device to achieve ulterior
ends or even to justify one's own conduct that may itself be criminal
terrorism or otherwise violate international or domestic law. For exam-
ple, consider the so-called Schultz Doctrine, revived by President Bush
II, applying military force to preempt terrorism or to retaliate against
terrorists or states supporting, harboring, or training terrorists. 50  For-
mer Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposed such responsive
military strikes because they "kill women and children." 151
The term terrorism and even the notion of law itself can be appro-
priated for ulterior, even illegal and terroristic, purposes. So, Baxter
may be correct in that perhaps the abuse of the term "terrorism" may be
so serious that the term should be abandoned. Abandoning the term
would be helpful as long as the conduct that constitutes it, as presented
here, is universally condemned anyway.15
In the Letelier vs. Chile153 murder case, the court noted:
[T]here is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or agents
commit an illegal act .... Whatever policy options may exist for a
foreign country, it has no "discretion" to perpetrate conduct designed
to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action
that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in
both national and international law. 154
This is true regardless of how efficient or advantageous the violation of
150. See George S. Schultz, Current Policy No. 783, U.S. Department of State Bureau of
Public Affairs 1-3 (delivered Jan. 15, 1986) [also reprinted as George S. Schultz, Low-Intensity
Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 25 I.L.M. 204, 206 (1986)] see also Jordan J. Paust,
Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHITTiER L. REV.
711 (1986) (citing "Task Force Supports U.S. Policy on Global Terrorism, Official says," Hous.
POST, Mar. 2, 1986, at A13). On the issue of self-defense, see YORAM DINSTIN, WAR
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (1988), where Professor Dinstein eloquently distinguishes
anticipatory and interceptive self-defense: "Interceptive, unlike anticipatory, self-defence takes
place after the other side has committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way.
Whereas a preventive strike anticipates an armed attack which is merely foreseeable ...an
interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is 'imminent and practically unavoidable.'"
DINSTEIN, 187-91 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that an armed attack may begin before the force is
actually used). Professor Dinstein supports the notion of "interceptive" self-defense. He also
argues that the use of "inter-State" force is permitted only in self-defense or as a matter of
collective security. Id.; see also Istvan Pogany, Book Review, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. 435 (1989).
151. Paust, Responding, supra note 150, at 712; see also Christopher L. Blakesley, The
Evisceration of the Political Offence Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109
(1986); Christopher L. Blakesley, An Essay on the Executive Branch Attempts to Eviscerate the
Separation of Powers, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 451.
152. See Robert A Friedlander, The Enforcement of International Criminal Law: Fact or
Fiction, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 88 (1985).
153. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
154. Id. at 673 (citations omitted); see also Eric H. Singer, Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA
Relief: The Letelier Case, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57 (1986).
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innocents seems to be. No matter what goal is seemingly promoted by
such violence, it is neither legally nor morally justified.
International and domestic law equip us to extricate ourselves from
the "infernal dialect" of violence; they provide the means whereby we
may avoid accepting or participating in the oppression or the slaughter
of innocents, even by our own acquiescence. It is error of the highest
order to accept the ideologue's argument that, because some nations or
rebel groups participate in oppression or other terror-violence, it is inevi-
table and therefore necessary to combat it with like conduct. It is practi-
cal and necessary to alter this vision. To commit evil acts because of
perceived or even actual evil acts perpetrated by the object of our acts is
to accept the evil as ours and to become evil. Self-defense under the
rule of law does not include the use of innocents as tools. We must
reestablish the vision of a world made up of human beings controlled by
the rule of law and morality, not by raw power.
Definitions of Terrorism
Attempts to suppress terrorism have proved far from satisfactory. 155
At the Rome Conference for the creation of the International Criminal
Court in 1998, at least fourteen national representatives argued for inclu-
sion of terrorism in the Rome Statute, 156 but it was ultimately not
included. The major reason for the refusal to include terrorism was the
fear of politicizing the tribunal. 157 Since September 11, 2001, momen-
tum has developed toward inserting terrorism into the statute as one of
the offenses. 15 8 Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey have proposed
155. See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 227 (2001).
156. Id. (referring to Algeria, Armenia, Congo, India, Israel, Kyrgyz Republic, Libya,
Macedonia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Turkey). These seem to be the constituent elements
of the crime against humanity of murder, under customary international law which is reflected in
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, in article 7(l)(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
9* (1998), available in BLAKESLEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 54. See Lee, CASES, supra note 19, at
755-57.
157. KrITICHAISAREE supra note 155, at 227.
158. See, e.g., UN News Centre, Robinson says establishment of International Criminal Court
Key to Fighting Terror (Mar. 5, 2002); Jean Pierre Stroobants, Trois questions a. . . Federico
Andreu, LE MONDE, SECTION: International, Feb. 18, 2002.[] Cf Jennifer Schense, Necessary
Steps for the Creation of the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717 (2002);
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 47 n.7 (2001-2002):
The United States expressed serious reservations about the inclusion of crimes of
international terrorism and drug-trafficking in the ICC Treaty, speculating that a
court of this nature would not be able to investigate complex terrorist cases as
precisely as national governments do and that if such cases are drawn within the
ICC's jurisdiction there would be an investigative overload. See Comments of the
United States of America Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution
49/53 on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Report of the
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that terrorism be included as one of the crimes against humanity. 159 To
do this, of course, it would be necessary to define terrorism and to elabo-
rate its elements. Defining terrorism has proved more than difficult.
One of the problems has been that although nations, governments,
legislatures, scholars, and others are willing to consider terrorism or
other offenses as generic, universal crimes that transcend time and space
limitations,6 suppression or prosecution of these offenses, though on a
foundation of universalism, is usually limited to a specified time and
place. 6 ' This appears to be because the prosecutors do not wish their
own to be subject to similar actions, which would occur if the offenses
were general.' 62 States adopt universalist rhetoric based on international
law and principles of universality to legitimize their own actions, but
will rarely apply these principles in a general way or in a way that might
apply to them. 163  Similarly, legislation or treaties calling for universal
jurisdiction will adopt an aura of racial, cultural, ethnic, or religious ster-
eotyping (if not included in the acts) applied by action, such as in trials,
arrests, or deportations of the "exotic foreigner"-for example, the
"Islamic terrorist"-thus incorporating bias and discrimination and
excluding "one's own kind." 164
Secretary-General, at 10-13, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/l/Add.2 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
Report]. During the deliberations [w]e said that while we had an open mind about
future consideration of crimes of terrorism and drug crimes, we did not believe that
including them will assist in the fight against these two evil crimes. To the contrary,
conferring jurisdiction on the Court could undermine essential national and
transnational efforts, and actually hamper the effective fight against these crimes.
The problem, we said, was not prosecution, but rather investigation. Id.; Is a U.N.
International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing Before the
Subcom. on Int'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th
Cong. 10, 15 (1998) (statement of David Scheffer, former Ambassador-At-Large for
War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dept. of State) .... The U.S. view, however, did not deny
the possibility that a crime of terrorism could also qualify as a crime against
humanity, a war crime, or genocide and thus fall within the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction.
159. KriCHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 227.
160. See, e.g., War Crimes Act 1945 (Austl.) (as amended by War Crimes Amendment Act of
1988 §§ 5, 9 (Austl.)); Simpson, supra note 24, at 9.
161. See, e.g., Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203. See Statute of the International Tribunal, 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1193 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/ic; [hereinafter ICTY Statute] Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at
http://www.un.org/ictr [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
162. This, it would appear, is the main reason for United States opposition to the ICC.
163. Simpson, supra note 24, at 10.
164. See id.; Anne Marie Prevost, Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 14 HuM. RTs. Q. 303, 305 (1992) (discussing race); Kathleen M.
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Is it possible to define terrorism in a manner that accommodates its
prosecution or other attempts to control or eliminate it? A neutral defi-
nition of terrorism is necessary if we are to have moral and intellectual
integrity in proscribing, prosecuting, and waging war against it. This
has not always been easy, as defining terrorism requires recognition that
sometimes one's own group may fall into the trap of thinking that the
end justifies the means. Almost daily we hear comments along the lines
of: "The terrorists did not care about innocent civilians, so why should
we?" It is easy to decide that using terror-tactics "to fight terrorism" is
justified. Certainly, this is a problem, as most, if not all, groups that use
terrorism to further their goals believe that their goals are more impor-
tant than the damage done by their terrorism. 165 True believers in a "just
cause" rationalize their own conduct as just, even when they would con-
sider that same conduct committed against them to be terrorism. I will
attempt to provide a model of terrorism and a reaction to it that will
suffice morally and legally. We must develop a neutral and specific
definition if we are going to consider terrorism our justification for
going to war or taking the lives or liberties of individuals whom we find
to have committed terrorism. If conduct is justified or excused, it must
be justified or excused for everyone. Also, perhaps defining terrorism
will help us avoid the trap and terror lived by Captain Ahab quoted at
the beginning of this article, above fn 7.
Inasmuch as the United States is planning to prosecute individuals
for terrorism and since it is possible that the International Criminal
Court will govern terrorism, we must come to grips with its legal defini-
tion and parameters. This section will attempt to fashion a meaningful
and useful definition of, and legal response to, terrorism. To do this,
terrorism must be defined in neutral terms, with the rules of law and
morality as the keys.
Melville is helpful in this exercise. He helps us sense our own
potential for destructive rage. He makes us look at what we have
become. Melville's insight penetrates to the core of the major danger
facing virtually all societies. He allows us to sense how values, morals,
and "the law" can be manipulated to cause actions that actually erode
those values, producing bile and hatred in their place. This, in turn,
causes a group to feel a certainty of having all the truth, right, justice, or
God on their side. Indeed, even the sense that one must act in certain
Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and
Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (1994)
(discussing gender); see also Roger Normand & Chris Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387 (1994).
165. I suppose that even nihilists believe that the chaos they wish to create is better than the
status quo.
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ways to protect his or her group can be manipulated. Evil erupts if the
opportunity arises.
Those who attacked on September 11 perverted religion or had it
perverted for them, as a means to prompt and then to veil the evil of
their conduct. It is not uncommon for groups or national leaders to do
the same with a religion, ideology, or philosophy of life. They are easily
used as justifications or excuses. Descent into demonization of "ene-
mies" seems to prompt one to commit demonic acts. 166 Captain Ahab
surely seems to represent those who attacked or conspired to attack on
September 11, who thereby self-destructed or who are now in the pro-
cess of self-destructing or being destroyed. Yet, I think that it is more
important to use Captain Ahab as a mirror into our own souls and sensi-
bilities. I am going to ruminate on Ahab as a type for our terrorist ene-
mies, but I also pose the question to myself and to you: Does Ahab
represent us, as well?
To address the terrorism committed on September 11 and to chal-
lenge the approaches taken by Professors Bassiouni and Ignatieff (which
incorporate the classic statist position), I will provide a working defini-
tion. I will define terrorism as: serious violence committed by any
means; causing death, great bodily harm, or serious property damage; to
innocent individuals; with the intent to cause those consequences or with
wanton disregard for those consequences; and for the purpose of coerc-
ing or intimidating some specific group, or government, or otherwise to
gain some perceived political, military, religious, or other philosophical
benefit; without justification or excuse. The element of "justification or
excuse" is essentially the key to defining terrorism in criminal law
terms. It must be asked whether there may ever be any justification or
excuse for the intentional or wanton killing or doing great bodily harm
to innocent persons. For me, the core concept of terrorism is the use of
166. See BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES, supra note 6, at 648-52, 694-703, 1324-30, 1389-90.
Even Jean Bodin fell into this trap. See JONATHAN L. PEARL, THE CRIME OF CRIMES:
DEMONOLOGY AND POLITICS IN FRANCE, 1560-1620 112, 121 (1999) (quoting JEAN BODIN, ON
THE DEMON-MANIA OF WITCHES 1580, at 204 (Jonathan L. Pearl & Randy Scott eds. & trans.,
1995). Robert Mandrou, author of Magistrats et Sorciers en France, remarked of Jean Bodin's
Demonomanie: "this vehement appeal to pitiless repression was understood by the magistrates of
higher justice who were charged with the repression of all crimes, of which witchcraft constituted
a good part." Id. Jean Bodin and other French authors might have had an impact on the
perpetuation of witch-hunts. Id.; see BARBARA L. BERNIER, The Praxis of Church and State in the
Underdevelopment of Women's Religion from France to the New World, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 659, 660-61, 674 (2001); LUCIEN FEBVRE, THE PROBLEM OF UNBELIEF IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY: THE RELIGION OF RABELAIS 423-32 (Beatrice Gottlieb trans., 1982);
ROBERT MANDROU, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FRANCE, 1500-1640: AN ESSAY IN HISTORICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 56-57 (R.E. Hallmark trans., 1976); Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Coming to Our Senses":
Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 923-24
(1992).
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innocents (i.e., innocent civilians, non-combatants, those "hors du com-
bat") to gain some military, political, religious, or philosophical (includ-
ing nihilistic) advantage. This definition, therefore, brings up issues of
military necessity, self preservation, and the like.
Obviously, for conduct to be punished the principle of legalitj or
the principle of nulla poena sine lege must be satisfied. The elements of
the proscribed conduct must be spelled out in advance of prosecution.
In the United States, this is required or the proscription will be "void for
vagueness." 167 Scholars and governments have long maintained that it
is neither possible nor useful to define terrorism. 168 Proscribed conduct
must have a mental element (mens rea) and a material element (actus
reus). 169
In 1937, the League of Nations adopted a Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Terrorism.170 This Convention, moribund at
birth, defined terrorism to be "[c]riminal acts directed against a State and
intended to or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of partic-
ular persons, or a group of persons or the general public."' 7 1 In recent
years, the U.N. General Assembly has focused on terrorism, noting that
it is never justified, and reiterating that terrorism is "criminal acts
intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes ....'"" In
1998, the United Nations, in its Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
rorist Bombings, provided that:
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary,
including, where appropriate, domestic legislation to ensure that
167. One reason courts invalidate statutes determined to be "vague" is because such laws "may
authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)); Forbes v.
Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the statute, which prohibited the
therapeutic use of fetal tissue, was void for vagueness). See generally ROLAND M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1-13 (3d ed. 1982); Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or
General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1923); Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional
Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. REV. 195 (1955); Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite
Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921); Austin W. Scott, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on
Substantive Criminal Law, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 275 (1957).
168. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 136, at 300; Levitt, supra note 136, at 97. See also
GEOFFREY M. LEVITT, DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERROR 73.9 (1988).
169. See, e.g., WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 7 (3d ed. 2000); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
167, at 1-13.
170. The League of Nations adopted a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment, signed
November 16, 1937, League of Nations Pub. C. 94. M. 47. V; see KiTTICHAISAREE, supra note
155, at 227.
17 1. League of Nations Terrorism Convention, supra note 33, at art. 1(2). The Convention
never entered into force.
172. Geneva Convention on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism, Dec. 11, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/5/53; see KITICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 228.
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criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where
they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave
nature .... 173
The U.N. Security Council on September 12, 2001, unanimously
approved Resolution 1368, stating that any act of international terrorism
was a threat to international peace and security. 174 While calling on all
states to bring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these terror-
ist acts to justice, it stressed that those responsible for aiding, support-
ing, or harboring them would be held accountable, and pointedly
recognized the right to individual and collective self-defense under the
Charter. 75 This measure does not expressly authorize the use of force.
Still, it is sufficiently broad to be relied on by the United States to
employ force against any or all of these parties. 176
On track to be passed is the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism. 177 The U.S. approach to these
terrorism financing and related problems is found in various portions of
the Patriot Act. For example, that a person:
[in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization....
"[engages] in terrorist activity," when he or she,. . . (I) commit[s] or
... incite[s] to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention
to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; (II) pre-
pare[s] or plan[s] a terrorist activity; (III) gather[s] information on
potential targets for terrorist activity; (IV) solicit[s] funds or other
things of value for B (aa) a terrorist activity; (bb) a terrorist organiza-
tion described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or (cc) a terrorist organiza-
tion described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate
that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
solicitation would further the organization's terrorist activity; (V)
solicit[s] any individual B (aa) to engage in conduct otherwise
173. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1998, at art. 5,
adopted by U.N. GA Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/52/49 (1997)
(emphasis added); KiTrCHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 229.
174. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001); see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
175. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 174.
176. Id.; see Robert K. Goldman, Certain Legal Questions and Issues Raised by the September
lth Attacks, 9 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 2 (2001).
177. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
reprinted in G.A. press release, Sept. 5, 2000, U.N. Doc. GA/5627, available at http://www.
un.org/millennium/law (last visited Jan. 5, 2001).
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described in this clause; (bb) for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or (cc) for membership in a
terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor
can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's ter-
rorist activity; or (VI) commit[s] an act that the actor knows, or rea-
sonably should know, affords material support, including a safe
house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or
other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification,
weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons),
explosives, or training B (aa) for the commission of a terrorist activ-
ity; (bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; (cc) to a
terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or (dd) to
a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor
can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist
activity. This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien
afforded to an organization or individual that has committed terrorist
activity, if the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney
General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secre-
tary of State, concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion, that this
clause should not apply.' 78
U.S. Definitions of Terrorism in 2002
In 2002, terrorism was also defined by the U.S. government as "the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimi-
date or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."' 79 President
178. See 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (2000) (establishing "membership" in certain
organizations as gounds for inadmissibility); § l182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(V) (defining to "[e]ngage
in terrorist activity" as including solicitation of funds or recruitment of personnel); see also Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 491-92 (1999) (rejecting challenge to deportation
of Palestinian activists based on speech and associational activities). This is part of the U.S.,
Uniting and Supporting America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
179. See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1998, at 6-7 (1999). The U.S. Department of Defense defines
terrorism as "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to
coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological." See The Terrorism Research Center, The Basics of Terrorism, at http://
www.terrorism.com/terrorism/bpartl.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2001). The United States
Department of State adheres to the definition provided in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (1994), which
defines it as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."
That definition is further refined by the description of "international terrorism" as "terrorism
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Bush's Executive Order of September 23, 2001, prohibiting the financ-
ing of terrorism and blocking property of Specially Designated Global
Terrorists (SDGTs), defines terrorism as an activity that involves vio-
lence or acts dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure and
appears intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence
government policy by intimidation or coercion, or affect conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage
taking. 18 The phrase "otherwise associated with" is not defined, but the
Executive Order does provide that "[b]efore designating such persons
the Secretary may consult with foreign authorities but is not required to
do SO.
' 18 1
This Executive Order is quite amazing if it was intended to pro-
scribe criminal conduct, which it appears to do. Amazingly, no mens
rea requirement is included at all.' 82 The intent of the Order was to
make the proscribed conduct criminal, as it applies to anyone who has
ever "aid[ed] or abet[ed]" terrorists "or act[ed] in preparatio[n] for" ter-
rorism. 183 Did the Administration intentionally or unintentionally pro-
vide for punishment of the listed conduct in a strict liability manner? In
effect, a foreign national who "threaten[s] . .. injury to or adverse
effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy"'184 may be prosecuted. What do these terms mean?
Their vagueness is breathtaking. Does a foreign person who writes an
article in opposition to the United States' position on the International
Criminal Court subject himself to potential prosecution before a U.S.
Military Commission? Apparently so, if the President's Attorney Gen-
eral has "reason to believe" that the writer's writing caused the noted
effects. Or, what if a person rents a car for a friend who has unknow-
ingly donated to a charity that turns out to have been a front for a "ter-
rorist organization"? 185
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." See U.S. Dep't of State, 2000
Patterns of Global Terrorism, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt20O0/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2001).
180. See Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten
to Commit, or Support Terrorism, Exec. Order No. 13,224, 64 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/terrorism.html.
181. Id.
182. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259, 1263 (2002) (citations omitted).
183. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 180; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 182, at 1263.
184. See Executive Order supra note 183; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 182, at 1263.
185. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 180; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 182 at 1263.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Legislative Definitions186
Legislation does not improve the vagueness significantly. The
Executive Order of September 3, 2001, does not cover prosecution for
186. Primarily in response to several high-profile terrorist acts, President Clinton, on April 24,
1996, signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996). 18 U.S.C. § 3071 (1994) provides rewards for
information concerning terrorist acts. 18 U.S.C. § 3077 defines an 'act of terrorism' as an activity
that:
(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
and (B) appears to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
Similar definitions include: 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(22) (1994) (defining "terrorism" for purposes
of regulation of firearms transactions); id. § 3077(1) (1994) (defining "act of terrorism" in
connection with rewards for information); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (Supp. 1995) (defining
"international terrorism" for purposes of foreign intelligence surveillance). See Gerald L.
Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation, and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14
Geo. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 323-25 (2000) (noting that the U.S. Code contains a variety of express or
implied definitions of terrorism). For example, Title 18 on Crimes includes Chapter 113B, labeled
"Terrorism." Section 2331(l)(B) defines "international terrorism" as noted above. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2332 (2002), Criminal Penalties, provides:
(a) Homicide.-Whoever kills a national of the United States, while such national is
outside the United States, shall-
(1) if the killing is murder (as defined in section I 11 (a)), be fined under this title,
punished by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both;
(2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as defined in section 1112(a) of this
title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and
(3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as defined in section 1112(a) of this
title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Attempt or conspiracy with respect to homicide. Whoever outside the United
States attempts to kill, or engages in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the United
States shall-
(1) in the case of an attempt to commit a killing that is a murder as defined in this
chapter, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and
(2) in the case of a conspiracy by two or more persons to commit a killing that is a
murder as defined in section 111 (a) of this title, if one or more of such persons do
any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both so fined and so imprisoned.
(c) Other conduct. Whoever outside the United States engages in physical
violence-
(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the United States; or
(2) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a national of the United
States; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(d) Limitation on prosecution. No prosecution for any offense described in this
section shall be undertaken by the United States except on written certification of
the Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attorney General
with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in the judgment of the certifying
official, such offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or a civilian population.
Congress has required the State Department to prepare annual reports on terrorism, including
terrorist groups, foreign countries financing terrorist groups, and cooperation by foreign countries
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crime in the traditional sense, but calls for prosecution of alleged foreign
terrorists before a Military Commission on the basis of "rules," such as
they might be or become, promulgated by the executive branch. Thus, a
legislative definition of terrorism, albeit not very coherent or clearly
drafted, is helpful only by analogy or as suggestive of concepts or prin-
ciples. U.S. legislation provides for prosecution of terrorists and even
goes so far as to include both a mens rea and an actus reus in proscrip-
tions of terrorism.
So, for purposes of this article, it may be helpful to consider the
more recent legislation on terrorism.18
[T]he term "international terrorism" means activities that-
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
or seek asylum;
(2) the term "national of the United States" has the meaning given
such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act;
(3) the term "person" means any individual or entity capable of hold-
ing a legal or beneficial interest in property; and
(4) the term "act of war" means any act occurring in the course of-
(A) declared war;
(B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between
two or more nations; or
(C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin; and
(5) the term "domestic terrorism" means activities that-
in the prevention or punishment of terrorism. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d) (Supp. 2002), which
defines terrorism:
as used in this section [international terrorism is] -(I) terrorism involving citizens
or the territory of more than 1 country; (2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents; and (3) the term "terrorist group" means
any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice,
international terrorism.
187. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (2002).
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(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 188
Working Definition of Terrorism
Terrorism, for purposes of this article, will be defined, then elabo-
rated, as the use of violence against innocent individuals for the purpose
of obtaining thereby some military, political, or philosophical end from
a third-party government or group. The violence must be aimed at or
must wantonly impact innocent civilians. Terrorism is political or ideo-
logical violence without restraint of law or morality. It is terrorism even
if it is fully domestic, but it is international terrorism only when the
conduct transcends borders or is so massive that it poses a threat to inter-
national peace and security or includes a use of weapons of mass
destruction . This definition obviates any application of self-defense
because innocents include non-combatants in war and non-attackers in a
non-war setting. One has no right to "defend oneself' with violence
against a person who is not threatening one's life or limb, in either
context.
Later, I will provide a more detailed definition of terrorism, and I
will determine its constituent elements and analyze them. We will con-
sider whether a war crime or crime against humanity is a functional
equivalent of terrorism, when occurring during a legally recognized or
recognizable armed attack. It will be necessary in this process to distin-
guish both domestic and international self-defense and to distinguish the
legal and illegal use of violence in war. It may be that the offenses
relevant to this article (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terror-
ism) have equivalent elements and similar harmful impact, but they
occur in different factual and legal circumstances. The differing circum-
stances are crucial to an understanding of terrorism and to adopting any
proper legal response to it.
This definition of terrorism, at least, provides for determining what
sort of conduct clearly constitutes the crime. 89 Regardless of whether
188. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 178, at § 2331.
189. For further discussion of the definition of terrorism, see Richard Baxter, A Skeptical Look
at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380 (1974); John Dugard, International Terrorism:
Problems of Definition, 50 INT'L AFF. 67 (1974); Thomas Franck and Scott Senecal, Porfiry's
Proposition: Legitimacy and Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195 (1987); Walter Laqueur,
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terror-violence occurs in a setting where it should be called a war crime,
a crime against humanity, state, or group terrorism, it is proscribed ter-
ror-violence. Terrorism from this point of view is a form of especially
violent crime, and so it has traditionally been considered by Anglo-
American, Continental, Islamic, and other systems of jurisprudence. 190
International law condemns this conduct and provides for universal
jurisdiction to be asserted over each of these types of terrorism on the
basis of at least three legal theories.19' Prosecution is appropriate under
each of these theories. Most, if not all, people consider violence against
their own people, innocents or noncombatants to be evil and illegal,
whether done by powers within their nation or by outsiders. Govern-
mental violence against innocents may provide justification for revolu-
tion,' 92 but it does not excuse or justify violence by proxy against those
of the nationality, ethnicity, or group from which the "evil-doers"
came. 193 If conduct is illegal when committed against one's own, it is
illegal to commit the same conduct, even if committed against the inno-
cent civilians of the original "evil-doers"' co-nationals or the innocent
civilians of countries that harbor them. To target these innocents is a
crime, whether committed by a soldier or other government agent during
Reflections on Terrorism, 64 FOREIGN AnF. 86, 88 (1986); Levitt, supra note 136; Ali Khan, A
Legal Theory of International Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 945 (1987).
190. MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955); Robert
Friedlander, Mere Rhetoric is Not Enough, 7 HARV. INT'L REV. 4, 6 (1985) (noting that the acts
that go into what is called terrorism are crimes and have been recognized and punished as such in
Anglo-American and continental jurisprudence).
191. The universality theory, the protective principle, and the territorial theories all would
suffice to provide jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite a person who committed the acts presented
as terrorism. See generally Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33, 70-81 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed., 1998); Christopher L.
Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1109, 1110 (1982); Patrick Moser, Mexican Authorities to Extradite Argentine Ex-Officer to
Spain, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Feb. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2334111; George P. Fletcher,
On Justice and War-Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 635, 636 (2002); Edward C. Synder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of
Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253 (1995); Christopher C. Joyner,
Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 166 (1996); see generally The Threat Posed by
the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. D1214-15 (2000)
(statement of Raphael F. Perl). But see Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International
Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L,J. 840, 855-56 (2002); Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia,
and the Limits of Law, 46 NAT'L INT. (1996).
192. See discussion of history supra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
193. With the heightened warnings issued by the Bush Administration in May 2002, talk
shows on television and radio are rife with comments that a pre-emptive nuclear strike would be
appropriate against a nation such as Saudi Arabia, from which several of the al-Qaeda operatives
came.
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a war or civil insurrection, or by a member of a political or guerilla
group.
Constituent Elements of Terrorism
The elements of terrorism, therefore, are: (1) violence committed
by any means; (2) causing death, great bodily harm, or serious property
damage; (3) to innocent individuals; (4) with the intent to cause those
consequences or with wanton disregard for those consequences and for
the purpose of coercing or intimidating some specific group, or govern-
ment, or otherwise to gain some perceived political, military, or other
philosophical benefit; (5) without justification or excuse.
The element of "justification or excuse" is essentially pro-forma, to
round out the definition in criminal law terms: there is no justification or
excuse for the intentional or wanton killing or doing great bodily harm
to innocent persons. The core concept of this definition is the use of
innocents (innocent civilians, non-combatants) to gain some military,
political, religious, or philosophical (including nihilistic) advantage.
This conduct is universally condemned in the sense that it is recog-
nized as criminal in virtually all nations and even among all groups, at
least in the sense that if the conduct is perpetrated against someone in
the group or nation, the nation or group considers itself to have been
attacked.' 94 Whether the conduct occurs during war (war crime) or dur-
ing relative peacetime (terrorism), the conduct is considered to be egre-
gious and criminal. The end or goal sought to be obtained by the
conduct does not provide an excuse or a justification. It does not matter
what ideology, philosophy, or religious ideal it arguably promotes. The
conduct is criminal no matter what it is designed to accomplish. This is
true even if it is aimed at combating terrorism or at combating
oppression.
If the terroristic conduct occurs during warfare, it is called a war
crime or crime against humanity. If it is committed during "peacetime"
or what seems today to be merely relative peacetime, it is terrorism. The
conduct is the same and the proscription is the same. For example, if a
group kidnaps and murders an infant child of a head of state or head of a
terrorist organization for the purpose of coercing that head of state or
terrorist group to provide some benefit, like releasing a hostage or pris-
oner, then the kidnapping and murder constitute terrorism. This may be
contrasted to killing or taking an enemy combatant captive during a war
(which is justified). It may also be contrasted to the common crimes of
kidnapping or murder for gain or revenge. The essential difference is
194. It has been so since the beginning of recorded time.
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the political nature of the terroristic conduct: it has a tactical or strategic
military or political purpose. It is also terrorism for a government to
torture, "disappear," or murder a cultural, religious, or ethnic minority,
its own citizens or non-citizens within their territory for the purpose of
intimidation, quelling dissent, or eliminating the group. This conduct is
subject to universal jurisdiction, so all nations have the right and the
obligation to prosecute or to extradite its perpetrators. The ultimate
manifestation of terrorism, of course, is genocide, such as that commit-
ted in Rwanda. 95
Thus, a war crime or crime against humanity 96 occurs when a state
agent or official allows or ignores the purposeful or criminally reckless
195. See generally, e.g., Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation,
12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2001-2002) (discussing Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide:
From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221 (2000)). Speaking at
"Genocide and the Rwandan Experience: A Rwanda-South Africa Dialogue," sponsored by the
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation on February 5-7, 2001, at Cape Town, Mark Drumbl
provided an alternative metaphor: "Individuals must peel off the layers of their own prejudice and
involvement." Mark Drumbl, Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide, 2
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 288, 295 (2000). Special Representative of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, submitted by the Special
Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Michel Moussalli, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/41/(2000) 197 [hereinafter Moussalli 2000]. Moussalli concludes that
"[r]econciliation of this kind is a lesson for the whole world. It belies the image of Rwanda as a
country riven by ethnic hatred." Id.
196. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: The Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 U.
COLO. L. REV. 449, 455 (1989) (defining crime against humanity).
The paradigm of justice established at Nuremberg and its vocabulary of
international law, despite its shortcomings, continue to frame the successor justice
debate. As a result, "Nuremberg" has become the shorthand term for reliance on
criminal prosecution as a primary mechanism for dealing with those responsible for
wrongs committed during a prior dispensation. Although the Nuremberg trials were
conducted internationally, the term is equally applied to intranational situations.
Since the handover of power was negotiated, it was not considered a realistic option
to have Nuremberg-type criminal trials where perpetrators, or at least the main
perpetrators, of human rights abuses would be punished for their crimes.
Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Cheating a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73
n.3 (2001) (citations omitted). Belgium has tried people accused of participating in the Rwandan
genocide for crimes against humanity. Rwandan Nuns on Trial for Genocide, CAPE TIMES, Apr.
18, 2001, at 4 (noting that "Belgium's eagerness to stage the £1.4 million trial reflects its failure to
prevent the genocide in its former colony"). Last year in Belgium, the former colonial power, two
Rwandan nuns were convicted of murder for their roles in the massacre of 7,000 Tutsis who
sought protection at a Benedictine convent. See Emily Wax, Islam Attracting Many Survivors of
Rwanda Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2002, at A10; Belgian Court: Nuns Guilt)' of War
Crimes in Rwanda, NEWSDAY, June 8, 2001, at A22; NY Times on extraterr. juris by U.S. Dan
Eggen, Ashcroft Pushes Senate on Judicial Nominees: Speech Fuels Battle Over Confirmations,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2001, at A04; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., N.Y Bank Probe Finds No Proof of
Mob Links; Lawmakers Still Plan Hearings, Legislation, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at E01,
1999WL 23304718. See also Style: Spying, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at C14, available at 2002
WL 23855452.
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killing of innocents (hors du combat), or the peacetime equivalent of
those hors du combat (innocent civilians).
The justifications for international criminal liability for perpetrators
of the international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity have remained essentially unchanged in the half
century since World War II's Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Despite
the vast literature on those famous prosecutions, including extensive
critiques leveled at what they accomplished, there is a remarkable
degree of consensus among international lawyers in favor of interna-
tional criminal accountability for mass murderers, rapists, and
torturers. 197
The universal criminal nature of these offenses is seen in the laws
of each nation and customs of each group. The conduct we are discuss-
ing is even seen as criminal when done between youth gangs. When the
act is perpetrated against "me" or "us," it is criminal. When one group
commits the act, it invariably tries to hide that fact. This again proves its
knowledge of the criminal nature of the act. Cover-up occurs even when
a group commits such conduct in retaliation or to "obtain justice" for
crimes committed against it. No doubt, such conduct is universally con-
demned as criminal.
Insight from Protocols I & H to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
On June 8, 1977, the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflicts adopted two protocols supplementing these
conventions: the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes, and the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,198 and relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II)."' The protocols entered into force December 7, 1978.2o
197. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 365, 365-66 (1999) (citations omitted).
198. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Ronald Reagan, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention on the Protection of War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987), 16 I.L.M. 1391
(1977).
199. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I1].
200. Protocol I, supra note 198, at preamble. The text of the protocols also appears at 72 AM.
J. INT'L L. 457 (1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (Protocol I), and 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (Protocol
II).
1094 [Vol. 57:1041
RUMINATIONS ON TERRORISM
Protocol I still has not received the advice and consent of the U.S.
Senate.
The debate over Protocol I provides insight into the difficulties in
defining terrorism. President Reagan, in January 1987, transmitted Pro-
tocol I to the Senate for its advice and consent, stating:
[The protocol] is essentially an expansion of the fundamental human-
itarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions with
respect to non-international armed conflicts, including humane treat-
ment and basic due process for detained persons, protection of the
wounded, sick and medical units, and protection of noncombatants
from attack and deliberate starvation. If these fundamental rules
were observed, many of the worst human tragedies of current internal
armed conflicts could be avoided. In particular, among other things,
the mass murder of civilians is made illegal, even if such killings
would not amount to genocide because they lacked racial or religious
motives. Several Senators asked me to keep this objective in mind
when adopting the Genocide Convention. I remember my commit-
ment to them. This Protocol makes clear that any deliberate killing
of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international armed conflict
is a violation of the laws of war and a crime against humanity, and is
therefore also punishable as murder.
While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to
this agreement, I have at the same time concluded that the United
States cannot ratify a second agreement on the law of armed conflict
negotiated during the same period. I am referring to Protocol I addi-
tion to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would revise the rules
applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other efforts
associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this
agreement has certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is funda-
mentally and irreconcilably flawed. It contains provisions that would
undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war. One of
its provisions, for example, would automatically treat as an interna-
tional conflict any so-called "war of national liberation." Whether
such wars are international or non-international should turn exclu-
sively on objective reality, not on one's view of the moral qualities of
each conflict. To rest on such subjective distinctions based on a
war's alleged purposes would politicize humanitarian law and elimi-
nate the distinction between international and non-international con-
flicts. It would give special status to "wars of national liberation," an
ill-defined concept expressed in vague, subjective, politicized termi-
nology. Another provision would grant combatant status to irregular
forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to dis-
tinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise com-
ply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among
whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.
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These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be
remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to
submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an
expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view. Finally,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded that a number of the
provisions of the Protocol are militarily unacceptable.2 'O
Whether one agrees or disagrees with President Reagan's reasons
for not becoming party to Protocol I, one may ask whether these reasons
retain their validity after the demise of the Soviet empire and the end of
the Cold War. Protocol I, article 51(2) prohibits "[a]cts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population. 2 °2 Is it appropriate to refuse ratification of this and
other salutary rules in Protocol I because it would provide "national lib-
eration movements" a "rhetorical and political victory"? Would the
United States be in a stronger or weaker legal position in its current "war
on terrorism" if it were party to Protocol I?
There may be other reasons for opposing Protocol I. For example,
did it go far enough? Professor Michael Reisman suggests that Protocol
I represents a shift away from the status quo in international affairs.20 3
He notes that Protocol I does not allow an existing state that has suffered
low intensity incursions or aggression to attack another state in which
the original low-intensity attackers have found haven, an innovation
contrary to self-defense in customary international law °.20  This is a
valid criticism. One can also criticize Protocol I for a basic confusion
between humanitarian rules for protecting victims during armed conflict
(jus in bello) and rules aimed at determining the status of parties to con-
flict (jus ad bellum). To the extent that Protocol I makes jus in bello
dependent on jus ad bellum it is unfortunate. Jus in bello originally was
undertaken as a matter of self-interest, but had the effect of protecting
victims within the embattled state, no matter what "morality" was seen
to reside with their "side." Jus in bello in Protocol I is viewed as apply-
ing only in certain "acceptable" wars. Protocols I and II made the
humanitarian rules applicable to more conflicts but, unfortunately, Pro-
tocol I limits their applicability on the basis of an ideological litmus
201. Reagan, supra note 198, at 910-11. BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES, supra note 6, at 1185-86,
1310-12.
202. Protocol Additional to the Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(2), opened for signature June 8,
1977 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978; restating the same principle)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
203. Michael Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in
Contemporary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 175-80 (1988).
204. Id.
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Terrorism Distinguished from Domestic Common Crime
Generally, it seems that U.S. domestic law has incorporated inter-
national treaties on some specific offenses that are considered terroristic,
proscribing the conduct. Classic examples of this are airline hijacking
and sabotage offenses.20 6 If a common crime such as murder is commit-
ted in a manner that conforms to terrorism, it appears that the terror
element functions as an aggravating factor, enhancing the
punishment.2 °7
It may be worthwhile to consider the conceptual relationship
between terrorism and basic substantive criminal law, including the con-
stituent elements of murder, self-defense, and other justifications for
violence. This allows us to consider terrorism in the context of basic
principles of culpability and innocence.
Defining Innocent: Justifiable and Unjust Violence Distinguished
No doubt, the term "innocent" is value loaded 2 8 and difficult to
define. It is true that the term is a difficult one that, like the term terror-
ism, has often been appropriated by propagandists. The difficult part
relates to what makes a person innocent. Still, it is necessary to define
the term if killing or violence during war or even individual self-defense
is going to be justified or excused. In the domestic law of all countries,
205. See id. at 193-97; Alfred P. Rubin, International Law and the Use of Force by National
Liberation Movements, 13 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 410, 414 (1989). President Reagan's
position with respect to Protocol I was vigorously rebutted by the Legal Adviser to the Directorate
of the International Committee of the Red Cross in an article entitled, Hans-Peter Gasser, An
Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987).
206. See, e.g., Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Montreal Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, Feb. 24,
1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-19; Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; see also
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 668; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 685.
207. See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, supra note 14.
208. Jordan Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN.
L. REV. 97, 704, 721 (1987).
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when one human being intentionally kills another human being it is mur-
der or another form of criminal homicide unless the perpetrator is justi-
fied or excused. 0 9 Justification exists when a person is defending
himself or another,21 ° or when he or she is required to commit the act by
law, for example, during war. When the line is drawn between justifia-
ble or excusable homicide and criminal homicide, one necessarily
defines who is innocent. The perpetrator commits criminal homicide if
he intentionally or recklessly kills a person who is innocent; that is, so
long as the victim was not attacking the perpetrator with deadly force.
An equivalent principle exists for an individual who is not an enemy
combatant with whom he is at war.2 11
209. See generally JOSEPH CONRAD, LORD JIM (1925); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 167.
210. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); George Fletcher,
Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, in
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 123, 123-27 (Edward Wise ed., 1975).
211. It seems a rather enormous deduction to make on the basis that men and boys of military
age were massacred. Can there not be other plausible explanations for the destruction of 7,000
men and boys in Srebrenica? Could they not have been targeted precisely because they were of
military age, and thus actual or potential combatants? Would someone truly bent upon the
physical destruction of a group and cold-blooded enough to murder more than 7,000 defenseless
men and boys go to the trouble of organizing transport so that women, children, and the elderly
could be evacuated? It is certainly striking that another Trial Chamber, in Sikirica, dismissed the
"significant part" argument after noting that the common denominator of the victims was that they
were men of military age and nothing more, as if this were insufficient. William A. Schabas, Was
Genocide Committed in Bosnia & Herzegovina? First Judgments of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 23 n. 115 (2001); Krstic, Case no. IT-
98-33-T, para. 595 (citation omitted).
Finally, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, in terms of the requirement of Article
4(2) of the Statute that an intent to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless
concern a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively, the military
aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica do in fact constitute a substantial part of
the Bosnian Muslim group, because the killing of these men inevitably and
fundamentally would result in the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim
community at Srebrenica.
Id.; see also, e.g., Kader Asmal et al., When the Assassin Cries Foul, in LOOKING BACK,
REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA 94 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000). Some have considered the
possible origins and implications of this restriction on self-help:
[T]he mythology of females as essentially non-violent grew out of a profound
impulse to give special protection to the bearers of future generations-a sort of
gender version of the non-combatant status of medics and Red Cross workers. But
the problem is the same for all non-combatants, whether in wartime or danger-
ridden peace: You can still get hurt, but you're not allowed to fight back.
Kathryn Kahler, Penalty: Death, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), May 2, 1993, at Fl,
available at 1993 WL 7535364. U.S. ARMY, CENTER FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS
(CLAMO) THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, CLAMO Report, 2001 ARMY LAW. 29.
These views do not necessarily reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General, the Department
of the Army, or any other government agency. Preparation Tips for the Deployment of a Brigade
Operational Law Team (BOLT) Law of War (LOW) matters are often paid lip service by brigade
leaders, under the assumption that a good soldier intuitively understands the line between criminal
and lawful acts. Id. The LOW, however, raises issues that conflict or appear to conflict with
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Culpability and Innocence
The term "innocent" is essential to any useful definition of terror-
ism, but the term must be specific and limited. Again, basic concepts of
criminal law and the laws of war provide clarity. In this context an
"innocent" means a non-attacker, a noncombatant during hostilities, or
his relative peacetime equivalent.2"2 There is no justification for killing
individuals hors du combat.21 3 One may analogize to the law of war, to
the concept of self-defense in domestic criminal law, 214 and to self
defense in international law.215 Oppression may be analogized to an
attack, allowing for justified revolutions based on a theory of self-
defense. "Self-defense" attacks, however, must be against individuals
holding the status of original attackers. To apply this test to the farmer
growing food ultimately used by the army would result in a murder or
mission accomplishment, such as the duty to evacuate friendly and enemy casualties in triage
order, as opposed to all friendly casualties first. Id. Brigades must not neglect LOW training
during pre-deployment preparations, and the BOLT should ensure that the training addresses the
"gray areas" of LOW combatant obligations not rising to the level of willful criminal acts.
212. For the rules in substantive criminal law, see, for example, PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
167, at 1119-1137; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 491-503 (3rd ed. 2000); FLETCHER, supra
note 210, at 123-27; George Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor, supra note
210, at 123, 123-27. For the rules in public international law, see, for example, Burrus Carnahan,
Lincoln, Lieber, and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military
Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 215, 219 (1998); LESLIE C. GREEN, CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
ARMED CONLICr, 197-243, 252-54, 347-54 (2d ed. 2000) (1993); Oscar Schacter, Self-Defense
and the Rule of Law, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 259 (1989); DINSTEIN, supra note 150; FRrrS KALSHOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 26 (1971); see also Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking
International Self-Defense: The United Nations' Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 20
(1998) (discussing the Caroline case of 1837, where U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
asserted that self-defense may be exercised only when the "necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation") (citations
omitted); Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law of Belligerent
Reprisals in International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155 (2001); Lt. Col. Mark S. Martins, Deadly
Force is Authorized, but also Trained, 2001 ARMY LAW. 1; Edward Kwakwa, Belligerent
Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 49, 50 (1990); William V. O'Brien,
Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 423
(1990).
213. A person not taking direct part in the hostilities is hors du combat. One is also hors du
combat upon surrender, when sick or wounded, or when serving as medical personnel. See INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS (1987); KI'rICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 129-39; Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Rep. 1996, para. 78; GREEN, supra
note 212, at 347-54 Carnahan, supra note 212, at 215, 219.
214. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 167, at 1119-37; LAFAVE, supra note 212, at
491-503; FLETCHER, supra note 210, at 855-75; Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic
Aggressor supra note 210, at 123-27.
215. See generally Carnahan, supra note 212, at 215, 219; GREEN, supra note 212, at 2, 6-7, 9-
10, 58, 73, 124, 130, 192, 340-54; Schacter, supra note 212, at 259; DINSTEIN, supra note 150, at
180; KALSHOVEN, supra note 212, at 26; see also Clemmons & Brown, supra note 212, at 243
Mitchell, supra note 212, at 155; Martins, supra note 212, at 1; Kwakwa, supra note 212, at 50;
O'Brien, supra note 212, at 423.
20031 1099
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
terrorist murder conviction if the farmer were executed to gain military
advantage. As in domestic law, self-defense matters; the determination
of whether the person killed is an attacker may be difficult in a given
case, but line drawing and categorization is the job of the judiciary. In
most cases it is not difficult.
It is suggested that it is inappropriate to determine what interna-
tional conduct is criminal by focusing on the object or the purpose of the
conduct. Generally, crime is defined by an act and a mental element, not
by its motive or object.2"6 It is argued that one should delineate a crime
by what was done, not why it was done or to whom. 17 Although this
argument is generally true, it is misleading. Proof of crime requires a
mens rea as well as an actus reus. Culpability is based on the mens rea
(intent to kill or wanton disregard for human life) that concurs with the
actus reus (shooting) to cause the prohibited result (death of an innocent
human being). Motive may or may not be relevant to proving the culpa-
ble mental state, but motive is not the culpable mental state. The perpe-
trator's intent, knowledge, or other culpable mental state regarding the
object and the act done to the object are precisely what must be proved
to establish guilt. For example, if one kills, reasonably believing he is
killing a deadly attacker, he acted in self-defense. If he has no such
reasonable belief, he is not justified or excused. If a person kills know-
ing he is killing a person rather than a deer, he has a mental state that
may establish criminal homicide when he acts to fulfill that end. Moreo-
ver, if one kills a deer, sincerely believing it is a person, one may not be
convicted of a criminal homicide. Similarly, a war crime is committed
when violence is perpetrated, intentionally or wantonly, against noncom-
batants (innocents), even though the same conduct is not criminal if
committed against combatants. A homicide will be justified if commit-
ted against a person attacking the killer with deadly force, but the killing
will be murder if one intentionally or knowingly kills an innocent. Kill-
ing an innocent will be criminal homicide, even if the killing is commit-
ted to save one's own life. It is criminal homicide to shoot an innocent
person, even if to fail to do so would cause oneself or a relative to be
killed by a third person. It is substantively necessary, therefore, to con-
sider the object of an allegedly criminal act and the object's status or
conduct toward the criminal. Culpability is based on the object's action
or status in conjunction with the perpetrator's mental state vis-A-vis that
object and its action or status. Thus, it is perfectly appropriate, even
216. See discussion and writings cited in Thomas Franck & Scott Senecal, Porfiry's
Proposition: Legitimacy and Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 197 (1987).
217. See id.
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necessary, to define criminal terrorism by taking the object and the
mental state into account.
Self-defense, like self-determination, often is asserted improperly
as a justification for killing. It is not difficult to determine the validity
of a self-defense claim.218  It is not self-defense to attack an innocent
who is not attacking the person raising the defense, even if killing the
innocent will preserve the life of the defendant. Self-preservation is not
self-defense. 219  Self-defense does not apply unless the victim/attacker
forced a choice on the killer to kill the victim/attacker or be killed.22°
This defense, along with its limitations, applies to individuals or groups.
Terrorism Distinguished from War Crimes
Today, war, or what might be called war, has changed to the point
that making sense of distinctions among terrorism, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes is difficult. Yet, making the distinctions is
important and possible. One problem seems to be that "war" in the
traditional sense of formal declared belligerency rarely, if ever, occurs
today. It may be that we have moved into a phase of world history in
which the people of the world are in a continual state of eruption into
internecine strife or war. That is, not strife that is not full blown civil
war or insurgency, but strife among or between members of the same
state; take, for example, the wars in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and
Palestine. These situations may. not have been declared formally to be
belligerency, but they seem like war to those involved. Perhaps we have
devolved into a situation similar to that which existed prior to the birth
218. See supra note 214.
219. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (Wall Jr.) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383);
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B. 273 (1884); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW & LITERATURE
110-14 (1931) ("[T]is not right on the art of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another.
There is no rule of human jettison."); Joseph J. Simeone, Survivors' of the Eternal Sea: A Short
True Story, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1123 (2001). German law may excuse the killing of a person
under a circumstance such as that in Dudley & Stephens. In former German Penal Code 35, a
person acts without culpability (das Schuld) if he does an act to avert an imminent, otherwise
unavoidable, risk to his life. The killing, however, would be rechtswidrig (wrongful; unlawful,
violative of the overall social order, though not culpable). The killing clearly does not fit the
German notion of self-defense, to kill the approaching, would-be cannibals. Fletcher,
Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor supra note 210, at 130-31; see also FLETCHER, supra
note 210, at 857-864. David Wasserman argues convincingly that the peculiar force of self-
defense as a justification is the "fact that the aggressor is forcing a choice between lives at the
moment he is killed." David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 356, 357
(1987).
220. "'Good Skipper' use him truly, For he is ill and sad 'Hush! Hush!' he cried, then cruelly
He kill'd the little lad." F. Morgans, Ballad of the Mignonette, reprinted at A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON,
CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW 253-54 (1984); Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B. 560,
52 L.T.R. 107, 111 (1885); see also Wasserman, supra note 219, at 357. For a discussion of self-
defense in international law, see generally DINSTEIN, supra note 150.
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of the nation-state.22'
Conventional and customary international law have proscribed cer-
tain conduct even during war: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. Certain conduct will violate international humanitarian law
governing an armed conflict.222 Indeed, war crimes are grave offenses
against the laws of war (jus in bello).223 Every offense against the laws
of war is not a war crime, but grave breaches are. 224 The Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, for the protection of war victims, provide a listing of
these grave breaches, which proscribe certain conduct against certain
persons and property protected under the Conventions. 25 Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, lists other grave
breaches. 226 These listings are not exhaustive. 227
Some Specific Crimes as Examples
War crimes, like any other crime, require an actus reus and a mens
rea. Thus, for "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, the mens
rea includes intent or recklessness, which may include what the com-
mon law called "depraved heart conduct" or criminal negligence, to use
Model Penal Code terminology.228 For the ICC Statute, the Preparatory
221. For an interesting philosophical discussion of these issues, see MICHAEL HARDT &
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000).
222. See KITrICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 227; GREEN, supra note 212, at 197-243; MARCO
SASS6LI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND
TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
161-62, 231, 444-50 (1999); THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
(Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory
eds., 1996).
223. Yoram Dinstein, The Distinctions Between War Crimes and Crimes Against Peace, in
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 222, at 1, 3.
224. Id.; see also Trial of Hagendorf (U.S. Military Court, Dachau, 1946), 13 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 146, 148 (1949); Hersh Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the
Punishment of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 77 (1944); Bernard Victor Aloysius
R61ing, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction Since 1945, 100 RECUEIL DES COURS 323,
340 (1961).
225. See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
226. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977); see
also DINSTEIN, supra note 150, at 4.
227. Id.
228. See discussion of this in the Celebici Judgment, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No.
IT-96-21-A, 782, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugoslavia, App. Chamber (2001)
[herinafter Celebici Judgment]; see also KI'rICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 142.
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Committee has deemed the general mens rea to be intent or knowledge,
or both.229
The actus reus for murder, or what the ICC calls "willful killing,"
is satisfied by establishing that the accused's conduct (acts or omissions)
caused the deaths of "protected persons" by whatever means.2 3 ° Pro-
tected persons include prisoners of war or captured persons of the
opposing military, or an innocent civilian. 231 Thus, causing death by
starvation, execution without a fair trial, or torture or ill-treatment of
POWs or innocent civilians in violation of the laws and customs of war
would satisfy the actus reus.232 The mens rea is satisfied if this conduct
is performed intentionally, with knowledge or reckless disregard for
human life.233
The term "terrorism" is generally applied to circumstances of rela-
tive peacetime; when there is no belligerency or armed conflict in the
legalistic sense. It may be, however, that the same conduct would con-
stitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or terrorism, with the dif-
ferentiating feature being only the factual-legal context. Intentional
killing of a human being is murder in domestic law.234 In common law
systems the intentional part for murder is deemed to be killing "with
malice aforethought" to distinguish it from justifiable or excusable kill-
ing.235 On the other hand, the exact same conduct, killing a human
being with intent to do so, is considered justifiable if done in self-
defense or during war as long as that human being is an attacker or an
enemy combatant not hors du combat.236 Killing a human being (sol-
dier) who is hors du combat is a war crime during international or inter-
nal armed conflict.237 This same conduct, killing of a human being, may
be a crime against humanity if the person is an innocent civilian; the line
229. KIT'ICHAISAREE, supra note 152, at 142.
230. See, e.g., id. (citing Celebeci Judgment).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., id.
233. See, e.g., the Celebici Judgment, supra note 228, at 437-439; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case
No. IT-95-14, 788, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia) (2000), available
at http://www.unorg.icty [hereinafter Blaskic Judgment]. These types of mens rea are also
roughly part of common law malice aforethought. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE supra note 167, at
125-38; see also FLETCHER, supra note 210, at 235-391; LAFAVE, supra note 212, at 651-87.
234. Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B. 273, 285-86 (1884); see also Regina v. Howe, I
App. Cas. 417 (H.L. 1987); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C. Pa. 1842); GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 604 (2d ed. 1983); JOHN SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND
EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (1989). On the moral problem of choosing one's victim, see
Andrew Ashworth, Justifications, Necessity, and the Choice of Evils, in PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 153-54 (3d ed. 1999).
235. See LAFAVE, supra note 212, at 651-87; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 167, at 46-119;
FLETCHER, supra note 210, at 235-391.
236. See supra note 213.
237. KITI'ICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 129-39; RED CROSS, supra note 213; Legality of the
2003] 1103
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
between the two is sometimes blurred. The same conduct will be terror-
ism when committed when there is no armed conflict; it may also be a
crime against humanity, and some have argued that it should be prose-
cuted before the International Criminal Court. 38 The essential com-
monality in these offenses is that they all entail individual responsibility
for killing innocent human beings.
War crimes and crimes against humanity are less poorly defined
than terrorism, but suffer from some vagueness of definition, at least for
purposes of basic criminal law. Some violence is obviously legal. For
example, some argue that violent humanitarian intervention is justified
in the manner and nature of substantive criminal law's defense of others
(which is akin to self-defense).239
What would be murder in civil society is justified in war. Inten-
tional killing coupled with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm is
war's essence. Where does terrorism fit amidst the definitions of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and common crime? How may terror-
ism be distinguished from war?
When one is at war, the enemy combatant, at least theoretically, is
akin to an attacker. He is trying to kill and, hence, may be killed. Kill-
ing such an attacker is considered self-defense in domestic law or peace-
time. It is justifiable homicide during war.24° On the other hand, if one
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 213, at para. 78; GREEN, supra note 212, Caranhan,
supra note 212, at 215, 219.
238. See, e.g., UN Weekly Newsletter, Robinson Says Establishment of International Criminal
Court Key to Fighting Terror (Mar. 9, 2002), available at http://www.unic.org.in/News/2002/nl/
nl9mar2002.htm 17.
239. See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust
Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 9-18 (2002) (discussing the debate over
humanitarian intervention); see also Farook Hassan, RealPolitik in International Law: After
Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
859 (1981); Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992); Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 189-91 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1973); BLAKESLEY, CASES, supra note 6, at 1117-27 (presenting the debate and
interventions in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), and Iraq, among others).
240. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, XIII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 149-51 (1949).
The finding of the Court [to acquit Erich Weiss and Wilhem Mundo, tried on 9-10
November 1945 by U.S. military commission for the alleged unlawful killing of an
American prisoner] is evidence that self-defence which, according to general
principles of penal law is an exonerating circumstance in the field of common penal
law offenses when properly established, is also relevant, on similar grounds, in the
sphere of war crimes.
Id. See also R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and MacLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
82, 91 (1938).
Id. For analysis of self-defense in wartime, see generally DINSTEIN, supra note 150; see also
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST & UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
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attacks and kills another without having been attacked first, it constitutes
criminal homicide-a war crime, depending on the context.24' Attack-
ing another nation without being under imminent attack from that nation
is a violation of jus ad bellum.242
Some conduct that is criminal even during justified war violates jus
in bello.243 International humanitarian law is derived from international
conventions and customary international law. It governs how force can
be used (jus in bello). Killing non-combatants or innocent civilians is
criminal. Jus in bello in the law of war is one of the oldest subjects of
international law and has a long history in customary international
law.24 4 Customary legal restraints on warfare are premised on the gen-
eral doctrine that destruction and violence, superfluous to actual military
necessity, are immoral and wasteful. Air bombardment is subject to
constraints both in relation to the selection of targets and to the accuracy
of the bombardment itself. By the time of the U.S. bombings in Cambo-
ILLUSTRATIONS 86 (2d ed. 1992). The U.N. Charter authorizes the use of force in only two
situations: self-defense, or when the Security Council authorizes it. The jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice is also very clear. See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are
We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in
the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 24 (1999); see also Leslie C. Green, The Law of
Armed Conflict and the Enforcement of International Criminal Law, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN
LAW OF WAR 239 (1985); Michael Mandel, Nato's Bombing of Kosovo Under International Law:
Politics & Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our Case Against Nato and the Lessons
to be Learned from it, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95, 107-08 (2001). Cf Gordon Christenson, Jus
Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988);
see also Nicole Barrett, Note, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of
Customary International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 429, 443-44 (2001); Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court: Possibilities
for Prosecutorial Abuse, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (2001).
241. See U.N. CHARTER chs. I, V-VII (noting especially note arts. 51 and 2(4)).
242. See Alfred P. Rubin, Jus ad Bellum and Jus Cogens: Is hnmorality Illegal?, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CHALLENGES AHEAD; ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS
KALSHOVEN 595-611 (Astrid I.M. Delissen et al. eds., 1991). On reprisal, see GREEN, supra note
240, at 197-243, 252-54, 347-54; see also WALZER, supra note 240, at 86.
243. See SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR, supra note 95, at 75-76; MALDERMAR A. KHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955); Waldemar A. Soilf, Protection of Civilians
Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117 (1986); U.S. v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); see generally
TAYLOR, VIETNAM, supra note 97; ANTONIO CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE
180 (S.J.K. Greenleaves trans., 1988) (discussing the 1,836 women and children executed by the
German Army as a reprisal for partisan attacks in the village of Marzabotto, Italy). It should be
noted that two heroic German soldiers were also executed for refusing to participate in the
slaughter. Id. For a brief discussion of the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and
the historical importance of maintaining the distinction, see Alfred P. Rubin, Jus ad Bellum and
Jus Cogens: Is Immorality Illegal?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT CHALLENGES
AHEAD; ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITs KALSHOVEN, supra at 595-611. On reprisal, see generally
GREEN, supra note 240; see also WALZER, supra note 240 at 86.
244. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 78 (1999) (citing GREEN,
supra note 240; SUN Tzu, supra note 95).
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dia and Laos in the late 1960s, a rule requiring that attempts be made to
spare civilians was firmly entrenched as a norm of customary interna-
tional law, and, thus, binding on all nations. This rule is based on three
related concepts: (1) distinction must be made between military targets
and civilians;2 45 (2) attacks must not be directed against civilians;24 6 and
(3) attacks must advance legitimate military objectives. 247 They must be
necessary and proportional.248
Some have argued that the analogue, when there is no state of war,
is terrorism or a crime against humanity. 49
245. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31: INTERNATIONAL
LAw-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS para. 1-3(c) (1976) [hereinafter
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET].
246. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS LIBRi TRES (1625); FRITS KALSHOVEN,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 4 (1987).
247. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD,
Gen. Orders No. 100, art. 23 (Adjutant General's Office, War Dep't) (1863) [hereinafter Lieber
Code]; League of Nations, Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing from the Air in
Case of War, Resolution of the League of Nations Assembly, O.J. SPEC. SUPP. 182, at 15 (1938);
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 225; G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at
1(c), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); see Protocol I, supra note 45, at art. 48. These concepts are elaborated in
numerous international conventions, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, U.S. military law, and
other significant international efforts to codify the customary norms of humanitarian law.
Notably, Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which entered into force in 1977,
codifies in treaty form many of these customary international legal principles.
248. Proportionality is a fundamental component of international law on the use of force and
the law of armed conflict. The concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are relevant to the
U.N.'s policy toward Iraq which set the balance between the achievement of a military goal and
the cost in terms of lives. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF
WAR 203-04 (1981) (defining proportionality in the jus ad bellum sense as "where the total evil of
the war is compared to its total good"; or "in contemporary language, the costs of the war must not
outweigh the benefits"). In the jus ad bello sense, proportionality has "to do with calculations of
force necessary to subdue the enemy." Id. at 202; see also Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality
and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993); U.N. CHARTER, Chapter VII, arts.
39-51. See generally Barrett, supra note 240, at 443-44 (discussing further the points made in this
paragraph).
249. See Akayesu decision and discussion and other aspects of the Rwandan Genocide.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial Chamber Sept. 2, 1998), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akayOOI.htm (on file with author)
[hereinafter Akayesu (TC)], affid Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A (ICTR App. Chamber
June 1, 2001), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/Akayesu/judgement/Arret/
index.htm); Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 365-66 (1999) (citations omitted); Daly, supra note 196, at 86 (discussing Mark
Drumbl, supra note 195):
Speaking at "Genocide and the Rwandan Experience: A Rwanda-South Africa
Dialogue," sponsored by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation on February 5-
7, 2001 at Cape Town. Mark Drumbl provides an alternative metaphor: "Individuals
must peel off the layers of their own prejudice and involvement."
Drumble, Sclerosis: Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide, 2 Punishment
& Soc'y 288, 295 (2000).
Id. at n.26. Michel Moussalli, Report of the Special Representative of the United Nations
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Terrorism Distinguished from Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity blur into and overlap with war crimes.
They both were declared intolerable, along with specific mention of the
slaughter of civilian populations, by the London Charter.25 0 The Nurem-
berg Tribunal, however, actually treated crimes against humanity and
war crimes as overlapping or interchangeable offenses.2
The Nuremberg Charter provided that crimes against humanity are:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian populations, before or during the
war; or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in exe-
cution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated. 52
The Protocol done at Berlin on October 6, 1945,253 modified this
article by replacing the colon before "or persecutions.. .." in the English
and French versions with a comma, so that it would be harmonized with
the Russian text.254 Thus, the two provisos: "in execution of or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" and
"whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated," cover the entire article. 5
Control Council Law Number Ten included a non-exhaustive list of
conduct considered crimes against humanity:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, tor-
ture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where
perpetrated.256
Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Aug. 4, 2000, at 197,
available at www.unhcr.ch. [hereinafter Moussalli 2000]. Moussalli concludes that
"Reconciliation of this kind is a lesson for the whole world. It belies the image of Rwanda as a
country riven by ethnic hatred." Id.
250. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 6(c); Gerry J. Simpson & Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, War
Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES 1, 4 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
251. The difference was that crimes against humanity consisted of the same conduct as war
crimes, but that which occurred in Germany itself or Austria and Czechoslovakia, those lands
annexed to Germany. KIT-rICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 87.
252. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, supra note 155, at art. 6(c).
253. Noted in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 2461, EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT SERIES 472 (1946); KIITICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 86.
254. KIrICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 86.
255. Id. (citing Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 188,
192-95, 204-05 (1946)).
256. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
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Control Council Number Ten added rape and torture to the Nuremberg
Charter list and also clarified that there was no requirement that the
crime against humanity be tied to a war crime, or that there be a nexus
between a crime against humanity and a war crime.257
The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have
elaborated and extended the scope of crimes against humanity, both in
their statutes258 and in their decisions.259 The Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court has developed the law even further in this
regard.26° It provides that crimes against humanity include conduct enu-
merated in the statute "when committed as a part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowl-
edge of the attack. ' This statute added: forcible transfer of popula-
tion;262 severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law;263 sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
Law No. 10, 36 I.L.R. 31 [ ]; KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 87. Control Council No. 10 is a
charter for the trial of war crimes, which was adopted by four major powers that were occupying
Germany. It called for trials in Germany by the courts of these occupying powers in their relative
sectors. See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 424, 426 (1993). Meron cites FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, ART. 44, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988); Suzanne Sidun, Comment,
An End to the Violence: Justifying Gender as a "Particular Social Group," 28 PEPP. L. REV. 103,
106, 109 (2000).
257. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 88 (citing Schwelb, supra, note 255, at 217-19.
258. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTFY), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1166 (1998); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000) [hereinafter ICTFY Statute] (establishing the tribunal
and endorsing a 34 article statute, annexed to the Secretary General's Report); Statute of
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighboring States Between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. S/RES/I165 (1998); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329
(2000) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
259. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21 -A.
260. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. The process ending in the successful promulgation of the Rome Statute for the ICC on
July 17, 1998, and the ultimate ratification and realization of the Court in April, 2002, was
initiated by a 1989 initiative by Trinidad and Tobago.
261. Id. at art. 7(1).
262. Id. at art. 7(l)(d); see also LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 158-59
(2002).
263. Rome Statute, supra note 260, at art. 7(l)(e); see also SADAT, supra note 262, at 138.
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of comparable gravity; 264 the crime of apartheid; 265 and the crime of
forced disappearances, such as that of the desaparecidos.266  The tradi-
tional catchall crime against humanity, "other inhumane acts," is
included, but refined and limited to acts "of a similar character intention-
ally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body, mental, or physi-
cal health." '267
The constituent elements of crimes against humanity include an
inhumane act in nature and character, that causes great suffering or seri-
ous injury to body, or to mental or physical health. The conduct must be
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack and must be
committed against a civilian population.268
The Actus Reus. Thus, the actus reus for a crime against humanity
includes participating in a widespread or systematic inhumane attack
against a civilian population that causes great suffering or serious bodily
injury to body, physical, or mental health.269
The Mens Rea. The mens rea for crimes against humanity must
include proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator actually
held the specific mens rea for the specific offense involved (say, murder,
rape, or torture), and that he committed the actus reus knowing or under-
standing the broader context in which it occurred z.27  That is, that his
conduct was part of a planned or policy based, widespread, or systematic
264. Rome Statute, supra note 260, at art. 7(l)(g); see also SADAT, supra note 262, at 138.
265. Rome Statute, supra note 260, at art. 7(1)(j); see also SADAT, supra note 262, at 138.
266. Rome Statute, supra note 260, at art. 7(l)(i); see also SADAT, supra note 262, at 138
(citing Alejandro Kirk, Desaparecidos, A Festering Wound, TERRA VIVA, June 24, 1998, at 4);
Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution & Impact of Foreign Human
Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2001). Note that the Agrupaci6n de
Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Chile (Chilean Group of Relatives of Detained and
Disappeared People) requested that Pinochet and other junta members be charged with genocide,
terrorism, and torture. With Pinochet as the nexus, the Spanish judicial system consolidated the
Argentine and Chilean cases before Judge Garz6n. On October 30, 2002, the National Audience
affirmed Spain's jurisdiction over the Argentine and Chilean cases and, on November 3, Spanish
Judge Garz6n issued a request of extradition against Pinochet on charges of genocide for
designing and implementing a plan, coordinated down to the smallest detail, to eliminate a sector
of the Chilean population. He also charged Pinochet with terrorism and torture. See BLAKESLEY,
CASES, supra note 6; Richard J. Wilson, Spanish Criminal Prosecutions Use International Human
Rights Law to Battle Impunity in Chile and Argentina, at http://www.Derechos.org/koaga/iii/5/
wilson.html?pinochet~tradition (last visited Mar. 25, 2001).
267. Rome Statute, supra note 260, at art. 7(1)(k); see also SADAT, supra note 262, at 138.
268. KTTrICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 90.
269. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96 B4-T, para. 578, Judgment at the
Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber (1998). Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR-96-3, para. 65, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber (1999);
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para 201, Judgment at the Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber (2000). These cases are cited and discussed in KITTICHAISAREE,
supra note 155, at 90-91.
270. KITrICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 91.
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attack on the civilian population.27'
Crimes Against Humanity and Terrorism are Quintessential Crimes
Crimes against humanity and terrorism are crimes of the first order.
They represent, along with genocide, the worst we mortals do to each
other; that is to say, as I will explain more fully below, to ourselves.
They are crimes of political violence without restraint of international
law or morality. One question for this article is whether international
criminal law and prosecution can even provide a remedy. The perpetra-
tor's motive is important: violence against innocents to achieve a politi-
cal, military, religious, or philosophical end or to be rid of individuals or
groups seen as enemies (or as at least as folks deemed to interfere with
"the good life"). Sometimes the offenses are bred of simple racial, relig-
ious, gender, or ethnic hatred, created and manipulated by evil leader-
ship. The leadership usually does this to gain or maintain power.
Finally, the people against whom the crimes are committed actually are
part of the essence of the crime.
This violence against innocents is condemned as criminal by every
nation of the world. When nations participate in it, they try to hide it or
to claim some exception or exemption from coverage. The conduct is
criminal and immoral no matter what its motivation. It is criminal
whether it is ostensibly done in the name of sovereignty, democracy,
national liberation, self-determination, God, or whatever other piety. It
is criminal even when done in the name of "rectifying wrongs" or for
"justice." The "values" one pretends to espouse in slaughtering innocent
people in reality are evil vanity. The crimes occur and, sadly, those
against whom these crimes are perpetrated often react in kind. The ven-
detta rages.
What is terrorism? How does terrorism compare to war crimes or
crimes against humanity? What is the proper response when one is
attacked with ferocious and indiscriminate272 force, causing the slaugh-
ter of thousands? What is the proper response when one is part of a
271. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, paras.
133-34, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber (1999); Prosecutor v. Dusko
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-T, paras. 626, 638, 656-57, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for former
Yugoslavia Trial Chamber (1997); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para 271,
Appeal at the Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber (1999); Prosecutor v. George
Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-1, para. 20, Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial
Chamber (2000); Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic & Others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, paras. 556-57,
Judgment at the Int'l Crim. Trib. for former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber (2000). These decisions
are discussed in K[TrICHAISAREE, supra note 155, at 91.
272. Perhaps it is more accurate to say "discriminate," in that innocent civilians were targeted
in the World Trade Center and in the airplanes used as weapons.
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group that has been oppressed for ages? What does one do? These are
questions that we must ask ourselves today.
Certainly, one defends self and family; one seeks to escape the
oppression. This is not so simple, however. Lofty rhetoric, perverted
religion and philosophy, appropriated principle, deep-seated fears and
hatreds are used to prompt people to commit acts of atrocity. These
things are also used to oppress. This article is an attempt to determine
the proper responses to oppression and atrocity such as that which
occurred on September 11, 2001. Is it possible to defend oneself and to
defend and protect the innocents of the world without purposefully or
indiscriminately destroying other innocents?
This article addresses terrorism, including the dangers that face
those engaging in a "war" on terrorism. These dangers may be similar
for those who use "terrorism" to fight what they see as oppression and
for those who use terror based measures to fight "terrorism." This
prompts us to focus on the need to define terrorism, to consider some of
the causes of terrorism, and to evaluate what a proper response to terror-
ism should be.
The overarching issue that motivates the article is whether oppres-
sion can provide any justification for the September 11 attack on the
United States and, similarly, whether that attack calls for self-defense
under international law and, finally, what is a proper legal form of self-
defense. Among other things, the article attempts to understand how
leaders of nations or groups induce or inflame hatred and fear in people
to the point of causing some to be willing to destroy themselves along
with those they see as infidels or enemies. What can cause individuals
to fly planes filled with innocent passengers as missiles into buildings
also filled with innocents? Thus, this article considers terrorism, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the parameters of self-defense, eluci-
dating the ideas behind and within these terms.
How is it possible to combat the menace of terrorism without
allowing oneself to fall into a trap of hatred or blind fear that leads to the
use of terrorism to fight terrorism? Officials claim that they are doing
everything possible to avoid civilian casualties, pundits and followers
argue that "they [al Qaeda, and the like] did not care that they were
destroying innocents, so why should we?" In the midst of our difficult
times, we run a significant risk of participating in or condoning violence
that also could include mass slaughter of innocent civilians.
Civil liberties and human rights have been eroded as an expedient
to fight terrorism. In the face of an attack as senseless and atrocious as
that of September 11, we have allowed promulgation of rules for "pro-
tection," which ultimately create a society that conforms more to what
20031
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the perpetrators of terrorism would want one to live under than the one
we intended to protect.2 73 We must, therefore, be vigilant to ensure that
we are not manipulated into taking action or acquiescing to action that is
terroristic and that can cause us to destroy ourselves or our values and
liberty in the process.
We have seen that when an armed attack is committed against a
person or group, it may require and justify a reaction in self-defense. 74
The September 11 attack was so malefic that it generates similar conduct
in reaction-conduct that one would wish that human beings could not
commit upon others.
Voltaire's "everyman" in Candide cynically reckoned that interna-
tional law and the laws of war were righteous brutality on a grand scale
and simple suffering on a human scale.2 75  His sense of international
law, terror, and our own tendency to become barbaric applies to our
tendency to confuse justice with vengeance.276 Exploitation of human
weakness by the few with power may be the prominent culprit.277 Primo
Levi despaired over the awful realization that common, everyday, "civi-
lized" people may fall into a miasma of evil. 278 Humans tend to distrust,
denigrate, and discriminate against those they see as different. This ten-
dency is often manipulated by "leaders" who appropriate it for their own
nefarious purposes. We are made to believe that those "who are differ-
ent" are dangerous.
Urania Cabral, the protagonist in The Feast of the Goat,279 talking
273. See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, supra note 14. The so-called Patriot Act provides the
following with regard to terrorism: it makes terrorism a predicate act for which a wiretap under
Title III can be authorized. The USA Patriot Act also authorized law enforcement to conduct
wiretapping for crimes related to computer fraud and abuse. Young, supra note 14, at 1064-65.
274. Principles of necessity and proportionality, rather than issues of jurisdiction, may inform
considerations of self-defense based military responses to terrorism. See, e.g., Robert J. Beck &
Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and Forcible State Responses to
Terrorism, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994) (discussing the United States response to the Iraqi
government's attempt to assassinate former President Bush); Timothy F. Malloy, Military
Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 287 (1987) (discussing proposed
responses to increases in terrorism against Americans); O'Brien, supra note 212, at 423.
275. Louis Rene Beres, Straightening the "Timber": Toward a New Paradigm of International
Law, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161 n.7 (1994) (citing FRANCOIS-MARIE VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 5
(4 Appelbaum ed., 1991) (1759)).
276. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 6, at 18-26, 177-79; Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note
102, at 77; Blakesley, Atrocity, supra note 62, at 211-24; P.D. JAMES, CERTAIN JUSTICE (1997).
277. See BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 22-31.
278. See PRIMO LEVI, I SOMMERSI E I SALVATI (THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED) (Summit
Books 1988) (1986); see also BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 15-26; SIGMUND FREUD,
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey trans., 1961). For an interesting fictional
musing on the subconscious, see IRVIN D. YALOM, WHEN NIETZSCHE WEPT: A STUDY OF
OBSESSION (1992).
279. LLOSA, supra note 90. The Goat was the secret nickname used by Dominicans for the
dictator Raphael Trujillo.
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to herself about the Trujillo era in the Dominican Republic, provides
insight as to how this happens:
[A]fter reading, listening, investigating, thinking, you've come to
understand how so many millions of people, crushed by propaganda
and lack of information, brutalized by indoctrination and isolation,
deprived of free will and even curiosity by fear and the habit of ser-
vility and obsequiousness, could worship Trujillo. Not merely fear
him but love him, as children eventually love authoritarian parents,
convincing themselves that the whippings and beatings are for their
own good.
The Need for Justice
Caesare Beccaria understood how impunity impeded both peace
and justice, noting that "the conviction of finding nowhere a span of
earth where real crimes were pardoned might be the most efficacious
way of preventing their occurrence."280 Individual criminal responsibil-
ity and protection of individual human rights must be the cornerstone of
any domestic or international action taken to combat terrorism, including
actual combat, extradition, and criminal prosecution.
Niremberg Principle Number I reads: "[a]ny person who commits
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible
therefor and liable to punishment."28' This principle provides one of the
bases for the "war" against terrorism (certainly for the prosecution of
terrorists), although its focus was on war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The "war against terrorism," in turn, includes elements of
law-enforcement and prosecution, as well as the use of force and vio-
lence. This principle was the motivation for the creation of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as for the per-
280. J.A. FARRAR, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS 103-94 (1880) (translating CAESARE BECCARIA,
DEI DELITI E DELLE PENE (1764)).
281. International Law Commission, Nuremberg Principle No. 1. In 1946, the U.N. General
Assembly affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the NUremberg Tribunal.
See, G.A. Res. 95(I), G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. at 1134-35, U.N.
Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946). This Resolution affirmed the law that was made or clarified at
Niremberg. It declared this law part of general international law. See also, Robert F. Drinan, The
N'remberg Principles in International Law, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NOREMBERG CODE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION at 174, 179 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin
eds., 1992). In 1949, the International Law Commission started working on the formulation of the
Nuremberg principles and preparatory work of a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and
Security of Mankind. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950)
(reporting on the Niiremberg Principles). See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable
Victims' Rights to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1399, 1043 (2002). The Niiremberg Principles imposed individual criminal liability for grave
international crimes and were later construed to require states to prosecute these crimes.
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manent International Criminal Court (ICC). We have wondered why
governments and scholars have been reticent to define terrorism.
What Justice is Due?
In the United States today, we are faced with the prospect of prose-
cuting accused terrorists in secret military commissions.282 Apparently,
President Bush has taken the power to decide that some of the alleged
terrorists in al Qaeda are not worthy of the protections afforded by the
Third Geneva Convention, which should apply to all combatants cap-
tured during an international armed conflict. 283  The administration's
position seems to be that these fighters are terrorists, therefore, although
they should be prosecuted and punished, they should not be afforded the
282. See President Bush's executive order of September 13, 2001, providing for the detention
and possible trial of terrorists in military commissions. See Tobias & Bryant, supra note 21; Ruth
Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A18; Harold Honjgu
Koh, Editorial, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,186581,00.html; Akhil Reed
Amar, War Powers: Is Bush Making History?, TIME MAG., Dec. 03, 2001, at 62; see also
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 11-12 (1946):
If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their
action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong
decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts
but for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions.
A U.S. military tribunal, established pursuant to the law of war, tried Japanese General Yamashita
in the fall of 1945 for his alleged war crimes committed in the Philippines. The crimes concerned
Yamashita's failure to exercise command responsibility for the conduct of his troops. The
Supreme Court again upheld the commission's jurisdiction. Several years later, the Supreme
Court held that a court established as part of American military government in the part of
Germany then occupied by the United States had jurisdiction to try an American dependent for a
crime she had committed. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Commander Yamashita was
convicted by a U.S. military tribunal and applied for habeas corpus, but the courts adjudicating the
application considered only the "lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for the
offense charged," not the evidence of his guilt. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8. None of the members
of the Control Council of Germany who reviewed the Nuremberg clemency petitions had a legal
education, and they agreed that review was to be "as a matter of policy" and that there would be
"no review on legal grounds." TAYLOR, supra note 97, at 604. The petitions for clemency of the
defendants convicted at Nuremberg were all denied. Id. at 606; see also Hon. Robinson 0.
Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the War on Terrorism, 48 Fed. Law. 20 (2001);
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
283. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See Human Rights Watch, U.S. Officials Misstate Geneva
Convention Requirements (HRW Press Release, Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://hrw.org/press/
2002/01/us012802.htm; see also Geneva Convention to Cover Taleban, BBC Online News
Report, Feb. 7, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1775162.stm; Hon. Richard
Goldstone, An International Legal Forum for Trying the Suspects of Al Qaeda, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Jan. 30, 2002, at Features Section 14.
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protections afforded combatants. It is claimed that these are "unlawful
combatants," presumably a term taken from the embarrassing U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Quirin.284  The prisoner of war
(POW) or non-POW status of the participants or conspirators is a sepa-
rate question from whether they have protections under the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, the Protocols to those Conventions, other conventions
relating to the protection of those accused of crime, and customary inter-
national law.285 Today, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide mini-
mum protections for all persons captured in any armed conflict.286
These protections include basic due process guarantees.287
Organization of American States (OAS) Urges the United States to
Reverse Detainees Decision
In March 2002, the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights called for a competent tribunal
to be convened to resolve the legal status of Guantanamo detainees. 288
284. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
285. See Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions; Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. I n.15 (2002); Int'l Comm., 3 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR, Commentary 51 n.1 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (noting that the Geneva
"Convention [for Civilians] contains a safety clause for the benefit of persons not covered [as
prisoners of war] ... in [common] Article 3 .... ("). But see Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War
Can't Protect al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at A17.
286. See supra note 283; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV]; see also Protocol
I, supra note 45. Protocol II, supra note 46.
287. Some of these guarantees are listed in the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), available in BLAKESLEY ET AL., supra note 6; see also
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. Each of these
reflects customary international law.
288. Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and
the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C.L.R. 1, 6 (2002). Camp Delta, a newer
and more modern facility, has been constructed near Camp X-Ray and, as of May 2002, is
receiving detainees. See Roy Gutman et al., Guantdnamo Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 34,
36. Transport to Camp X-Ray began on January 11, 2002. U.S. Readies New Prison at
Guantdnamo Bay, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Apr. 28, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com.
The issue is whether detained at Qaeda and Taliban fighters qualify for "prisoner of war" status
under the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see, e.g., Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189
F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (denying habeas petition brought on behalf of Camp X-Ray
detainees); John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International Armed Conflict, and Their
Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS, at http://www.asil.org/
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The Commission has been a primary and crucial entity promoting
human rights in the Western Hemisphere, being most known for its
efforts to end political disappearances in South America during the era
of military dictatorships.2 89 Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy
Director for Human Rights Watch, stated that the "Commission enjoys
tremendous respect in Latin America, [and that i]gnoring this ruling
could seriously hurt America's credibility as a defender of human rights
in the region. '290
The Bush Administration announced in February 2002 that it would
consider much of the Geneva Conventions to apply to the Taliban pris-
oners in Guantanamo Bay, but that prisoner of war status would be
denied, because these fighters failed to respect the laws of war or wear
uniforms. 29 ' These criteria have traditionally been used to withhold
POW status from irregular troops, not from regular forces fighting on
behalf of a government, such as the Taliban.292 The administration dis-
played its ignorance of or disdain for the Geneva Conventions because
even as it denies combatant status to those caged in Guantanamo, it is
ignoring that members of U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and
other places, for example, have fought while wearing traditional Afghan
(or other local) clothing. Thus, interpreting the Conventions and the cir-
cumstances in this way endangers U.S. troops, considering them expend-
able. "They may not realize it, but the administration has effectively
declared U.S. Special Forces fighting in Afghanistan to be unlawful
combatants," said Malinowski. "The OAS Commission is giving them
an opportunity to revisit that decision. ' 29 3 Human Rights Watch also
noted that abiding by the Commission's decision would not hinder
United States efforts to interrogate or prosecute Taliban and al Qaeda
prisoners who may be entitled to POW status.29 4
Another puzzling attitude taken by the United States relates to
humanitarian missions. Indeed, Congress passed a law ensuring that
insights/insigh8 I.htm (Jan. 2002); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Legal Status of
the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay to Be Determined by Tribunal, reprinted in 23 HUM. RTS. L.J.
15, 15-17 (2002); Alfred P. Rubin, Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions,
Armed Conflict, and al-Qaeda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 79 (2002).
289. Id.
290. Tom Malinowski, OAS Urges U.S. to Reverse Detainees Decision, HUMAN RTS. WATCH
(Mar. 15, 2002), at http:hrw.org/press/2002/03/oasO31502.htm.
291. See supra note 282-288.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.; see also Human Rights Watch Press Release, U.S.: Bush Errs in Geneva Convention
Rules, Feb. 7, 2002, at http://hrw.org/press/2002/02/genevaO207.htm; Background Paper on
Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. Forces, January 2002, at http://hrw.org/
backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.htm; Human Rights Watch Press Release, U.S. Officials Misstate
Geneva Convention Requirements, Jan. 28, 2002, at http://hrw.org/press/2002/0l/us0l2802.htm.
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when the United States does not want to take part in some proposed
United Nations humanitarian intervention, such as the Rwandan geno-
cide, the United States will not only not take part, but will actively cam-
paign against anyone else taking part.29 5 Is that not strange and
interesting? Just like the Belgians who, having lost ten soldiers in
Rwanda the day the genocide started and wanting to get out quickly,
mounted a huge diplomatic push to persuade other countries to abandon
Rwanda so that Belgium would not look like a coward.29 6
295. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 314 (1997); W. Michael
Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794
(1995); Louis Henkin, Refugees and Their Human Rights, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1079 (1995);
Alexis Heraclides, Secession, Self-Determination and Intervention, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 399, 402
(1992); see also Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69
J. INT'L AFF. 429 (1993); Stephen Salarz & Michael O'Hanlon, Humanitarian Intervention: When
Is Force Justified?, 1997 WASH. Q. 3; Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World
Order Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 341 (1995); Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Commentary on International Law: Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND.
L.J. 903 (1992); Josh Delbruck, Commentary on International Law: A Fresh Look at
Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992);
Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69 J. INT'L AFF. 434
(1993). Some international lawyers argue that there is an obligation to humanitarian
intervention,"when government is acting in a tyrannical manner its population, in the aim protect
minorities from genocide or violent oppression, combat gross and persistent violation of human
rights, and act to protect extreme cases of violence against a people." Judy Gallant, Comment,
Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A Reappraisal in Light of a
Changing World Order, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 881, 890 (1992). A similar opinion can be
seen in the statement of former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar: "We are clearly
witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the
defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal
documents." DAVID J. SCHEFFER ET AL., POST-GULF WAR CHALLENGES TO THE U.N. COLLECTIVE
SECURITY SYSTEM: THREE VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 4 (1992);
Bogdan Denitch & Ian Williams, The Case Against Inaction, Apr. 26, 1999, at http://www.global
policy.org/security/issues/kosovo41.htm (lamenting the absence of a Security Council Resolution
specifically endorsing military action); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force:
Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-6 (1999), available at http://www.ejil.org/journalNol10/
Nol/abl.html (last modified Apr. 26, 1999) (arguing that the right of a state to intervene militarily
to permit humanitarian intervention "deserve[s] a friendlier reaction" under international law); see
also Peter Uvin, Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community
in Rwanda after the Genocide, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 177 (2001); Ian Martin, Hard Choices after
Genocide: Human Rights and Political Failures in Rwanda, in HARD CHOICES, MORAL DILEMMAS
IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 157 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998); ALAN J. KUPERMAN, THE
LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2001). The Bush II regime did
take a different tack at least rhetorically when it adopted the "humanitarian intervention" excuse
for attacking Iraq after finding no evidence of Iraq's having weapons of mass destruction.
296. Romeo A. Dallaire, The End of Innocence, Rwanda 1994, in HARD CHOICES, supra note
295, at 71, 73; see also GuY VASSALL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL
ACTION 31 (1994); ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
1, 15, 205 (1999) (estimating 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsi killed in Rwanda); J. Bryan Hehir,
Military Intervention and National Sovereignty, Recasting the Relationship, in DES FORGES,
supra, at 29, 30; J. Mathew Vaccaro, The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Rwanda, in
U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990's 374
(William J. Durch ed., 1996).
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Before it became personal and acute to Americans on September
11, we had seen death dances of hatred around the world lead to mass
rape, unthinkable brutality, other torture, and genocide. Most Ameri-
cans, if they were aware at all, watched in abstract sadness as a wide-
spread desire for vengeance arose with horrific consequences in
Rwanda, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Pales-
tine, and earlier, Cambodia. We watched accounts of mass slaughter,
rape, and torture, terrorist attacks and wars throughout much of the
world. We shuddered to think of those who suffered and continue to
suffer terrorism and oppression directly. Most people in all countries
and groups surely have been made ill by it all, as they were once after
the genocides in Nazi Germany and Turkey. We are reminded that none
of this is new.297 One can list these horrors ad nauseam. 98
We certainly must understand our own tendency to demonize if we
are ever going to understand why others do the same, with us as the
object. As U.S. citizens, we need only consider our past that included
slavery, genocide of Native Americans, slaughter of Mormons in Mis-
souri and Illinois, the internment of our brothers and sisters of Japanese
ancestry, Jim Crow and lynching to keep African Americans in a posi-
tion of servitude, and so many forms of racism or ethnocentrism, turned
even uglier than usual. We may properly ask whether we, or any nation
or group, escape the history of terrorism, either as perpetrators, as vic-
tims, or both.
Since September 11, the United States299 and others300 have faced
not only the dangers of expected terrorism, but also the dangers associ-
ated with possible implementation of reactive draconian criminal laws,
procedures, and methods that risk eroding our values, our protections,
and our liberties. We risk stereotyping those of other cultural back-
grounds, religions, races, or views. We risk demonizing them. We have
already demonized the al Qaeda, the Taliban, especially those in "deten-
297. U.S. citizens need only consider our past, including slavery, genocide of Native
Americans, and racism.
298. ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 174, 198 (Justin O'Brien trans.,
1960).
299. See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, supra note 14, Oct. 26, 2001, to deter terrorism at
home and abroad following the September II terrorist attacks.
300. The United Kingdom follows the United States' lead. See Hugo Young, Once Lost, These
Freedoms Will Be Impossible to Restore-The Terror Threat is Being Used to Attack Civil Rights
Here and in the US, GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2001, at 1.
John Ashcroft, the US attorney general, is a politician of the ultra-hard right. David
Blunkett, the British home secretary, comes from the old Labour left. They meet
tomorrow, when Mr. Ashcroft makes his first stop on a tour of coalition nations
designed to ensure they all understand what must be done, in the field of law and
justice, to defeat international terrorism.
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tion," or those who are presented as potential "sleepers," ready to com-
mit other terrorist acts, and Baathist Party members and other supporters
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Moreover, the United States originally designated all of the people
detained and moved from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, Cuba, as "unlaw-
ful combatants."' 30 ' In February 2002, the U.S. government modified
this position by noting that the Taliban captives fit under the Geneva
Conventions as POWs, but not the al Qaeda fighters.30 2 In late April
2002, the U.S. government considered another new angle. It contem-
plated making it a crime to be a member of al Qaeda, as long as the
perpetrator is proved to have furthered the aims of the organization.3 °3
This is interesting because it is reminiscent of the Italian crime Grupo di
tipo Mafioso, proscribing membership in the Mafia, and the French
offense Association de Malfaiteurs or Bande Organise. °  It appears
that the U.S. government's major concern is that it would not be allowed
to question them if they were prisoners of war incident to these conven-
tions. The Government also attempts to distinguish al Qaeda fighters or
other "terrorists" from criminals to be prosecuted before United States
domestic courts, or even before courts of military justice. 3 5 Does this
301. See Human Rights Watch material, supra note 294. In a significant decision, the Inter-
American Commission of the Organization of American States urged the United States to "take
urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay determined
by a competent tribunal." See Andres Cala, Legal Status of Detainees Questioned, A.P. ONLINE
p. 1 (March 13, 2002). The Commission acted on a petition brought by the New York-based
Center for Constitutional Rights. According to Michael Ratner, vice-president of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, the decision is "a victory for advocates of the rule of law and due process."
Ratner added, "Failure to abide by the Commission's recommendation would be a lawless act and
a violation of the U.S.' treaty obligations." OAS Tribunal Orders U.S. to Determine Legal Status
of Cuba Prisoners, 3/14/02, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, March 14, 2002, at 1-2 2002 WL 2359292.
302. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Weighing New Doctrine for Tribunals, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21,
2002, at 1; Donald R. Rothwell, Opinion, When Our Citizens Are Left to Rot, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 15, 2002, at IA; see also Human Rights Watch material, supra note 294.
303. See Lewis, supra note 302, at 1.
304. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Rapport Gndral, Les Systmes de Justice Criminelle Face
au Dffi du Crime Organisie, 69 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PtNAL 35 (1997).
305. See President Bush's executive order of September 13, 2001, providing for the detention
and possible trial of terrorists in military commissions; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1946); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). See also William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough
Choices if bin Laden Is Captured, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (discussing comments made
by Ruth Wedgwood); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at A18 (claiming that the criminal court system is poorly equipped for trials against
international terrorists). Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 337 (2002) (arguing that it is better to have trials of "terrorists in domestic criminal
courts, rather than in military commissions, at least for terrorist acts committed on U.S. territory");
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5
GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002) (arguing the validity of jurisdiction in military commissions to
"prosecute" al Qaeda terrorists). See also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
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approach reflect the image of Captain Ahab?
Terroristic outrage is sickeningly common. Few, if any, of us
escape its taint. Chemical warfare has been applied against combatants
and non-combatants alike. It is now well known that on or about March
23, 1988, the Iraqi Air Force bombed villages in Kurdistan, spreading
mustard, cyanide, and possibly nerve gas over villagers, dropping them
in their panicked tracks, many holding their babies to their breasts. 316
Russia seems to have done the same in Georgia and Chechnya.3 °7 Iraq
accused Iran of using similar weapons. 30 8  The anthrax attacks in the
United States and the attacks on September 11, still under investigation
at this writing, caused fear and the hurried promulgation of the "Patriot
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that no
constitutional authority obtains to deny constitutional rights to those facing military tribunals
when there is no immediate threat to the Constitution or to the Republic); George P. Fletcher,
Bush's Military Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 1-14, 2002).
"If we argue it is legal, we are arguing that other sovereigns Libya, Syria, Iraq, Cuba could
also have tribunals," said Alfred P. Rubin, a former Pentagon lawyer who is a professor at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. William Glaberson, Critics' Attack
on Tribunals Turns to Law Among Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at BI; see also World
Organization Against Torture, Press Release, Jan. 25, 2002, available at www.omct.org; HRW
Demolishes U.S. Case on Status of Prisoners in Camp X-ray, Letter from Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director Human Rights Watch, to the Honorable Condoleezza Rice, National Security
Advisor, (Jan. 28, 2002); PoWs or Common Criminals, They're Entitled to Protection: Judge
Richard Goldstone, International Human Rights Expert, Tells Clare Dyer Why al-Qaida Suspects
Must Not Be Tried in Secret, GUARDIAN (LoNDoN), Jan. 30, 2002, at 2-14. On Military
Commissions, see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946);
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (holding that a court established as part of the U.S.
military government in United States occupied Germany had jurisdiction to try an American
dependent for a crime she had committed there). Cf Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1 (1866); Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). The armed services and Congress should seek to anticipate
possible situations when military tribunals should be used to try terrorists for their acts of violence
and espionage. The most likely situations would be those in which it seems necessary or desirable
to conduct trials outside the United States. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court might
conclude that the cases fall outside its jurisdiction. Cf Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950). George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, 13 AM. PROSPECT 26 (2002); Bryant &
Tobias, supra note 21, at 375, 434-38.
306. See, e.g., Peter Carlson, Deportation Consternation - After Supporting Bush on War,
Iraqi May Lose Asylum, NEWSDAY, Apr. 14, 2003, at B-03 reprinted at 2003 WL 17814645; Peter
Carlson, Exile Fights Deportation; Woman, 53, Survived Early Poison-Gas Attack by Iraqi Army,
THE HAMILTON SPECTRE (Canada), April 11, 2003, at C-02, reprinted at 2003 WL 18356511.
307. Anne Barnard and David Filipov, Ways to Subdue Attackers Probed: Putin Rebuffs Offer
from Chechen Rebels for Diplomatic Talks, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2002, at A-8, 2002 WL
101980884; cf, 2003 WL 2393173, Los ANGELES TIMES, March 22, 2003. Anti-terrorist police
have focused on an alleged Algerian-dominated network whose operatives are believed to have
received specialized training with biological and chemical weapons at Al Qaeda camps in the
Russian republic of Chechnya. One of the suspected leaders is Abu Musab Zarqawi, a veteran
terrorist who has operated in Iraq with the protection of the Iraqi regime, according to U.S.
officials.
308. Matthew Hickley & Paul Eastham, U.S. closes Iraq's Oil Pipeline to Syria, DAILY MAIL,
April 16, 2003, 2003 WL 17440583.
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Act,' 30 9 which will further erode civil liberty in the United States. Even
before the 2001 biological attacks, it was proposed that the United States
government increase its research into biological agents to be used as
weapons or defenses.
The Achille Lauro affair is well known and was once one of the
worst examples of terrorism against United States citizens.3 10 The out-
rage of the desaparacidos and the plight of those tortured for "good
order" are now well known too. 31 I The United States government sup-
ported, both directly and indirectly, the Nicaraguan "Contras" who
themselves killed innocent Nicaraguans in conjunction with their guer-
rilla warfare.3 12 Sandinistas in Nicaragua and their enemies apparently
killed many innocents in maintaining their power, including depreda-
tions against the native Miskitos.3 13 The depredations in Cambodia are
renowned for their infamy. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge destroyed the
Cambodian legal system and culture, slaughtering by starvation, torture,
and mass murder at the very least 800,000 to one million Cambodians,
in their "auto-genocide." '314 There are so many others. It is nearly
impossible to keep track: Sierra Leone, the Congo, Liberia. Every day it
seems, some institution, government, or group uses innocent children,
women, and men as fodder in their "war" against enemies, in their
309. USA Patriot Act of 2001, supra pay. note 14.
310. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
although the Palestine Liberation Organization is not a state actor, "piracy" (hostage-taking)
involved "clear violations of international law" and tort law), vacated, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
The PLO moved to dismiss on the ground that it was immune from suit. The district court denied
the motion, and the PLO appealed. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.
1991). Passenger Leon Klinghoffer was shot in his wheelchair as he sat on the ship's deck, then
thrown into the sea. Id. at 47. His daughters brought suit in federal court, under state law,
maritime law, and the Death on the High Seas Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that the PLO was not immune from suit because it was not a sovereign state, and only
sovereign states were immune from suit under the version of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act then in force. Id. at 48 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1988 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).
311. See, e.g., LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH
TORTURERS (1998).
312. See Nicaragua v. U.S.A., I.C.J. Rep. 392 (1984).
313. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1986) (concerning persecution of
Miskito Indians by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua where a Miskito prevented his
deportation back to Nicaragua by establishing that there was a clear probability that his life or
freedom would be threatened if he were returned because of his race, religion, nationality political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group); S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 50-53 (2001).
314. See Craig Etcheson, Terror in the East: Phases of Repression in Region 23 of Democratic
Kampuchea, Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations, June 19-22, 1997; DAVID CHANDLER, BEYOND THE GRAVE; AN ACCOUNT OF
POL POT'S GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA, TOLD THROUGH THE RECORDS OF ITS VICTIMS: VOICES FROM
S-21: TERROR AND HISTORY IN POL POT'S SECRET PRISON (2000); BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES,
supra note 6, at 681-90.
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attempt at promoting a perverted vision of lex talionis.315
Still, we have hope that something can be done about the Khmer
Rouge killers: a timid dialectic toward and then away from the creation
of an ad hoc tribunal to try Khmer Rouge genocidaires. At least some
of the genocidaires of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are facing
justice in their Ad Hoc Tribunals. Capture and prosecution of individu-
als in some of these atrocities triggers a media "feeding frenzy." If one
is not careful, even prosecution prompts rage, fear, and propaganda.
Currently, quite a debate is taking place over the pros and cons of
assassination of the leaders of al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein or other "ter-
rorist groups" versus capturing, then prosecuting, them. One issue is
whether killing Osama bin Ladin during a firefight or a bombing would
be an assassination or the killing of an enemy combatant. If he were
captured, where could one find an appropriate place to prosecute him?
If we are so outraged by such things, and we are, how and why are we so
easily manipulated into acquiescing or sometimes even participating in
concomitant conduct in retaliation? Perhaps it is because: "Cruelty has a
human heart, And jealousy a human face; Terror the human form divine,
and secrecy the human dress. 3 16 This human tendency prompted
Joseph Conrad to say, "The terrorist and the policeman both came from
the same basket. ' 317
Nothing a government can do in the name of its people can justify
the atrocity at the WTC. And who can forget the pusillanimous down-
ing of Pan-Am Flight 103? Nothing can justify that, but some still claim
that this carnage was in retaliation for the pusillanimous slaughter of
innocent children, women, and men aboard the Iranian Air Bus, blown
out of the sky by American forces. One thing is clear: Innocent chil-
dren, women, and men aboard Pan Am Flight 103 and aboard the Air
Bus were used as fodder for some "war" or cause. Two Libyans were
finally prosecuted before a Scottish Tribunal that sat in The Hague.318
315. See Deuteronomy 19:21 ("Do not look on such a man with pity. Life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, and foot for foot!"); Leviticus 24:17-20 ("When a man causes a
disfigurement in his neighbor, as he has done it shall be done to him, fracture for fracture, eye for
eye, tooth for tooth; as he has disfigured a man, he shall be disfigured."); see also Exodus 22:32;
22:1; 22:6; JOHN SMITH, ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW (1960). In addition, see THE
ANCIENT CODE OF HAMMURABI; GODFREY DRIVER & JOHN MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS
(1952) (applying both the lex talionis and compensation). Rule 196, for example, decrees that
"[I]f one destroys the eye of a free-born man, his eye shall one destroy," but Rule 198 requires,
"[I]f the eye of a nobleman he has destroyed or the limb of a nobleman he has broken, one mine of
silver he shall pay." Id., at Rule 196.
316. WILLIAM BLAKE, Appendix to SoNGs OF INNOCENCE AND OF EXPERIENCE.
317. JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT 61-79 (1924).
318. Lockerbie Deal Closer After Talks, SCOTSMAN, March 22, 2003, at 5, 2003 WL
15777613; Saif Aleslam al-Qadhafi, Libyan-American Relations, MIDDLE E. POL'Y 3544, 2003
WL 18602827 (2003).
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One Libyan (Abdelbasset Megrahi) was convicted and another (Lameen
Fhima) acquitted.31 9 Many still think that Iran was actually behind at
least part of the atrocity.320
When a group commits acts of such atrocity that they constitute
crimes against humanity of a jus cogens scale, action must be taken to
counter them and to protect against their continuation or recurrence.
Over the years, however, only timorous steps have been taken on the
prosecution front, while sometimes too vigorous steps have been taken
on the war front.
History has not borne much hope in progress toward the goal stated
by the Niiremberg Tribunal: that limits must be put on the amount and
type of savagery that occurs in war. Despite the recognition that interna-
tional law imposes duties on individuals that transcend national obliga-
tions 32 I and the prohibition of needless cruelty, unmitigated butchery
continues with impunity. Indeed, today, those who commit atrocities
hide among innocents, so as to avoid being attacked in more ways than
one.
PALESTINE, SABRA, AND SHATILA
Still, in Palestine innocent people are killed by Israeli forces, Pales-
tinian forces, or suicide bombers, each seeking to use innocent bodies as
the pathetically ironic weapon for freedom from fear or oppression. At
this writing, we await information on whether war crimes took place in
Jenin.322
In September 1982, innocent men, women, and children were
slaughtered in the refugee camps at Sabra and Chatila, Lebanon by Leb-
anese-Christian forces dependent on Israel. 323 Until repealed in July
2003, a landmark Belgian law incorporated the Geneva Conventions and
the principle of universal jurisdiction into Belgian criminal law provid-
ing for prosecution of perpetrators of certain crimes committed against
innocent civilians, conduct proscribed without any limitation in time or
space.32 4 Incident to this expansive law, an attempt was made to charge
319. Id., Scotsman.
320. Id., Scotsman.
321. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at NUremberg, 22 I.M.T., TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 411, 427 (1948).
322. See, e.g., Ema Paris, Sharon and Arafat Should Both be on Trial, GLOBE & MAIL
(TORONTO), April 17, 2002, available at http://www.globeandmail.com ("If the new International
Criminal Court is to mean anything, we must be ready to judge the acts even of those whose
causes seem just"); Baruch Kimmerling, I Accuse, KOL HA'IR (Israeli Hebrew Weekly), Feb. I,
2002, at 1.
323. See, e.g., Laurie King-Irani, Detonating Lebanon's War Files: The Belgian Court Case
and the Beirut Car Bomb, Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.merip.org.
324. See the Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction: the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the
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and seek the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for his respon-
sibility in the events in Sabra and Chatila. 25
Elie Hobeika, the leader of the Christian militia Forces Libanaises,
which was responsible for the 1982 massacres in the Sabra and Shatila
refugee camps, was blown up in front of his home by a car bomb.326
With him died two of his body guards and a passer-by. 327 Hobeika also
was a minister in the Lebanese government during the period Israel
occupied Beirut.328 A Belgian camera team had interviewed Hobeika
three days earlier.329 During the interview, he claimed innocence of the
1982 massacres and said he would testify in Brussels if and when the
trial of Israel's Prime Minister Sharon occurs. Sharon was minister of
Defense when the massacres in Sabra and Shatila happened.33 ° In spite
of Israeli denials, the assassination of Elie Hobeika was attributed to the
Mossad, Israel's secret service, by, amongst others, Lebanese President
Lahoud.331 A recent article by Laurie King-Irani, former editor of Mid-
dle East Report, provides details of both the massacre and the assassina-
tion of the Elie Hobeika: 332
It is hard to say which news surprised Beirutis more on January
24: the previous evening's report from Brussels that a war crimes
case against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and others had
moved one step closer to trial, or the sickeningly familiar roar of that
morning's car bomb, which killed Elie Hobeika, one of the most ruth-
Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of
Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional Thereto," as amended by the Law of February 19,
1999, "concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law."
Arrest Warrant of I I April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2000 I.C.I., Feb.
14, 2002, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/iwhats.htm. La decision de la Cour
internationale de justice (CIJ), rendue le 14 fevrier 2002, d'annuler un mandat d'arret
international lance par la Belgique contre un ancien ministre congolais, au principal motif que le
ministre etait encore en exercice au moment de l'emission dudit mandat d'arret, conduit a
d'importantes consequences sur la mise en oeuvre de la responsabilite penale individuelle pour
les crimes les plus graves. The crimes with which Yerodia (the Congo's Foreign Minister) was
charged were punishable in Belgium incident to the above noted law. See id. A summary of the
decision can be found in 8 ANN. SURVEY OF INT'L & CoMp. L. 151 (2002). Under pressure from
the U.S. and Israel, and after the numbers changed in Belgian Parliamentary elections, this law
was repealed, Summer 2003. See 19 No. 9 INTL E.L. REP. 352 (Sept. 2003).
325. See King-Irani, supra note 323.
326. See Alexander Cockburn, The Nightmare in Israel, THE NATION March 25, 2002, at 8.
327. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-2536399,00.html Belgian Senate
Guts 'Genocide Law', THE GUARDIAN April 6, 2003; Belgium Limits Genocide Law, http.//www.
dw-world.de/english/0,3367, 430_A_827171_1_A,00.html 07.04.2003.
328. See material in notes 322-327, supra.
329. See material in note 322-327, supra.
330. See material in notes 322-327, supra.
331. Frank Tiggelaar & Elie Hobeika, Leader of the Christian Militia Forces Libanaises-
Responsible for the 1982 Massacres in the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps-Blown up, based
on a VRT Journal Report, Jan. 24, 2002, available at www.justwatch.com.
332. King-Irani, supra note 323.
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less political survivors of Lebanon's bloody civil war of 1975-1990.
Just 48 hours before his violent death, Hobeika, commander of the
right-wing Lebanese Forces during the war, had met with two visiting
Belgian senators to stress his willingness to testify in a landmark Bel-
gian legal case that is reopening the troubling files of the 1982 Sabra
and Shatila massacres. Claiming that his testimony would clear his
own name while establishing Sharon's guilt, Hobeika voiced growing
fears for his physical safety. This chronology of events immediately
filled Lebanese newspapers and caf6 discussions with speculations
about possible links between the court case in Belgium and the car
bombing in Beirut.
Top Lebanese officials and Syrian state-run radio quickly
accused Israel of eliminating a key witness to and participant in the
slaughter of 1000-2000 unarmed Palestinian and Lebanese civilians
in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Hobeika, after all, knew
more than virtually anyone else about what really happened in Sabra
and Shatila. Then intelligence head of the Lebanese Forces, Hobeika
was the primary liaison between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
officers and personnel surrounding the camps and the Christian mili-
tia members inside who undertook an orgy of murder, rape and tor-
ture from the evening of September 16 until the early afternoon of
September 18, 1982.
Walkie-talkie and binoculars in hand, Hobeika, just 26 years old,
had helped to orchestrate the unfolding massacre. In one infamous
instance (recounted by an IDF soldier who gave testimony before
Israel's 1983 Kahan Commission inquiry), Hobeika coldly com-
manded a militia member who had radioed to ask what he should do
with 40 women and children his unit had rounded up: "You know
exactly what to do with them. Don't ask me a question like that
again !,,333
Legal Accountability, Command Responsibility.334 The central issues of
the Belgian case filed in June 2001 by massacre survivors centered on
who had command responsibility. Such issues include: Who issued
Hobeika's orders? Who ordered the Israeli army to block all entry and
exit points to the two camps before, during, and after the massacres?
Who gave the orders to launch flares during the night to assist the killers
of these innocent non-combatants? Who allowed the Christian militia
units to cross security lines between East and West Beirut and along the
airport road? Who decided, even after being informed that a massacre
was in progress, that the Lebanese militiamen should be allowed to
333. Id.
334. Cf Mirjuan Damaka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
455 (2001).
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remain in the camps to continue "mopping up"?3 3 5 Who benefits from
Hobeika's assassination? King-Irani continues:
The rumors now circulating inside and outside Lebanon that Hobeika
was ready to testify that Israeli units had participated in the actual
killing in the camps have strengthened this interpretation. Recent
revelations that the car used in the January 24 bombing was pur-
chased by two men using false identities from a car dealer in the
southern Christian stronghold of Jezzine-formerly a key military
intelligence post during Israel's occupation of south Lebanon-also
seem to support this theory. But Hobeika had many enemies: Pales-
tinians, Syrians and Lebanese as well as Israelis. Other issues, other
half-remembered wartime files besides Sabra and Shatila, may help
to identify Hobeika's assassins.
[Seasoned] observers of Lebanon's complex political scene have
quietly presented alternative theories about who might have ordered
Hobeika's elimination. Samir Qassir, writing in the pages of al-
Nahar, voiced doubts that Israel was behind the car bombing. Noting
that an act of assassination undertaken on foreign soil would have
required a discussion, if not a vote, during an Israeli cabinet meeting,
Qassir hypothesized that, given Sharon's controversial history in
Lebanon, it was unlikely that such a decision could have been taken
unanimously, let alone never leaked to the press.
What no one has yet written or stated publicly and unequivo-
cally in Beirut is that many people-Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians
and Americans, not to mention Israelis-dread the opening of Leba-
non's wartime files. Over the last decade, other countries emerging
from tortuous civil wars established truth commissions and official
commissions of inquiry to come to terms with the blood-soaked past,
assign accountability, effect a transition to a new government or
establish just compensation policies. But Lebanon's long war-
which resulted in 120,000 deaths and the disappearance of over
17,000 civilians, still missing-has yet to undergo such unflinching
public scrutiny. The tentative opening of Lebanon's wartime files is
largely left to the realm of popular culture: the sardonic music of Ziad
Rahbani or the compelling feature films of Jean Chamoun and Randa
Sabbagh.
Opening the Sabra and Shatila files risks opening all of Leba-
non's wartime files, thereby depriving the postwar, Syrian-backed
regime of what little legitimacy it has ever possessed. Since 1990,
Lebanese politics has hinged primarily upon a delicate Syrian balanc-
ing act: pitting this group against that in one context, that group
335. King-Irani, supra note 323.
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against this in another, by means of threats, incentives and the con-
struction of complex, overlapping patron-client relations within Leba-
non and between Lebanon and Syria. A full airing of who did what
to whom during the war years would destabilize this delicate game.
Hobeika's assassination is a grim reminder that many others-
Syrians, Lebanese and Israelis-have enjoyed, and hope to continue
enjoying, impunity for the massive and systematic war crimes com-
mitted in Lebanon from 1975-1990. For their part, the Sabra and
Shatila massacre plaintiffs and their lawyers stated on January 24 that
they are undeterred by Hobeika's assassination and will continue to
seek justice in a Belgian court.336
Western governments apparently have aided and abetted atrocity-
riven situations in several places, such as East Timor, by their complic-
ity or at least "willful blindness. 337 We all must ask, with Primo Levi,
why sometimes we have such difficulty perceiving "the experience of
others" or allow a "construction of convenient truth" to move us the
wrong way. Yes, how much of the Holocaust and "concentration camp
experience is dead and will not return ...?"
On September 11, 2001, terror transcended abstraction and we in
the U.S. suffered both directly and vicariously the pain of terrorism on
United States soil. Since that horrific day, we seem to be living an
omnipresent terroristic melodrama. As we watched the terrorism com-
mitted on our own soil that awful day we were sickened, outraged, and
certainly felt the need for self-defense. This sense was appropriate, but
prompted the question of what constitutes valid action in self-defense.
Perhaps we do suffer from a plague, as Camus suggests in his won-
derful novel of that name:
It is the willful negation of life that is built into life itself: the human
instinct to dominate and to destroy to seek one's own happiness by
destroying the happiness of others, to build one's security on power
and, by extension, to justify evil use of that power in terms of "his-
tory," or of "the common good," or of "the revolution," or even of the
justice of God.... Man's drive to destroy, to kill, or simply to domi-
nate and to oppress comes from the metaphysical void he experiences
when he finds himself a stranger in his own universe.338
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Rick Mercer, West Complicit in East Timor Genocide, NATION, Apr. 23, 1999,
1999 WL15653159; John Pilger, A Worse Slaughter: Blair Makes Much of 'Humanitarian Values'
but Sells Arms to Indonesia Which Are Used Against East Timor, GUARDIAN, June 1, 1999, at 14.
338. See, Thomas Merton: The Plague of Albert Camus: A Commentary and Introduction,
reprinted in THE LITERARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 181 (Patrick Hart, ed. 1981) (discussing
ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE (1947)). See also ALBERT CAMUS, L'Homme Rdvoltd (1952); THE
MYTH OF SISYPHUS (1955); L'ETAT DE SIPGE (1948); LES JUSTES (1950); LES POSS81D9S (1959).
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Or is it simply that minions of various leaders are easily stirred up
into a blind rage by desire for vengeance? It does seem that a few mas-
terminds of manipulation ginned up hatred and fear of the United States,
or the "West," or "modernity," into a desire for vengeance for real or
perceived past sins and oppression. This reaped and is still reaping its
bitter fruit. Our mal du si~cle continues to accelerate in the new millen-
nium. Crimes against humanity form part of a nauseating modem
equivalent of the ancient blood feud.
There are so many other examples that it is nearly impossible to
keep track, but now we have suffered one of the most massive atrocities
on United States territory. The problem is that we are facing a vicious
threat from a group that has moved beyond the pale to use terrorism
against us by a group that feels a moral-religious (an invented word,
"religiose," might be better?) right to kill innocent people in order to
obtain vengeance, throw off oppression, and, as they see it, make the
world safe for their god.
Other times, it is simply the wronged person or group looking to
right wrongs or obtain retribution. Sometimes, it is the nihilist simply
looking to destroy with terror. Even the nihilist seems to have an almost
metaphysical vision of the need to destroy. Perhaps many of these are
pretend nihilists, using crimes against humanity simply as his or her way
of gaining power and becoming a statist functionary, then using terror to
maintain his or her power.
Propagandistic Appropriation of the Term and
the Law on Terrorism3 39
We delude ourselves if we think that terrorism is committed only
by our enemies. Our enemies do the same. My purpose in this article
has been to try to convince governments and leadership groups that they
must define terrorism in a neutral manner, not by the end sought. Doing
this will help us to combat terrorism efficiently and justly. Failure to do
so only tightens the grip of this deadly phenomenon. Yet, most of us are
ideologically predisposed to dismiss any suggestion that we or our lead-
ers would ever commit terrorism. It serves no good purpose to take the
position that because others commit terrorism against us, we should do
the same against them.
Terrorism, Torture, and Our Constitutional Republic
Leave truth to the police and us; we know the good;
339. Richard Falk used this term in his book, REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE
DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM (1988).
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We build the Perfect City time shall never alter;
Our Law shall guard you always like a circue of mountains
Your ignorance keep off evil like a dangerous sea.34 °
Since September 11, some pundits have taken to arguing that tor-
ture is appropriate under these circumstances and should be legal. Mario
Vargas Llosa uses his novel The Feast of the Goat to illustrate the dan-
gers of what Professor Dershowitz and others are suggesting ought to
become official practice. Generalissimo Trujillo's Minister of the
Armed Forces, General Jos6 Ren6 (Pupo) Romdn Fernindez, reflects on
torture in La Cuarenta, where he thought he was being taken:
He knew that gloomy house on Calle 40, near the Dominican Cement
Factory, very well. It had belonged to General Juan TomAs Dfaz,
who sold it to the State so that Johhn Abbes could convert it into the
setting for his elaborate methods of extracting confessions from pris-
oners. He had even been present, following the Castroite invasion on
June 14, when one of those being interrogated, Dr. Tejeda Florentino,
sitting on the grotesque Throne-a seat from a jeep, pipes, electric
prods, bullwhips, a garrote with wooden ends for stangling the pris-
oner as he received electric shocks-was mistakenly electrocuted by
a SIM technician, who released the maximum voltage.34'
General Pupo Roman was tortured in another house that also had been
equipped with a Throne. They kept Roman "mounted" (a moribund
term formerly used in Voodoo ceremonies in which the subjects were
drained of themselves and occupied by spirits:342)
[T]hey stripped him and sat him on the black seat in a ... window-
less, dimly lit room. The strong smell of excrement and urine nause-
ated him. The seat, misshapen and absurd with all its appendages,
was bolted to the floor and had straps and rings for the ankles, wrists,
chest, and head. Its arms were faced with copper sheets to facilitate
the passage of the current. A bundle of wires came out of the Throne
and led to a desk or counter, where the voltage was controlled. In the
sickly light, as he was strapped into the chair, he recognized the
bloodless face of Ramfis [Rafael Trujillo's son] .... Ramfis moved
his head and Pupo felt himself thrown forward with the force of a
cyclone. The jolt seemed to pound all his nerves, from his head to his
feet. Straps and rings cut into his muscles, he saw balls of fire, sharp
needles jabbed into his pores. He endured it without screaming, he
only bellowed .... Between sessions they dragged him, naked, to a
damp cell, where buckets of pestilential water made him respond. To
keep him from sleeping they taped his lids to his eyebrows with adhe-
sive tape .... At ... times they stuffed inedible substances into his
340. W.H. AUDEN, supra note 2, at 1.
341. LLOSA, supra note 90, at 328.
342. Id. at 328-329.
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mouth; at times he detected excrement, and vomited. In a rapid
descent into sub-humanity, he could keep down what they gave
him.... [Later] they removed the tape, ripping off his eyebrows...
and a drunken, joyful voice announced: "Now you'll have some dark,
so you'll sleep real good.' He felt the needle piercing his eyelids. He
did not move while they sewed them shut .... When they castrated
him, the end was near. They did cut off his testicles with a knife but
used a scissors, while he was on the Throne. . . . They stuffed the
testicles into his mouth, and he swallowed them, hoping with all his
might that this would hasten his death.343
Another former Trujillista stalwart who had joined the conspiracy
to assassinate the goat was Miguel Angel BdIez Dfaz. After being tor-
tured like Pupo Romin, he then received the following treatment:
[When they were near starvation], a pot with pieces of meat was
brought to them .... BRiez ... gulped it down, choking, eating with
both hands until they were full... [The jailer came in and] ....
confronted Biez Dfaz: "General Ramfis Trujillo wanted to know if
eating [your] own son didn't make [you] sick . .. , 3 4 4
The problems that terrorism cause strain the very core of a constitu-
tional republic and, it seems, cause many who have professed to be lib-
ertarians to decide that abuse, even torture, is appropriate or acceptable
under extreme circumstances, such as that caused by the September 11
attack. Some, claiming to represent "liberal" thought, such as Lawrence
Tribe, Ruth Wedgwood, and Cass Sunstein, have argued that the institu-
tion of military commissions by President Bush's Executive Order of
November 13, 2001, is constitutional and wise. 345 A segment of CBS
343. Id. at 329-31.
344. Id. at 339.
345. Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/print
_testimony.cfm?id=121&wit_id=42 (statement of Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago School of
Law) (noting "the legitimate interests behind the President's military order can be accommodated
while also producing what the president wants which is full and fair trials .... ). Sunstein also
suggested that military commissions would be appropriate if: (I) the language of the order were
narrowed to clarify that the commissions would only be used to try violations of the laws of war;
(2) the "essentials of procedural justice" were protected, including the right of the accused to
know charges against them, to reasonable rules of evidence, to be defended by counsel, to respond
to the evidence, to be tried in a public proceeding except where strictly necessary, and to be
presumed innocent; and third, the neutrality of the judges were assured, perhaps by appeal to a
civilian court or the use of federal judges on the commissions). For arguments opposing the
commissions based on American constitutional law, see generally Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4
(statement of Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School); Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of
Neal Katyal, Georgetown University Law Center); George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution,
AM. PROSPECt, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at 26-29; Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Com-
missions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002); Laurence Tribe & Neal Katyal, Waging War, Deciding
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News' 60 Minutes program broadcast Sunday, January 20, 2002, fea-
tured law professor and pundit Alan Dershowitz, who argued that the
use of torture by law enforcement officials should be sanctioned in cer-
tain cases, such as acts of terrorism. 346 He argued that torture is "inevi-
table" in such cases and that it would be better to have procedures in
place to regulate it.3 47  Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human
Rights Watch, was also interviewed for the program, and disagreed vig-
orously with Professor Dershowitz.3 48 Part of the transcript of the pro-
gram is enlightening:
(CBS) Is there a place in the United States justice system for torture?
Alan Dershowitz, the occasional civil libertarian defender of 0.
J. Simpson, believes the law should sanction torture so it may be
applied in certain cases, such as terrorist acts.
In a report to be broadcast Sunday on 60 Minutes, Dershowitz
tells Correspondent Mike Wallace that torture is inevitable. "We
can't just close our eyes and pretend we live in a pure world," he
says.
After the events of Sept. 11, with many al Qaeda members in
custody, Dershowitz says he wants to bring the debate to the fore-
front. He gave the "ticking bomb" scenario-a person refusing to tell
when and where a bomb will go off as an example of the type of case
warranting torture.
The FBI has anonymously leaked to the press the belief inside
the bureau that torture may be an option [in these trying times]. But
Lewis Schiliro, former New York bureau director, warns of problems
with torture.
"If anybody had the ability to prevent the events of Sept. 11...
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill Yale L.J. 1259 (2002); Letter from Law Professors and
Lawyers, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Dec. 5, 2001), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/liman/lit-
terleahy.pdf These are all discussed in Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terror-
ism: Definitions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002). See also Jim Puzzanghera, The Case of Taliban John: Treason Among
Options for Charging American, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at A3, available at WL 3530877;
Charles Lane, Walker's Case Poses Novel Legal Issues; Taliban Suspect's Detainment Overlaps
Geneva Convention, Fifth Amendment, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at A25, available at 2001 WL
31544095; Ruth Wedgwood, Commentary: The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
2001, at A18; Akhil Reed Amar, War Powers: Is Bush Making History?, TIME MAG., Dec. 03,
2001, at 62. These arguments are challenged by George P. Fletcher in War and the Constitution,
AM. PROSPEcr, Jan. 1, 2002, at 26, referring to Ex parte Milligan as being the proper precedent,
not the aberrational and embarrassing decisions of (generally cited as authority) Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942), and Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (almost never cited, as it is far too
embarrassing). See also Koh, supra note 305; Bryant & Tobias, supra note 21, at 375, 434-38..
346. Andras Riedlmayer sent a notice of this to the discussion group JUSTWATCH-L, on Jan.
18, 2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0, 1597,324751-412,00.shtml.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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they would have gone to whatever length .... The problem becomes,
where do we draw that line?" he tells Wallace.
Torture is prohibited by the United States Constitution, says
Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth, who also
says its not reliable. He points out that an Islamic terrorist, convicted
in America for terrorist plots he admitted to after torture by authori-
ties in the Philippines, had also admitted to being the Oklahoma City
bomber.
"People will say anything under torture," says Roth, adding that
resorting to torture degrades humanity and the idea of democracy.
"We, in many important respects, become like the terrorists," he tells
Wallace. "They will have won. Our democracy will have lost."
This is a naive viewpoint, says Dershowitz. "If anybody has any
doubt that our CIA, over time, has taught people to torture, has
encouraged torture, has probably itself tortured in extreme cases, I
have a bridge to sell you in Brooklyn." '349
Dashiell Hammett provides an apt warning for those who take this atti-
tude: "Play with murder [torture] enough and it gets you one of two
ways. It makes you sick, or you get to like it."35 Camus also provides
a moral legal negation: "[Even i]f murder is in the nature of man, the
law is not intended to reproduce that nature." '351
Terrorism, Crimes Against Humanity, and Total War
Terrorism, crimes against humanity, and "total war" are parallel
concepts. They have parallel results. In total war, where innocent civil-
ians are targets for military victory, war or much of its conduct becomes
quintessentially criminal. When blanket or saturation bombing occurs
especially in unmilitarized places or certain weapons are used that are
designed to cause massive death or unnecessary suffering, it is terrorism.
The purpose of this conduct is to panic the population and to force the
leadership to succumb. Thus, it was considered "acceptable" to drop the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, slaughtering so many in such
a horrible way, with "rags of hanging skin, wandering about [and
lamenting] among the dead bodies," in order to terrorize the population
and leadership of Japan so they would quit the war more quickly. Inno-
cent persons, not part of the war effort, in undefended cities or unde-
fended sections were chosen so that the shock would have sufficient
impact. How different is that from placing a bomb on a civilian flight or
at a shopping mall other than that the latter causes less mass destruction?
349. Id.
350. DASHIELL HAMMETT, RED HARVEST 102 (1929).
351. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH 174,
198 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1972).
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There is one other difference. Japan was given a chance to surrender
and was warned of the consequences of not doing so. The Japanese
leadership was aware that the United States had the bomb and was told
that the United States would use the weapon if Japan did not submit to
all the Allied demands by a certain date. Thus, the Japanese leadership
was at fault for allowing their people to be subjected to this horror. This
does not fully excuse the United States. The United States is the nation
that unleashed this terrible weapon and used it against a civilian
population.
Sadly, today and perhaps for many more years in the past than we
think, belief in the inevitability of total war has pervaded all political
and military theory and practice. When total war became accepted as a
possibility or, worse, the norm, it quickly also became ingrained in the
consciousness of all powers. Today, it pervades all of our relational
thought processes, whether we are for societal status quo or for change.
I wonder how different this is from how humans have been since
antiquity.
Consider the fearsome view of the world held by much of its popu-
lation. Each side of virtually every world conflict is manipulated into
believing that it has absolute right on its side and that absolute evil
resides in its enemy. Each applies absolutist terminology and action.
Each group believes that its very existence is threatened by its enemies;
that it may be annihilated, unless it annihilates the opposition first. Each
believes that absolute or total war is appropriate and necessary for it to
survive. Thus, oppressed minorities see the state or, today, the United
States as an absolute evil to which absolute destructive power may be
applied. Government tries to make its people see the group that might
rebel or that is rebelling as absolute evil. So, each justifies the use of
absolute power. This is the same in both the domestic and international
context. Is it any wonder that terrorism and crimes against humanity are
the mode of warfare and politics?
It is tragic that such a terroristic mindset seems to have permeated
orthodox military strategy, or perhaps it has grown naturally out of that
strategy. Nearly every nation's basic political and military strategic
planning is based on this dangerously flawed vision. With current avail-
ability of absolute power to destroy, we would be wise to figure a better
way to see the world and each other.
Fear, Rage, and Becoming What We Hate
Government leaders and leaders of smaller groups often react to
harm or threats of harm to the group in a self-destructive way. They
sometimes abuse their people's fears to accomplish selfish international
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or domestic ends. This tactic crystallized for American policy early in
the era of the Cold War. A special Report of Covert Operations com-
missioned by President Eisenhower was adopted as hallowed American
policy: "Another important requirement is an aggressive covert psycho-
logical, political and paramilitary organization more effective.., and, if
necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy .... There
are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human con-
duct do not apply. 352
In the face of terrorism or crimes against humanity, we may allow
our fright to become rage and seek vengeance. This often happens
because fear is easily manipulated into rage. If we succumb, we partici-
pate in what Albert Camus called an ugly, infernal dialectic-a self-
destructive death dance.353 Leaders with a melodramatic bent of mind
blind their adherents to any humanity on the other side. The people are
made to believe that they are fighting the devil himself and that all truth
is being destroyed. The people usually swallow it. Law and morality
are perverted by reaction to violence, and when manipulated by obfusca-
tion and deceit, unrestrained violence may ensue. None of this is to say
that truly horrible conduct is not the cause or the trigger, but only to
suggest that a horrific cause often implicates a manipulated reaction that
may be more dangerous and destructive than the original terrorist acts.
When this occurs and escalates, the rule of law is replaced by brute
power. This was not lost on Adolf Hitler, who blamed Germany's fail-
ure in World War I in part on not having sufficiently utilized this propa-
ganda tactic of "making monsters of their enemies" in the eyes of the
German yolk.354
Symbiotic Relationship Between Enemies
A weird and paradoxical symbiotic relationship may develop
between leaders of enemy groups. An enemy is required to take the heat
for the leadership's incompetency, corruption, or other internal
problems. So, the leaders appropriate or pervert law and morality. A
people's sense of losing security is exacerbated by its leaders. Purported
wrongs that have been or are claimed to have been done to them are
called upon by leaders to rationalize the claimed "necessity" for the peo-
ple to commit crimes against humanity. Leaders often use their version
of "law" and the claiming of a right as exhortation to summon public
352. Report of the Special Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency (the "Doolittle Report") (Sept. 30, 1954) (declassified April 1, 1976); see also discussion
infra note 319-24 regarding arguments for torture since September 11, 2001.
353. See CAMUS, supra note 351, at 198; ALBERT CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR
EXECUTIONERS (Dwight MacDonald trans., 1960) (1947).
354. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Behtle Vertag trans., 1981).
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support for uses of force. To accomplish this, the person against whom
the force is applied must be associated with evil. Media and many com-
mentators fall into the trap laid by leaders, using the label "genocidaire,"
"terrorist," or other villainous epithet to justify their own crimes against
humanity or terrorism.
An Infernal Dialectic
Both sides of most conflicts either try to hide or rationalize even
their own worst conduct as "legal" even though, if it were done to them,
they would consider it criminal. So, we see how easy it is to fall into
Albert Camus's
infernal dialectic that whatever kills one side kills the other too, each
blaming the other and justifying his violences by the opponent's vio-
lence. The eternal question as to who was first responsible loses all
meaning then .... [Can't we] at least ... refrain from what makes it
unforgivable-the murder of the innocent. 5
I trust that Albert Camus was right when he wrote that humanity gener-
ally does not want to be either victim or executioner, 356 but leaders often
manipulate their people to become both. When we participate in this
conduct or accept the role, however, no matter how lofty the claimed
end, we simply become executioners, oppressors, or slaughterers of
innocents. As Camus said in his Reflections on the Guillotine, "[even i]f
murder is in the nature of man, the law is not intended to reproduce that
nature. '357 But in this, we must still try to overcome, by rectifying
wrongs done in the past or currently being perpetrated, the tendency to
allow inertia or momentum to make executioners or victims of us all.358
Unfortunately, we are all caught up in this "infernal dialectic," this
horrible "death-dance," this "plague" which is a propensity to pestilence
and destruction that we try to hide. Thomas Merton, analyzing Camus's
The Plague, states the tendency beautifully:
It is the willful negation of life that is built into life itself: the human
instinct to dominate and to destroy ... to seek one's own happiness
by destroying the happiness of others, to build one's security on
power and, by extension, to justify evil use of that power in terms of
"history," or "the common good," or of "the revolution," or even of
"the justice of God."'35 9
355. Camus, supra note 351, at 135, 138.
356. CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS, supra note 353, at 27.
357. Camus, supra note 351, at 131, 135, 137, 174, 198; CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR
EXECUTIONERS supra note 353, at 27.
358. Camus, supra note 351, at 218.
359. THOMAS MERTON, The Plague of Albert Camus: A Commentary and Introduction, in THE
LITERARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 181-82 (Patrick Hart ed., 1981).
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Merton continues, noting that our drive to destroy, to kill, or simply
to dominate and to oppress derives, perhaps, from our alienation or the
"metaphysical void he experiences when [we find ourselves] a stranger
in [our] own universe. 360 Merton explains that we seek to make that
universe familiar by using it for selfish ends, but that these ends are
often capricious and ambivalent. 361 When a group is alienated and
manipulated, these ends usually become life denying, armored in legal-
ism and false theology, or perhaps even the naked language of brute
power.362 Thus, those who are oppressed, or are manipulated into
believing that they are, or those who believe insanely that they have a
divine right to destroy, act out with brute violence. Those who are
attacked will inevitably react with similar or worse violence.
All attempts (from either side) to make it appear acceptable through
obfuscation, secrecy and rhetoric, in the end, will be for naught. We
must stop participating in this
miasma of evil [being deluded by t]he self-assurance of those who
know all the answers in advance and who are convinced of their own
absolute and infallible correctness [which] sets the stage for war, pes-
tilence, famine, and other personages we prefer to leave unnoticed in
the pages of an apocalypse.363
This ignorance that Camus and Merton reject "prefers its own right-
ness to the values that are worth defending. Indeed it sacrifices those
values by its willingness to kill men in honor of its dogmatic self-idola-
try."' 3 64 "As long as one is content to justify one's existence by refer-
ence to these automatically accepted norms, one is in complicity with
the absurd, with a murderous society, with death, with 'the Plague.' 365
It is worth considering whether prosecution of perpetrators, especially
the leaders, is beneficial to escaping the cycle.
Do law and international law exacerbate or thwart influences?
Jean-Paul Sartre believed that law made things worse. He wrote:
A fine sight they are too, the believers in non-violence, saying
that they are neither executioners nor victims. Very well then; if
you're not a victim when the government which you've voted for,
when the army in which your younger brothers are serving without
hesitation or remorse have undertaken race murder, you are, without
a shadow of doubt, executioners .... 366
360. Id. at 221.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 181, 191.
364. Id. at 195.
365. Id. at 198.
366. Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 21 (1963).
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Try to understand this at any rate: if violence began this very
evening and if exploitation and oppression had never existed on the
earth, perhaps the slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But
if the whole regime, even your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by
a thousand year-old oppression, your passivity serves only to place
you in the ranks of the oppressors.3 67
Could it be true that even international law may be seen as fostering
oppression and violence? Indeed, when the law is appropriated and
abused it may do just that. And it is true that some oppressing nations
justify their conduct by claiming that it is consistent with international
law. Others simply suggest by their actions and their cynical excuses
that there is no international law. But the reality is that oppression vio-
lates international law, no matter what the excuse given and regardless
of whether some nations "get away with it" for a time.
As a means to break the yoke of oppression and terror, victims or
their leadership sometimes opt for violence. This, of course, is a per-
fectly legal form of self-defense. On the other hand, violent action
against other innocents is not self-defense. Still, many times when the
oppressed rise up, they do so in a way that causes them to become what
they hated in their oppressors. Lex talionis, "an eye for an eye" (as in
Exodus 21:24), calls for victims or the victims' proxies to carry out the
sanction against the victimizers. There are proper and improper sanc-
tions. The history of lex talionis is interesting and may provide impor-
tant insight into the "modern" sensed "need" to retaliate.
Self-Centered, Self-Justified, and Self-Serving "Self-Defense"
It was argued by the Reagan and Bush I administrations and resur-
rected by President George W. Bush against Iraq, that it is "justifiable
self-defense" to apply military force to preempt anticipated terrorist
activity or to retaliate against terrorists or against states that harbor,
finance, or train terrorists.368 In addition, abduction of "terrorists" or
even common criminals from abroad is claimed to be "justifiable self-
defense.'369 Thus, the bombing of Tripoli, including the targeting of
Qaddafi's family, was argued to be in "self-defense" and, although Qad-
367. Id.
368. See Seymour Hersh, Qaddaf! Targeted, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 22, 1987, at 5; RICHARD
FALK, REVOLUTIONARIES & FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM 73, 78, 123, 198 n.1
(1988) (pointing to over 100 civilian casualties in the attack on Qadaffi's compound).
369. See generally Oscar Schachter, Self-Judging Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
121 (1987); Abraham Soafer, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986, at A24; Abraham Soafer, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1986, at A14; John Walcott et al., Reagan Ruling to Let C.LA. Kidnap Terrorists
Overseas Is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 1; Ver Findlay, Abducting Terrorists
Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1988); U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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dafi was missed by the bombs, his adopted baby girl and at least a hun-
dred civilian casualties were not. 371 Moreover, it was argued that the
only judge of a self-defense claim is the claimant. Hence, a decision to
take such measures of "self-justified self-defense" becomes per se legal.
No other branch of government and certainly no other nation or institu-
tion may question it. Here, we find ourselves making the same tired
argument once again.
One obvious practical danger of this attitude of self-justification is
that other nations or groups may utilize it as well. President George W.
Bush in his State of the Union Message in January 2002 "warned" us all
about the "axis of evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Does this rhetoric
help or hurt? Could it prompt North Korea, or could China or Russia
"justify" a pre-emptive strike against the United States? Can groups that
consider themselves violated by the United States "justify" similar con-
duct through nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponry? If self-justifi-
cation replaces a neutral rule of law for self-defense, and the former is
elevated to the level of legality, there is no rule of law in any crucial
context. 3
7 I
Unfortunately, self-justification is popular today. A significant
danger of this concept of self-justifying self-defense is that it allows all
nations or groups to claim legality to any act that they wish to commit in
the name of "self-defense." If one has the power to succeed, one is
"justified." It is fearsome that this is the current view of international
law and self-defense held by many leaders in the world including leaders
of states or smaller groups. Another danger is what such a self-defining
vision of self-defense might do to democratic constitutional order. That
vision assumes a dangerous perception of the separation of powers tend-
ing toward accepting executive branch absolutism. We see this eroding
the idea of the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution. In the
United States, acceptance of abduction of criminals as a tool of law
enforcement is a good example. It is worth noting that much of the
abuse of the criminal justice system in the United States and elsewhere
today is based on a "war against terrorism," a "war on drugs," and a
"war against crime." Rhetorically placing a problem on a "war footing"
seems to fool the people into accepting draconian measures that erode
constitutional protections.
Self-justified self-defense is strikingly similar to the ancient Rus-
sian, then the former Soviet, the current Russian, and ancient Germanic
notions of "necessary defense." The ancient German concept of das
370. See Seymour Hersh, Quaddafi Targeted, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 22, 1987; FALK, supra
note 368, at 198, n.I.
371. Schachter, supra note 369, at 122-23.
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Recht combined with that of "necessary defense" (Notwehr),37 2 and the
Russian idea of the same notions (neobxodimaja oborona),373 provide
that any right or defendable interest, from life to personal honor,
receives the same degree of protection and privilege. The only question
is whether a right or interest is threatened. If one is threatened, good
social order is equally threatened. "Necessary defense," therefore, is
triggered. Any force necessary to prevent the invasion of the right or
interest, and the concomitant destruction of "good order" is justified.37 4
In both the German and Russian conceptualization of "necessary
defense" the ideas of "legal order" (die Rechtordnung) and social dan-
gerousness (and protivopravnost) identify "necessary defense" with pro-
tection of the legal order itself in its entirety.375 Thus, justification for
attacks on the Sudetenland, Poland, and the like at the beginning of
World War 1I, as well as the attempted "elimination" of many perceived
"threats" to the legal order, such as the Jewish population, the Roma,
"deviates," the insane or otherwise "mentally deficient," or similar ene-
mies of the Third Reich, were justified in the name of self-justified "nec-
essary defense. '376 The same thing has occurred in Stalinist Russia,
Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Tibet, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Congo,
Iraq, and more.
The policy of self-justified self-defense and the clich6 "one per-
son's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" '377 are really a propagandis-
tic appropriation of the law that actually should be allowed to condemn
terrorism in a principled and neutral way. What is occurring with regard
to terrorism and counterterrorism today seems almost analogous to the
increasingly popularized view of many private individuals, at least in the
United States domestic scene: Because many criminals are not caught or
punished, there is no effective criminal law; hence, resort to vigilante
justice and terrorism are promoted. Usually, it is the innocent minority
that suffers.
Nationalistic solutions to crimes against humanity assume that such
offenses are committed only by "the enemy." The enemy is painted as
fully evil; the solution is to eliminate the enemy. Obviously, when the
372. See former German Penal Code, StGB,53 (1986).
373. See former Penal Code Ugolovnyj Kodeks, R.S.F.S.R. 13.
374. See Fletcher, Proportionality supra note 210, at 123-27.
375. Id.
376. Dostoyefsky presents this with his usual genius through Raskolnikov's attempts to justify
his slaughter of the old malevolent pawnbroker, Aliona Ivanova, as a revolutionary blow against
capitalism and a call to destroy the Czarist rule in Russia. See generally FYODOR DosToYEFSKY,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1932); see also Thomas Franck & Scott Senecal, Porfiry's Proposition:
Legitimacy and Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 195, 197 (1987); Fletcher, Proportionality,
supra note 210, at 123-27.
377. See generally FALK, supra note 339, at 140.
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leaders of all sides to a conflict have that attitude and transfer that atti-
tude to their people, power is accepted as the only medium of interna-
tional relations. Sadly, most nations and groups in conflict take this
tack, and the rule of law and constitutional or human rights protections
are thrown aside.
Any Positive Strains of History?
For centuries, military commanders-from Henry V of England,
under his famous ordinances of war in 1419, to the United States mili-
tary prosecutions of soldiers involved in the My Lai massacre under the
United States Code of Military Justice, through the Ad Hoc Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda-have enforced such laws
against violators. In other cases, states have brought to trial captured
prisoners of war for offenses committed against the customary laws of
war. Thus, both the accused's own state and the captor state have stand-
ing to prosecute. None of these systems, however, functions with any
degree of efficiency.378
CONCLUSION
Behind you swiftly the figure comes softly,
The spot on your skin is a shocking disease.
Clutching a little case,
He walks briskly to infect a city
Whose terrible future may have just arrived...
True, those who allow, affirm, or acquiesce to oppressing others
and, of course, to the slaughter of innocents are truly on the side of the
executioners. Similarly, as Thomas Merton warns in his essay The
Plague of Albert Camus,38 ° and as Camus himself suggests in his novel
The Plague and in his essay L'Homme Revolti,38' revolution and "free-
dom fighting" are often used as "facile justification of mass murder." '382
Sartre was wrong to suggest that violence against non-combatants is jus-
tified. He believed that all those not engaged in fighting oppression
were enemies; hence, the equivalent of combatants or oppressors.
Camus was correct, on the other hand, to reject this Sartrean ethic to the
extent that it finds virtue in slaughtering innocents, even for a supposed
378. See TAYLOR, supra note 96, at 20; BLAKESLEY ET AL., CASES, supra note 6, at 1253-67.
379. W.H. AUDEN, GARE DU MIDI (1938).
380. MERTON, The Plague of Albert Camus, supra note 338, at 181.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 199 (asking "[c]an there be any historic action that does not eventually end in
mass murder?").
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just cause.3 83 One can defend and protect the innocents of the world
without destroying other innocents.
No doubt, Camus is correct that the established clichds or the
"ethic" of established order, or at least of those with power, are based
upon "values" that lead ultimately to a moral (and I would add, legal)
abyss. Obviously, this makes the abased or perverted values immoral
and illegal. Many with power who are trying to maintain or expand that
power, or those seeking power, apply an ideology based on demoniza-
tion and death. Thus, oppression and exploitation of human beings to
accommodate one's material interests, even if disguised in some high
sounding abstraction, are terroristic. Similarly, destruction of innocent
humanity to accomplish escape from oppression is terrorism.384 In the
end, self-justification and self-delusion work only to allow one's so-
called enemies to feel justified in their counter-vengeance. Oppression,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in kind counter-violence are of
a kind; they only continue the frightening cycle. We participate in this
tyranny of evil and death3"5 when we passively allow our government or
the leaders of our group to commit evil or bolster regimes or groups that
commit evil. Our obligation as human beings actually is to fight pas-
sionately to save the lives of all other human beings.386
Sartre was correct, but incomplete, in aphorizing that "once begun,
it [a war of national liberation] is a war that gives no quarter." '387 Killing
in war, sadly, is deemed by nations and other groups to be justifiable or
acceptable. This perception is especially troublesome when groups con-
sider themselves faced with an unending war. Thus, the seemingly eter-
nal war of the oppressed to escape oppression (or what is called
oppression) calls for destruction of the enemy so that one's own will not
be destroyed. We saw a "Crusade" against Islam during the Middle
Ages. Now we see the idea of a "Crusade" against Islam raised as a
"battle-flag" of vengeance to manipulate the manipulable to rise up in a
counter "Jihad." To counter that, President Bush called for his "War
against Terrorism," which he warns will be long-lasting and continual,
requiring all our devotion.388 Thus, it seems that we have an ongoing,
continual war against evil-doers (from both sides' points of view). What
383. Id. at 185, 194.
384. Id. at 181.
385. Id. at 182.
386. Id. at 186.
387. SARTRE, supra note 366, at 21.
388. David E. Sanger, Domestic Security Spending to Double Under Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES
NEWS SERV., Jan. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL-NYT 0202500118 ("President Bush said on
Thursday that he would propose doubling the amount the government spends on domestic security
next year to nearly $38 billion, saying the United States was 'still under attack' and would remain
on a war footing for a long time to come.").
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happens to our values, our human rights, and civil liberties? If we
remain in an emergency setting, what are we willing to accommodate?
Happily, the reality is that the actual rule of law proscribes such a
self-destructive and baleful approach to life, or governing, or death.
Some conduct still, even within war, and thus, afortiori during times of
relative peace, is not justifiable, legal, or acceptable. A fight for survival
or even one for gaining or retaining power may cause people to do
unspeakable things, but we must not justify or even accommodate this.
Thus, even if killing innocents is deemed effective to promote an end
considered by the actors to be good, even if it actually is an efficient
means to intimidate a government or dissident group, or to render a pop-
ulation insecure, it is not morally justified or legal. Unfortunately, gov-
ernments and revolutionaries alike, as well as most international-law
jurists and commentators, have not learned or have forgotten their essen-
tial and basic criminal law.389
Would that we have developed enough to transcend the extremes of
this need to propitiate the gods, but justice is required for real peace. At
least some culprits may now be preparing to meet a proper legal fate.
For example, Generalissimo Augusto Pinochet, although not extradited
to Spain by the United Kingdom, was held not to be immune from pros-
ecution both in the United Kingdom and in Chile.390 He may never
stand trial as there was a question about his competency a couple of
years ago. Spain and the United Kingdom have attempted or are
attempting to prosecute some Argentine and Chilean military officials
for their conduct during the dirty wars in Argentina. 39' Also, a "mixed
tribunal" (international and local) has been established for Sierra
Leone.392 Another may be established to prosecute some of the Khmer
389. See, e.g,. LAFAVE, supra note 212; BOYCE & PERKINS supra note 210, at 46-119; GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 235-391 (1978). Cf JOSEPH CONRAD, LORD JIM (1925);
JOSEPH CONRAD, THE HEART OF DARKNESS (1915); WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE SOUND AND THE
FURY (1929); WILLIAM FAULKNER, LIGHT IN AUGUST (1929); WILLIAM FAULKNER, SANCTUARY
(1931). All of this is discussed brilliantly in THOMAS MERTON, Faulkner and His Critics, in THE
LITERARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 117-23 (Patrick Hart ed., 1981). See also, Regina v.
Dudley & Stephens 14 Q.B. 273, 285-86 (1884); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 604 (2d ed. 1983);
JOHN SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, AND NECESSITY AND DURESS,
THE HAMLYN LECTURES (1989). On the moral problem of choosing one's victim, see Andrew
Ashworth, Justifications, Necessity, and the Choice of Evils, in PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
153-54 (3d ed. 1999).
390. See Blakesley, Autumn of the Patriarch, supra note 104, at 16-18.
391. See Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S.
Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 151-52, 176 (1997)
(explaining the collapse of judicial independence in Argentina, resulting in a highly politicized
judicial review which de facto always supported the actions of the executive branch).
392. See Michael Dynes, War Crimes Court Waits for Sierra Leone Poll, TIMES (LONDON),
May 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4207936; Anthony Goodman, Mixed Court Proposed to Try
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Rouge genocidaires.393
Pinochet and these other leaders, of course, have wanted immunity.
The United States' claim that to allow trials of its own for the violation
of international humanitarian law endangers peace is similarly spurious.
Whoever orders or participates in terrorism of any sort has committed an
ongoing crime. Those who have suffered the pain of terror, torture,
rape, and slaughter of loved ones will hold that pain within themselves.
They, and humanity, need catharsis, which prosecution may help pro-
vide. Whether a "peace" is imposed or not, someday, unless there is
justice, rage will fester and we will face the same problem again. Mercy
is also necessary in certain cases, but, as Aryeh Neier noted, mercy is
not possible if there is no possibility of punishment! 394 It is not true and
it is dangerous to suggest that somehow not punishing those who com-
mit atrocities lends itself to peace. By the same token, prosecuting or
punishing without being scrupulous in ensuring fairness and justice is
just as dangerous.
Are terrorism and the usual response to it of one cloth? They are
indeed, in at least one way. Simone Weil and Thomas Merton were not
far off in expressing this as they described a great beast, which is the
urge to collective power, "the grimmest of all the social realities .... 395
They said aptly that this lust for power is masked by the symbols of
"nationalism, fundamentalism, capitalism, fascism, [and] racism. ' 396 I
would add to that list that perversions of morality and perversion of
values like sovereignty, self-determination, and even democracy, cause
similar problems.3 97 Abusing people's sense of ethnicity and heritage,
by prompting fear that they are being destroyed, and by fostering insecu-
rity, leaders can cause their followers to do unspeakable acts. And, of
course, one must add to the list the perversion of national security,
Sierra Leone War Criminals, at http://www.my.aol.com/news/story/html#CYCLE (July 27,
2000); Tom Masland, "We Beat and Killed People... "; Leaders Gather at the U.N. This Week to
Discuss the World's Kids, Including Child Soldiers, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 13, 2002, at 24,
available at 2002 WL 7294190.
393. Hun Sen Accuses U.N. of Blocking Khmer Rouge Trial, ASIAN POL. NEWS, May 20, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 17029790; Cambodia's Hun Sen Lashes UN for Pulling Out of Khmer
Rouge Trial, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2406826; UN Not Needed
for Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Says Cambodia's Prime Minister, CANADIAN PRESS, May 14, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 21293642; U.N. Endorses Tribunal for Khmer Rouge War Crimes Trial, at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9903/06/cambodia.01 (Mar. 6, 1999).
394. Presentation by Aryeh Neier, Meeting of Experts, Association Int'l de Droit Pdnal,
December 4-8, 1994, Siracusa, Italy (on file with author). See also ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES:
BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998).
395. See THOMAS MERTON, The Answer of Minerva: Pacifism and Resistance in Simone Weil,
in MERTON, note 338, at 134, 138 (analyzing Simone Weil, The Power of Words, in SELECTED
ESSAYS 1934-1943 (1962)); see also SIMONE WEIL, A FELLOWSHIP OF LOVE 155-60 (1964).
396. MERTON, The Answer of Minerva, supra note 395, at 138.
397. See Ecclesiastes 1:2 (everything is-may be-vanity).
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which often is "a chimerical state of things in which one would keep for
oneself alone the power to make war while all other countries would be
unable to do so." '398 We must, individually and in our nations or groups,
explode the myths created and used to prompt us to violence. Other-
wise, terrorism and crimes against humanity will be the norm.
The conduct at the focus of this essay poses a vicious threat to
peace and human dignity. I believe, however, that the common person
may be capable of avoiding or overcoming the manipulation that
prompts participation. I believe that we human beings have a common
core of values on a few very basic points that are at the essence of our
common humanity, that allow us to recognize these crimes and to con-
demn them.399 We condemn them easily when these crimes are commit-
ted against us. We need to instill the vision and fortitude to recognize
and resist them when our leaders want to pursue that sort of conduct
against others.
Terrorism is condemned-it is criminal-whether committed by
states against their own inhabitants or extraterritorially. It is criminal
whether it is perpetrated by insurgents, even those struggling for inde-
pendence or freedom from oppression. I am not arguing for punishment
of states, nations, or groups for the commission of these offenses,
although this may sometimes be appropriate. My attention has been
aimed at the fact that individuals commit these offenses and cause their
people to commit them. Thus, individuals, even (or certainly) when
functioning in their official governmental capacity, are subject to law
and may be punished for committing or aiding and abetting the criminal
conduct analyzed herein. Impunity must be eliminated.
If prosecution is to occur, the elements of the offenses must be
clearly established. Thus, this criminal conduct we call terrorism should
include: (1) violence committed by any means; (2) causing death, great
398. MERTON, The Answer of Minerva, supra note 395, at 139 (quoting Simone Weil).
399. Cf Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets
Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 761 (1999).
The absence of a [complete] "common core" of values and legal norms, however,
should not be interpreted as lack of a common humanity but rather as recognition of
different normative values and possibly institutional processes. Moreover, a group's
identification of difference may serve to "'create' the community and 'create[ I' the
difference with the outside world." Such a process may be psychologically
necessary to counteract the perceived pressure to achieve cultural and legal
uniformity, as expressed through universal human rights standards.
Id.; See Laura Nader, Introduction to LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 1, 7-8 (1997); Mark Van
Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a
New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 495, 498, 536 (1998). Cf CONRAD,
THE HEART OF DARKNESS, supra 389; CONRAD, LORD JIM, supra note 389; FAULKNER, THE
SOUND AND THE FURY, supra note 389; FAULKNER, LIGHT IN AUGUST, supra note 389; FAULKNER,
SANCTUARY, supra note 389.
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bodily harm, or serious property damage; (3) to innocent individuals; (4)
with the intent to cause those consequences or with wanton disregard for
those consequences; (and for the purpose of coercing or intimidating
some specific group, or government, or otherwise to gain some per-
ceived political, military, or other philosophical benefit); (5) without jus-
tification or excuse. During legitimate conflict, some innocents will be
killed or injured, but this is not criminal if it was unavoidable and pro-
portionate to legitimate self-defense.
Procedural and other human rights protections for victims and the
accused must be clarified and vigorously maintained. To date, no trea-
ties have done this. Perhaps customary international law and jus cogens
principles, as manifest in the domestic laws of virtually all nations, pro-
vide the needed clarity and specificity. The penal codes of all nations
and the customary rules of groups everywhere condemn intentional kill-
ing or maiming without justification or excuse. Even those nations or
groups that claim some privilege, justification, or excuse to commit such
conduct, find it criminal when committed by others against them!
An example from the human rights arena may illustrate. Groups
that commit female genital mutilation justify it on cultural or even relig-
ious grounds. Suppose, however, that a group of women from another
culture (or even from their own) captured men from the group that com-
mits genital mutilation. Now suppose that the capturing group of
women apply genital mutilation on the captured men, claiming some
justification or excuse. Does anyone have any doubt that the captured
men and the official hierarchy of their group or nation would claim that
the mutilation was criminal? So it is with a common core of crimes that
can be established by looking to the basic principles of nations; that
conduct which is deemed criminal when committed against that nation
may well be universally criminal. These crimes will essentially be those
that impact on our personal autonomy and the integrity or autonomy of
our group. This is true, regardless of whether nations commit this con-
duct against others. Thus, the evidence of the universal condemnation
of these offenses is found in the complex of international custom, trea-
ties, and jus cogens principles arising out of custom and domestic sub-
stantive criminal law. The excuses and reasons given by apologists for
those who commit these atrocities ring hollow, but frighteningly famil-
iar. They should remind us of Milton's poignant warning: "So spake the
Fiend, and with necessity, The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish
deeds. "400
Care must be taken to ensure that international and domestic action
400. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. 4 (emphasis added), lines 393-94; see also CONRAD,
LORD JIM, supra note 389, at 86, 95, 357, 367; CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, supra note 389.
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taken to obtain justice and to prosecute perpetrators does not fall into the
same trap that ensnared those who committed the crimes. If we allow
ourselves to descend to simple vengeance, we are lost.
